Gary Samore today visited the IISS where he gave a spirited and forceful talk on the Obama Administration's priorities over the coming year. I'll try to type up my notes in a way that doesn't completely distort everything he said.
A began by stating an underlying assumption that is today guiding White House policy on non-proliferation and disarmament. Namely that proper containment of states wanting to cheat on their obligations under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty cannot be attained unless the regime is strengthened. The belief of the Administration is also that once the regime is shored up, it will be easier to deter or contain future cheaters.
Mr. Samore had already outlined some of the Administration's tactical objectives in this respect at a luncheon hosted by the Arms Control Association. They are well known:
- Ensuring CTBT ratification;
- Support negotiations on a verifiable FMCT; and
- Getting a new START agreed.
He said that there was a "reasonably good chance" to get agreement with the Russian Federation on START before it expires in December 2009. This agreement would be facilitated by a common understanding on ballistic missile defence. To that end, the US and Russia have started on a joint assessment of Iran's ballistic missile threat. Mr. Samore noted that Iran had shown increased capabilities in this area recently, and this was a cause for US concern. He felt that there were four major problems in US-Russian negotiations at present:
- Missile defence (especially the issue of the third site).
- US plans to put conventional warheads on ballistic missiles.
- Coming up with a number of delivery vehicles that does not require Russia to produce more missiles, or the United States to destroy many of theirs.
- Agreement on a verification protocol.
On verification he said that he did not believe that the old START verification procedure needed to be preserved in its entirety. However, a reduced, yet credible, verification system needed to be produced. This would take a lot of difficult, technical, work, and he foresaw many meetings of US-Russian technical working-groups in the months ahead.
Mr. Samore said that the really difficult task will be to agree on deeper cuts. Here, the Russians want to discuss the US strategic reserve forces, and the US wants to address Russian tactical nuclear weapons. As the two sides move to lower numbers, he anticipated that missile defence would be a problematic nut to crack.
He said that it would be easier to get agreement amongst the parties to the NPT on stronger non-proliferation measures if the US and Russia, as the holders of the largest nuclear arsenals, supports nuclear disarmament. There has been a plethora of ideas on how to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, many developed in the UK and France, and the key now was to formulate them in a concrete way, and to get them supported by the NPT membership. On withdrawal, in particular, the US would explore the possibility to get the UN Security Council to agree language by way of binding resolution, in a similar fashion as under UNSCR 1373 and 1540.
Many of the proposals that Mr. Samore referred to stems from the discovery of Iran's clandestine nuclear programme, and the country's subsequent reluctance to cooperate with the IAEA and the UN Security Council. Not surprisingly, therefore, Iran featured heavily in the question and answer session. Asked about the prospect of direct negotiations with Iran in 2009, Mr. Samore answered that negotiations were not possible until the domestic situation in Iran had settled somewhat. However, the Iranian government should know that if no progress on the nuclear issue has been made until January 2010, the US would seek stronger action from the UN Security Council. Adding that Russia felt more comfortable with the US, and that Europe felt upset about the political repression in Iran, Mr. Samore felt that getting consensus on stronger actions against the country would be comparably easy.
The DPRK also featured in questions and answers. Mr. Samore said that the question of uranium enrichment was now firmly on the US agenda and that talks, when resumed needed to address this. There were "so many unknowns", he said, "which needs addressing". He felt, though, that the DPRK now wanted to reduce tensions with the rest of the six parties. He did not see a "big deal" in the DPRK's 4 July 2009 "shooting of a few missiles".
Mr. Samore recognized that many developing nations might not support these initiatives unless their right to develop a nuclear fuel cycle was assured. He felt, thought, that it would be possible to support growth in the nuclear industry without spreading sensitive technology. The key was to set up fuel centres, such as the Russian Federation's fuel centre in Angarsk, and a framework for assured supply of nuclear fuel.
Finally, he addressed the question of the IAEA. He said that the White House had welcomed the election of Japanese Ambassador Amano to the Director-Generalship, and that the US is now proposing an eight per cent increase in the IAEA's budget. He added that there was European resistance to this, in his mind, moderate proposal. He emphasized that the IAEA will get these funds if they commit to efforts to make their management structures more efficient.
He also encouraged the IAEA to use more of the authority that they already have, by for instance pushing for special inspections in Syria.
All in all, an interesting afternoon. And I did enjoy lunch.
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