Verification, Implementation and Compliance

Thank you for having the interest in a major topic...

2009-04-09T20:39:00.000+01:00

Thank you for having the interest in a major topic of my research and a piece of my IAEA CV.

You will need to read Fischer's and G. Stein's paper slightly in more detail to catch some nuances and reference other sources to correct the statement "Presently, there are about thirteen inspections per year at a typical uranium enrichment facility. Once a year, the physical inventory is audited by IAEA inspectors through a so-called "physical inventory verification". In addition, monthly routine inspections are conducted to verify material flow. These inspections, called LFUAs have an element of unpredictability."

Please note:
1) PIV is annual physical inventory - yes this is correct.
2) HSP proscribed the monthly interim inspections for flow verification. They are routine and scheduled..they have nothing to do with the cascade halls.
3) LFUA is 4-12 times a year and are random and short notice with the operator having 2 hours to let the inspectors in the cascade...they are not concerned with the material flows but undeclared HEU production by reconfiguring the cascades. Env. Samples complicate the proliferator's task as the IAEA can pick up HEU particles from swipes in the cascade hall durnig LFUAs.
NOTE: The operator MAY ask the inspectors after completing LFUA to inspect some product cylinders so that he may ship them out ASAP.

Hence, monthly inspections under HSP have no "element of unpredictability". They are scheduled.

The IAEA wants to move beyond this with the so-called "Mailbox" that is combined with short notice inspections so that there is always a chance during the year for the material flows to be inspected in the same manner that the cascade halls can be inspected in the LFUA process.

Hence, one can see the gaps in detecting undeclared NU feed...and the consequent undeclared LEU product and DU tails that could be concealed in a diversion scheme of LEU product for a clandestine facility.

See
http://web.mit.edu/stgs/pdfs/Friend%20-%20Urenco%27s%20Views%20on%20International%20Safeguards%20Inspection.pdf

for a pertinent reference and 3 other references in the bibliography in that paper that clear up ambiguities.

sincerely,
Brian D. Boyer
Nonproliferation Team Leader/ Proj. Leader Int'l Safeguards
Nuclear Nonproliferation Division
N-4, Safeguards & Security Group
Los Alamos National Laboratory
(IAEA Safeguards Inspector, SGOC 1997-2001, IAEA Safeguards Analyst SGCP, 2001-2002 - did inspections at Capenhurst, Gronau and Almelo URENCO sites - 1998-2001)

Scott Ritter contends that Iran's domesticly produ...

2009-03-03T02:46:00.000Z

Scott Ritter contends that Iran's domesticly produced U308 is contaminated with molybdenum; that Iran doesn't possess the technology to remove it; that domestically sourced UF6 would destroy the cascade if they ever tried to feed it in. Is this still the case, or have they developed the technology now to remove the contaminant?

Also, 90+% enrichment seems to be a lot higher goal than the current 3.5% - it seems that given how long its taken them to get to this point, that it would take much longer to get to highly enriched uranium?

Nice post.
Lidar mapping services

Hairs. Thanks for your explanation. I've followed ...

2008-10-10T12:55:00.000+01:00

Hairs. Thanks for your explanation. I've followed up with one of our advisors today, and this guy is as skeptical as you and I to the C-14 story. I have understood that it is difficult to remove all traces of C-14 from the graphite. And as you point out, the absence of significant quantities of C-14 would most likely indicate that the graphite hasn't been irradiated. No surprises there.

Seriously, there are many Russian irons in the fir...

2008-10-10T12:03:00.000+01:00

Seriously, there are many Russian irons in the fire at the moment. The Al-6000 series matchup (Libya & DPRK) and now this ... so much smoke and mirrors at the moment.

Andy. Yes it is, posted on ACW first by an unknown...

2008-10-10T11:57:00.000+01:00

Andy. Yes it is, posted on ACW first by an unknown but very talented artist.

As for the Agency, there is less than a dozen people working on the Syria gig at the moment. Information is very rare - and they're a tight group.

But yes, it would seem like some people at the Agency believes that there was 'reactor-grade' graphite present at Al-Kibar.

There could indeed be a fire here, but we also hav...

2008-10-10T11:51:00.000+01:00

There could indeed be a fire here, but we also have to recognise that any Russian scientist operating alone to assist an Islamic regime acquire such sensitive capabilities is playing with the mother of all fires with his political masters and their intelligence services. The Russian strategy with the Iranians has been to play close but not to too close - they have at least as much interest as anyone to prevent Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and destablising central Asia.

