Welcome to Vitaly

Vitaly Fedchenko of SIPRI has accepted to join us, and has already written an excellent post about Julian Whichello's team's effort to devise 'novel' safeguards technologies. Comments are back up, now subject to moderation. Keep it civil folks.

And welcome to Vitaly!

DPRK declaration verification and the Star Trek tricorders

The August 2008 issue of Jane’s Intelligence Review has an article by James Acton, “Definitely, maybe – Verifying North Korean denuclearization”. (What is this they are fond of at JIR, Oasis, or romantic comedy films or good old Soviet sci-fi? ).

Like everything James writes, the article is good and worth reading.

I would like to second one particular point that James has made:

«In the long term, determining the extent of the North Korean enrichment programme, if it exists, could prove remarkably difficult. […] Such a determination is problematic since clandestine centrifuge programmes are notoriously hard to detect. A centrifuge plant capable of producing sufficient HEU for one nuclear weapon a year would be relatively small; about the same size as a typical supermarket. Unlike reactors or reprocessing plants, centrifuge facilities have few distinctive external features and those that exist, such as cylinders for storing uranium hexafluoride, can be easily hidden. Their power requirements are very modest and, if operated efficiently, their environmental emissions are almost negligible and only detectable within a few kilometres of the plant».

That's true for the technologies and equipment that are out there at the moment. But what about future ones? Verification technologies are being developed all the time in various frameworks, such as CTBT, «national technical means», and the IAEA.

Let's take safeguards as an example. Not only safeguards themselves evolve over the years (discoveries in the DPRK and Iraq in early 1990s, «93+2» program, Additional Protocols and so on), the equipment and technologies for safeguards implementation are being advanced as well, of course.

The IAEA differs between three types of technologies it is using for safeguards purposes:

1. «Traditional» technologies – i.e. technologies used for good old verification of declared activities in declared locations, for instance, on-site verification activities and unattended monitoring to ensure continuity of knowledge between inspection visits.
2. «New technologies» are defined as «those for which the methodology is already understood and implemented bythe IAEA for safeguards applications». These technologies, for instance, ground penetrating radar, are used for verification of undeclared activities in declared locations, alongside with environmental sampling, information analysis, illicit trafficking monitoring, and satellite imagery analysis.
3. «Novel technologies» have not been applied previously to safeguards applications. Once developed, they are supposed to be used for verification of undeclared activities in undeclared locations. (In other words, thay are supposed to look for the famous Rumsfeld's «unknown unknowns»).

Since 2005 the IAEA's Department of Safeguards has a Novel Technologies Program (or, more formally, Novel Techniques and Instruments for Detection of Undeclared Nuclear Materials and Activities project) headed by the eloquent and witty Julian Whichello. I have heard him and Andrew Monteith (from the same unit) presenting at the ESARDA Working Group on Verification Technologies and Methodologies during the 30th ESARDA Annual Meeting in May this year.

If I got the story right, they have discussed with many inspectors at the Department, what improvements would they want to have introduced into all that safeguards equipment currently in use by the Agency. Turns out, the perfect safeguards tool would be … well… a Star Trek tricorder! Indeed, you only need one not-so-heavy gadget, which you can point at something and with a push of a button your verification results are in.

But since tricorders are unavailable at the moment, the Novel Technologies Program had to look into providing better safeguards tools in a more complicated way. They decided that they should:

«…review indicators and compile signatures for all critical NFC activities, identify those with the most promise for detection, particularly at a distance, and perform a gap analysis to identify suitable methodologies or instruments for safeguards applications. If it is determined that a suitable methodology or instrument does not exist, then the Project, with the support of Member States, will pursue the required development and testing that will result in a safeguards-appropriate solution».

