Thank you for having the interest in a major topic...

2009-04-09T20:39:00.000+01:00

Thank you for having the interest in a major topic of my research and a piece of my IAEA CV.

You will need to read Fischer's and G. Stein's paper slightly in more detail to catch some nuances and reference other sources to correct the statement "Presently, there are about thirteen inspections per year at a typical uranium enrichment facility. Once a year, the physical inventory is audited by IAEA inspectors through a so-called "physical inventory verification". In addition, monthly routine inspections are conducted to verify material flow. These inspections, called LFUAs have an element of unpredictability."

Please note:
1) PIV is annual physical inventory - yes this is correct.
2) HSP proscribed the monthly interim inspections for flow verification. They are routine and scheduled..they have nothing to do with the cascade halls.
3) LFUA is 4-12 times a year and are random and short notice with the operator having 2 hours to let the inspectors in the cascade...they are not concerned with the material flows but undeclared HEU production by reconfiguring the cascades. Env. Samples complicate the proliferator's task as the IAEA can pick up HEU particles from swipes in the cascade hall durnig LFUAs.
NOTE: The operator MAY ask the inspectors after completing LFUA to inspect some product cylinders so that he may ship them out ASAP.

Hence, monthly inspections under HSP have no "element of unpredictability". They are scheduled.

The IAEA wants to move beyond this with the so-called "Mailbox" that is combined with short notice inspections so that there is always a chance during the year for the material flows to be inspected in the same manner that the cascade halls can be inspected in the LFUA process.

Hence, one can see the gaps in detecting undeclared NU feed...and the consequent undeclared LEU product and DU tails that could be concealed in a diversion scheme of LEU product for a clandestine facility.

See
http://web.mit.edu/stgs/pdfs/Friend%20-%20Urenco%27s%20Views%20on%20International%20Safeguards%20Inspection.pdf

for a pertinent reference and 3 other references in the bibliography in that paper that clear up ambiguities.

sincerely,
Brian D. Boyer
Nonproliferation Team Leader/ Proj. Leader Int'l Safeguards
Nuclear Nonproliferation Division
N-4, Safeguards & Security Group
Los Alamos National Laboratory
(IAEA Safeguards Inspector, SGOC 1997-2001, IAEA Safeguards Analyst SGCP, 2001-2002 - did inspections at Capenhurst, Gronau and Almelo URENCO sites - 1998-2001)

Comments on Verification, Implementation and Compliance: A new safeguards approach for enrichment plants

Thank you for having the interest in a major topic...