That's a cool picture - is that a google sketchup ...

2008-10-09T15:32:00.000+01:00

That's a cool picture - is that a google sketchup rendering?

Also, I'm not quite clear what you're saying in this post - is it that these sources at the IAEA think there was "reactor-grade" graphite at al kibar?

Andreas,

Carbon 14 does indeed exist in tra...

2008-10-09T14:47:00.000+01:00

Andreas,

Carbon 14 does indeed exist in trace quantities in nature, but most of it is produced in the upper atmosphere by nitrogen 14 absorbing thermal neutrons (the neutrons are generate by cosmic ray collisions with the atmosphere). Since C 14 decays with a half life of about 5,700 years this means that there will be some equilibrium between what is produced up in the atmosphere (and which subsequently forms compunds such as carbon dioxide, to be taken up by plants or dissolve in the oceans) and what decays. Thus we have - or had - a fairly constant trace quantity of C 14 around us.

In reality the cosmic ray flux varies, as does the earth's magnetic field, which provides a small degree of protection from cosmic rays, thus the equilibrium level of C 14 actually varies slightly over the centuries. It is this variation, as well as the inherent difficulties of measuring trace quantities, that causes the uncertainty in C 14 dating. As you say, human nuclear activities, especially atmospheric weapons testing, generated big increases in atmospheric C 14, and these spikes can be used for checking ages based on body carbon.

Getting back to what you really want to know, I think your source IS somewhat confused. Nuclear grade graphite IS made by the process you describe, and since the raw material (pitch, which ultimately derives from oil) has been underground for millions of years it is obvious that it should be very low in C 14. Of course, extracting the oil may add some more recent C 14, for example the ethanol in ethanolamines used by the production process, but generally oil and its products are very low in C 14. Consequently nuclear grade graphite can be expected to be almost pure C 12.

As for the reference to the calcining process, I really don't understand that. Calcining is not much more than just heating the pitch in an inert atmosphere in order to drive off all the other hydrocarbons present - like heating coal to produce coke (the solid remainder) and "town gas" (that rather nasty brew of CO and hydrocarbons that people used for suicide attempts before we changed to natural gas, LPG, etc). There is nothing in the calcining process that is remotely energetic enough to affect the nuclear properties of C 14, or to somehow destroy the C 14.

If (almost) pure C 12 is used in a nuclear reactor then the thermal neutrons in the core very rapidly create C 14. Thus if the IAEA have found samples of graphite which are very low in C 14 then that on its own doesn't (to me, at least) prove that they have found reactor grade graphite; they have only found graphite manufactured from an ancient source of carbon. On the other hand, if they find a graphite sample that is very rich in C 14, and particularly if its crystal structure is damaged in the "right" way (neutron irradiation causes characteristic dislocations in the graphite crystals) then there's a good chance they've found graphite that was once part of an OPERATIONAL recator.

One last point, materials containing different isotopes generally have lower coefficients of thermal conductivity than isotopically pure materials. Hence the thermal characterisitics of a reactor made with pure C 12 graphite are initially slightly better than one containing C 14 (e.g. if the carbon source for the graphite were, say, sugar!). More importantly, the neutronics of pure C 12 graphite are much better than graphite containing C 14, which makes it easier to handle / model start-up criticality and loading pattern calculations. Of course, once your reactor gets going you can't avoid C 14 production, with consequent effects on moderation, but it's still nice to start with (almost) pure C 12 if you can!

Overall, then, core designers like to use graphite that is very low in C 14. But since ANY graphite produced from fossil fuels will be naturally low in C 14, the finding of "low C 14 graphite" proves only that it came from fossil materials (which is true of most electro graphites).

Hairs

P.S. Possibly your source is confusing the effect of calcining on C 14 with its effect on chemical impurities. As mentioned, calcining is intended to drive off all but the heaviest hydrocarbons, so some contaminants such as sulphur are reduced by calcining.

Andreas - This is a very useful discussion and sum...

2008-10-03T05:14:00.000+01:00

Andreas - This is a very useful discussion and summary of the problem. But isn't the problem resolved by doing two things:
1. All NWS, including India, must place all reactors under permanent IAEA safeguards to verify non-diversion
2. All spent fuel produced remains under permanent safeguards to ensure civilian use
I believe the Japanese working paper on the FMCT at the CD in 2006 had some ideas along these lines.