The Novel Technologies Program works through the Member State Support Programme (MSSP) system. It seems that they currently work on the following:

1. Conducting laboratory and on-site forensic analysis of a location’s past nuclear activities. If a building was subjected to radiation in the past, the radiation-induced «signatures» may be left in the construction materials. Technique called optically stimulated luminescence (OSL) may be used to reveal those «signatures».
2. On-site forensic analysis of found materials. If inspection encounters material of possible interest, its composition may be determined by laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS).
3. Near-site sampling of airborne materials. If there is indeed an undeclared nuclear fuel cycle activity going on at the undeclared site, characteristic gaseous compounds may emanate into the atmosphere. It may be possible to detect them with Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) techniques. Alternatively, one could be taking samples of atmospheric gases in order to analyze them later in the lab.

(I have a feeling that I will be looking into these and other verification technologies in much more detail, so perhaps some more blogging on verification gadgets will follow).

I do not know if these or other «novel» technologies would be available in time for verification of the DPRK declaration (whoever does it). I just think that the DPRK situation has once again illustrated three things:

1. Technologies to verify undeclared activities at undeclared locations are needed, especially those designed for detection at a distance, such as the wide-area environmental sampling (WAES).
2. Such technologies are not really available at the moment.
3. Thus, more resources should be dedicated to their development.

The Road to Semipalantinsk

The CTBTO sent out this press-release today. The organization is definitely gearing up for this extremely ambitious enterprise.

Vienna, 21 August 2008: The final preparations for the largest and most ambitious-ever inspection exercise of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) are under way. The so-called “Integrated Field Exercise 2008” or IFE08 will take place during the whole month of September 2008 in Semipalatinsk, the former Soviet Union nuclear test site in Kazakhstan.

“What counts is to show the world that the CTBT’s verification system really works,” CTBTO’s Executive Secretary, Tibor Tóth, said in a comment. “The Integrated Field Exercise is a major priority for us in 2008. It’s important for preparing for the entry into force of the CTBT.”

The Largest Exercise Undertaken by the CTBTO
The exercise is unprecedented in scope and size, with over 200 participants, consisting of an international inspection team of 40 inspectors, the Kazakh hosts, an evaluation team, observers and an operation support centre in Vienna. Additionally, almost 50 tonnes of equipment, or six truckloads, are being flown to Kazakhstan. An advance team will shortly be setting up base in Semipalatinsk, one of the most remote places in the world, preparing the grounds for the main inspection team and the equipment to arrive. For all its scale and complexity, this exercise will bear greater resemblance to a humanitarian aid operation than an inspection under a non-proliferation Treaty regime.

“The former Soviet nuclear testing site of Semipalatinsk, where 456 nuclear explosions were carried out between 1949 and 1989, is an ideal site for conducting the exercise,” explained Mr. Boris Kvok, the Director in charge of on-site inspections (OSI). “Its features such as radioactivity or boreholes make it an ideal location for our experts. As foreseen by the Treaty, the area to be searched for signs of a recent nuclear explosion will be limited to 1,000 square kilometres,” he added.

On-Site Inspections: The Ultimate Verification Measure
An OSI is the ultimate verification measure of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which bans all nuclear explosions on Earth. For on-site inspections to be fully operational once the Treaty enters into force, all procedures and methods developed for such inspections have to be applied on an experimental basis and equipment has to be tested.

The IFE08 is the first comprehensive OSI exercise to encompass all elements of a nuclear test detection, from the first suspicious-looking seismic wave appearing on the screens of the CTBTO’s International Data Centre (IDC) in Vienna to the final verdict presented in the inspection report. It will therefore start with a week of activities in Vienna at the end of August before moving on to the actual field mission in Kazakhstan.

On site, the inspectors have a wide range of state-of-the-art technical methods at their disposal to detect signs of a nuclear explosion, some of which are applied from helicopters. These techniques include: multi-spectral imaging, gamma radiation monitoring, seismic monitoring of aftershocks, magnetic and gravitational field mapping, ground penetrating radar and many more.

The CTBTO is very grateful to Kazakhstan for hosting the exercise as well as to the European Union for providing financial assistance.

Our contact at the PTS e-mailed the following to Oliver and I yesterday. We're getting our tickets home by a 'Kazakh gentleman' before our six hour wait for the flight back.

a Kazakh gentleman ( I will provide you with his mobile number) will be at the airport and hand you over the ticket before departure; just to be on the safe side: please provide me with your phone number so that you can get in touch, in case needed; furthermore, do I suppose correctly that you and Andreas will stay at the airport for those few hours until departure?

Please let me know. Wish you a nice vacation!

A pleasant stay in a tent in a field of radioactive rocks. I dare to say that vacation isn't the right word. Fun read though.

Safeguarding Sukhumi

Russia’s armed action in Georgia has few nuclear dimensions, but has nevertheless made me think about the long row of nuclear smuggling incidents in the region. One of the first nuclear institutes established by the Soviet Union was that in Sukhumi, Abkhazia. The institute was initially set up in an old sanatorium (all pictures in this post are taken at the site itself)

Lavrentiy Beria was born near Sukhumi and clearly wanted to bring one of the most prestigious and important projects in Soviet history back to where he grew up. He also went to technical school in the city.

Several German scientists were relocated there, and many seemed to have liked it. The contrast between post-war Germany and the lush and beautiful landscape of Abkhazia must have been hard to fathom. No expense was spared. Many Germans stayed for decades, and brought up their families around the facility. Many are buried in the now overgrown cemetery nearby.

The institute has now largely fallen into disrepair (many buildings in Abkhazia are still pockmarked by small arms fire), but concerns over the nuclear material balance at the facility have proven hard to dispel. 

GE view of the facility (42°58'59.93"N 41° 3'41.84"E)

From 8 to 10 September 2005, the IAEA conducted a safeguards mission to Abkhazia, reportedly to follow up on long-running concerns that at least two kilograms of weapons-usable uranium is missing from the facility. In the past, GSN have also reported on missing plutonium from the site.

Such concerns over the security and reporting of this institute are not new. Indeed there has been much uncertainty if or indeed whether plutonium had ever been stored in the facility. When Russian inspectors gained access to the institute in 1997, four years after Abkhazia proclaimed independence from Georgia, they found no indication of missing nuclear materials. They also determined that the facility had been deserted. A subsequent IAEA visit in 2001 (at the invitation of the Abkhaz government) confirmed these findings.

The Georgian authorities and Abkhazian officials cooperated fully with the inspectors when the IAEA visited in September 2005. The results were evaluated and were thereafter reported to the Georgian government in line with the provisions of Georgia’s safeguards agreement. As a break-away region of Georgia, Abkhazia is outside the Georgian government’s jurisdiction and control.

Under the existing safeguards agreement with Georgia, the agency is not required to inform the Abkhaz authorities of the result of the inspections (although it is something they are most likely to do anyway).

Since Abkhazia is not recognized by the international community, it cannot join the NPT nor bring into effect bilateral verification arrangements with the IAEA. Its facilities remain subject to the Agency’s safeguards agreement with Georgia. The IAEA has still to conclude subsidiary arrangements, detailing the rights and obligations for the IAEA and the facility operator for the Sukhumi Institute in Abkhazia.

The Abkhaz case highlights the problem in verifying failed or unrecognized states and points up the need to develop acceptable guidelines to deal with these (admittedly few) cases.

Heinonen continues talks with Iran

Payvand and agencies reports that the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran has invited Olli Heinonen back for further talks with Iran. This is the DDG-S's second trip to the Islamic Republic this August alone. Reportedly, he is joined by an expert from the Agency's department of safeguards.

The talks have been described by both sides as 'constructive', but there is a veritable news blackout as to what precisely they're talking about. I've made no effort in finding out, but made some guesses a while ago. I hope that the unnamed expert is no other than Jill Cooley, the Director for Concepts & Planning, because if that's the case, there is a real possibility that Iran is considering strengthening safeguards measures at Natanz.