Well, I happen to be quite familiar with the law o...

2008-05-03T10:55:00.000+01:00

Well, I happen to be quite familiar with the law on this point, and I note that Iran has abided by the elements of "compliance" as defined in Article XIIc of the IAEA Statute, as well as Article 19 of its safeguards agreement, since the IAEA has repeatedly stated that Iran has not diverted nuclear material for nonpeaceful uses.
I wish people who claim to be lawyers would do a better job and they would not confuse a safeguards breach (which has been remedied) with noncompliance as defined by the IAEA Statute.

Furthermore, Iran's right to nuclear technology is not dependent on the NPT at all. The NPT merely recognized the pre-existing right of all nations -- Iran, Pakistan, the US, China -- to nuclear technology. It did not "give" Iran that right. It is a sovereign right (which is why non-npt signatories quite legally have nuclear programs) and when UNSC resolutions conflict with such rights protected as element of jus cogens, then the UNSC resolutions are ultra vires and invalid.

Nope, the bottom line is that the DCM-14 is pretty...

2008-04-24T23:05:00.000+01:00

Nope, the bottom line is that the DCM-14 is pretty awesome. I will follow up with some more technical specs whenever I find time.

The suggestion in your post that the Feb 2008 IAEA...

2008-04-24T19:21:00.000+01:00

The suggestion in your post that the Feb 2008 IAEA report that quite specifically declared all outstanding issues with Iran as being resolved, and your conclusion safeguards are "not going to solve any underlying problems" anyway, only vindicates the Iranian view that no amount of verification and transparency by them will ever suffice to satisfy what are essentially politicall-motivated charges that have no real relationship to any legitimate non-proliferation concerns. No matter what Iran does, the goal posts will keep moving, and whatever it has done will be declared as being insufficient.

And btw, the article itself concludes that "the si...

2008-04-24T17:24:00.000+01:00

And btw, the article itself concludes that "the silos provide Iran with the ability to launch a potential retaliatory strike against aggressors" -- how is that "offensive"??

Even assuming that the speculation about the missi...

2008-04-24T17:18:00.000+01:00

Even assuming that the speculation about the missile intended to be used in the silos -- if they are in fact silos -- is correct, on what basis do you assume that they're "offensive" rather than "defensive"??

And silos for conventional weapons make perfect sense for a country that is constantly threatened with being bombed (and further suggest a defensive nature.)

I think you missed the point of the Iranianswere t...

2008-04-24T16:57:00.000+01:00

I think you missed the point of the Iranianswere telling you. When they complain about their treatment after implementing the AP and when they tell you that too much transparency can work against them, they're telling you is that they don't trust that the AP and other transparency measures will be enforced in a good faith manner

Considering the blatant breach of the Paris Agreement by the EU-3, and the explicit statements by the Bush administration that Iran is not even to have the "knowledge" of nuclear enrichment (with or without the AP) AND considering how they've been denying access to civilian nuclear technology which they were entitled to have, then they have a point.

So the bottom line is that Iran is being monitored...

2008-04-24T16:49:00.000+01:00

So the bottom line is that Iran is being monitored by the IAEA as with any other country.

Yep. The guy was more or less identical to O'Reill...

2008-04-09T09:28:00.000+01:00

Yep. The guy was more or less identical to O'Reilly, who isn't really a journalist. There are lots of serious journalists around, you know. I know many, and even have some in the family. In my mind, there is nothing wrong with craftsmen and women who comply with their professional standards and ethics.

PressTV's treatment of you sounds as unprofess...

2008-04-09T01:20:00.000+01:00

PressTV's treatment of you sounds as unprofessional as much American TV interviews & commentary (O'Reilley, Hardball, etc.). Except it's a brand new media outlet and is inexperienced. Hope they improve & become more professional.

But, on the whole, journalism is a disreputable occupation, only only one notch above prostitution (in my judgment).

Chris Gelkin, my quick response is that you ought ...

2008-03-17T10:26:00.000Z

Chris Gelkin, my quick response is that you ought to familiarize yourself with the IAEA Statute, which describes the authorities of the IAEA and circumstances under which the Agency's Board of Governors (BoG) can refer noncompliant States to the UN Security Council, for sanctions and other forms of enforcement. It would also behoove you to read the text of Iran's comprehensive safeguards agreement, part of which reiterates the Agency and BoG's authorities. There are clear legal rationales for the Security Council sanctions, and non-lawyers (especially dumb ones like me) are capable of understanding these rationales. But you yourself must put in the effort for such understanding.