Since 2005, Ms. Cooley has been at the forefront in developing the new model safeguards approach for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants.

At the moment, anyone's guess is as good as mine.

The new nuclear pioneers

For those who have missed it, the Economist calls us the 'new nuclear pioneers'. Intriguing. Why are we pioneers? And who were the old nuclear pioneers? I'm sure to ask the editor next time I meet her.

I've heard old CND campaigners call the UK-Norway-VERTIC initiative the most promising thing in their entire career. I've heard people say that it's groundbreaking, innovative and daring. Then, I've heard other say that we're selling out by working close with government on this.

Personally, I think that the project is something else. It is completely unique, and potentially very important. I am very proud to be one of its founders, and to still be part of it. And I think we can and should do more.

So let's see what comes out of it.

DPRK enrichment programme tied to Libya?

On 11 August 2008, the United States hoped to get the DPRK to sign off on its ‘verification plan’. The Global Security Newswire reports that parts of the plan have been rejected by the North. Reportedly, the draft verification plan called for full access by inspectors to all North Korean nuclear sites. 

According to the Yomiuri Shimbun, 'Washington also demanded that Pyongyang accept inspections of its nuclear weapons and nuclear development program with highly enriched uranium, which were not specified in its declaration, as well as its cooperation with other countries' nuclear development'. This would fulfil the requirements of UNSCR 1718 which in its sixth operative paragraph decides: 

...that the DPRK shall ... act strictly in accordance with the obligations applicable to parties under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the terms and conditions of its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards Agreement (IAEA INFCIRC/403) and shall provide the IAEA transparency measures extending beyond these requirements, including such access to individuals, documentation, equipments and facilities as may be required and deemed necessary by the IAEA.

An obvious non-starter for the DPRK which 'vehemently condemns and strongly rejects' the resolution.

The DPRK's alleged enrichment programme clearly continues to be a concern to the US. There are several unanswered questions. For instance, the DPRK is known to have imported two flow-forming machines from Japan (see this nifty animation of how flow-forming works). These machines are capable of flow-forming some 50 aluminium tubes per day.

Why the DPRK would need capacity to flow-form 100 tubes per day? If it doesn't need this capacity, could one or both of the machines have been re-exported to another country? In days after the Israeli strike on Al-Kibar, there was intense speculation about a re-export to Syria.

The Japanese company recently busted for export control violations (Horkos) has reportedly been suspected of being in the business of supplying the DPRK for several years. Initially, several people I talked to did not think that there was a connection between the Japanese company and the AQ Khan network. Now, I've heard that there may be a match between the aluminium found and sampled in Libya, and the aluminium found and sampled in North Korea. 

The exporter of the two batches is a Russian company that, reportedly, acquired the necessary end-user statement from the importer. North Korea imported aluminium enough for some 3,000 machines, but the tensile strength of the 6000-series aluminium isn't good enough to be used in centrifuge rotors.

Mark Hibbs have written an excellent article about the confusion surrounding aluminium exports from Russia in the 11 August issue of Nuclear Fuels, 'Export of 7075-grade aluminium evaded controls in Singapore'. It appears that the Khan Network avoided export controls simply by writing that the exported aluminium was 6061 and 6082-series, with comparably low tensile strength, instead of the 7075 series aluminium that it was. The German re-exporter knew that this was misleading authorities, but went along anyway.

If that's how easy it is to beat export controls...

According to Hibbs, the 7075-series aluminium had a tube length of 280mm and an outer diameter of 106mm. The outer diameter would have been about five millimetres wider than the outer diameter of the P-1 rotor tube. But the diameter of the imported tube would have been perfect for SCOPE to flow-form the tube into the finished rotor.

While the aluminium sampled in North Korea is of the 6000-series (and consequently unusable for rotors) it could have been used for other P-1 components, such as outer casing. 