Finally, you might want to familiarize your self with the IAEA's safeguards glossary, which does a better (albeit still imperfect) job at translating IAEA legalese into something resemling clear Anglo-Saxon English. Really, this is a most helpful document.

Masoud, carefully re-read (or perhaps carefully read?) the IAEA Director General's most recent report on Iran ongoing noncompliance. Yes, the IAEA has received not unsatisfactory explanations for many outstanding issues, but Iran doesn't yet have a clean bill of nuclear health, so to speak. Iran remains in noncompliance.

Masoud,

Sorry for not replying. It is not m...

2008-03-17T09:57:00.000Z

Masoud,

Sorry for not replying. It is not malice, I've just been very busy since returning from Iran. The "load of crap" was that the host started to read from a paper, "qouting" the NPT saying that the sanctions instrument was ruled out. So, where in the NPT is that written? Not in article IV.2, that's for sure.

As for deleted comments. I've not deleted anything, and am the only one with administrative rights. I did prohibit anon comments though, just in case soemone started to thread on the limits of what's permissable.

I'm not even approving stuff. So, comment away.

ahem.........by 'chris' i mean 'Robert'.

2008-03-17T03:54:00.000Z

ahem.........by 'chris' i mean 'Robert'.

Chris,

I don't understand why anyone would ...

2008-03-17T03:53:00.000Z

Chris,

I don't understand why anyone would in 2008 be referring to a report published three years ago. Section two doesn't seem to make any special distinction for countries in 'non-compliance'(in this case, declaration of certain activities not occurring soon enough before they were actually taking place). In any case,El Baradei's report last month that all IAEA issues with Iran had been resolved.

Chris,

This will be the second time I am po...

2008-03-17T03:39:00.000Z

Chris,

This will be the second time I am posting this point.

Article IV:
..

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.

Section two of article 4 would seems to prohibit sanctions targeted at halting the nuclear development of member countries of the treaty. If that's crap,I think an explanation for those of us who aren't serving members of the International Law Association would be nice. Or someone could just delete these comments again.

Chris Gelkin and Masoud, I believe that you're bot...

2008-03-17T00:49:00.000Z

Chris Gelkin and Masoud, I believe that you're both severely misreading what Andreas Persbo wrote.

The "load of crap" to which Mr. Persbo refers, I presume, is the PressTV host's surreal claim, which is essentially this: That the NPT prohibits any sanctions against Iran by the UN Security Council, even despite the fact that, after two years of IAEA safeguards and verifications activities, the IAEA Board of Governors in 2005 found Iran to be in noncompliance with its Article III-required IAEA safeguards obligations and responsibilities.

Verification, Implementation and Compliance

Thank you for having the interest in a major topic...

Scott Ritter contends that Iran's domesticly produ...

Nice post.Lidar mapping services

Hairs. Thanks for your explanation. I've followed ...

Seriously, there are many Russian irons in the fir...

Andy. Yes it is, posted on ACW first by an unknown...

There could indeed be a fire here, but we also hav...

That's a cool picture - is that a google sketchup ...

Andreas,Carbon 14 does indeed exist in tra...

Andreas - This is a very useful discussion and sum...

Well, I happen to be quite familiar with the law o...

Nope, the bottom line is that the DCM-14 is pretty...

The suggestion in your post that the Feb 2008 IAEA...

And btw, the article itself concludes that "the si...

Even assuming that the speculation about the missi...

I think you missed the point of the Iranianswere t...

So the bottom line is that Iran is being monitored...

Yep. The guy was more or less identical to O'Reill...

PressTV's treatment of you sounds as unprofess...

Chris Gelkin, my quick response is that you ought ...

Masoud,Sorry for not replying. It is not m...

ahem.........by 'chris' i mean 'Robert'.

Chris,I don't understand why anyone would ...

Chris,This will be the second time I am po...

Chris Gelkin and Masoud, I believe that you're bot...

Nice post.
Lidar mapping services

Andreas,

Carbon 14 does indeed exist in tra...

Masoud,

Sorry for not replying. It is not m...

Chris,

I don't understand why anyone would ...

Chris,

This will be the second time I am po...