According to Hibbs, officials close to the US investigation say that the outer diameter of the tubes found in North Korea match the diameter for the outer casing of the P-1. See 'U-235 contamination found on Russian aluminium imported by DPRK', Nuclear Fuel, 14 July 2008. If the information is correct, that the aluminium may have been supplied by the same company that supplied Libya, the Kahn network may have implicated more countries than previously thought.

North Korea is known to have considerable expertise in vacuum technologies – they could therefore have done advanced studies in autoclave and product withdrawal technologies relevant for uranium enrichment. Their knowledge of magnetic technology is less known but I've heard that South Korean intelligence is aware of at least one exchange of scientists and engineers between Khan Research Laboratories and its North Korean counterpart.

With a large number of unknowns in existence, it is very likely that the US will continue to push for a verification procedure that covers more facilities than Yongbyon.

CTBTO on IFE08

The Vienna press crowd may want to attend this briefing.

VERTIC has been invited to observe this event, so on 9 September I'll be traveling to Semipalantinsk together with Oliver Meier of the Arms Control Association. I'm working with some friends in the US on having some VERTIC staff over to Washington to discuss this event in the coming months.

Oliver and I will stay in a tent during the exercise. And the temperature reportedly ranges from -10 to +30. Oh, joy...

More pictures by photographer Timofey Yuriev available here.

Vienna, 14 August 2008

Ambassador Tibor Tóth
Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

cordially invites

Media representatives

to

a press briefing on the CTBTO Integrated Field Exercise at 10.00 am on Wednesday, 20 August 2008. The briefing will take place at the Vienna International Centre, in the CTBTO multi-media room, E0665.

The Executive Secretary, Ambassador Tibor Tóth, and the Director of the On-Site Inspection Division, Mr. Boris Kvok, will be present at the briefing.

The CTBTO Integrated Field Exercise 2008 is the biggest and most challenging project in the history of the organization. Over a period of five weeks, the on-site inspection regime, which is the ultimate instrument to verify compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT), will be put to the test.

A team of 40 inspectors monitored by a large international team of observers will conduct a complete on-site inspection. 40 tonnes of equipment will be shipped from Vienna to the former Soviet Union nuclear test site Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan. The exercise will start with a week of launch activities in Vienna at the end of August and will then continue for four weeks at Semipalatinsk in September.

You are invited to hear about the main elements and activities of the exercise. You will also be briefed on possibilities to get updated with relevant information during this period.

RSVP
Awoba Bagshaw, Public Information
Christian Evertz, Public Information
Tel: 26030 -6457 or 260306108
e-mail:Awoba.Bagshaw@ctbto.org
e-mail:Christian.Evertz@ctbto.org

Saudi Arabia to ratify comprehensive safeguards agreement

The government of Saudi Arabia seems to have decided to push for the ratification of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the International Atomic Energy Agency. It signed the agreement, with a small quantities protocol attached, on 16 June 2005.

Saudi Arabia deposited its instrument of accession to the NPT with Washington on 3 October 1988, and should have joined the safeguards regime no later than 18 months after that. So it's 20 years late in joining (and technically in breach of article III.4 of the NPT).

The ratification process within Saudi Arabia differs quite radically from Western countries. The King has the final say in all matters of international relations. But before he issues a royal decree bringing the CSA into force, he needs to observe a consultation process. The international agreement is brought to two bodies, and they may take their time when examining it.

First, and importantly, the Shura Council needs to have a look at it. Since the King's law is subject to Divine Law, the opinion of the Council is important. The Council is tasked, under the constitution, to express its opinion on the general policies of the Saudi state. It studies international agreements and makes appropriate suggestions regarding them.

The Council of Ministers needs to study it after this. This is not a big deal, since the King himself chairs the council. And once the process is complete, the King issues a Royal Decree, and the agreement is ratified.

At present, there are no known fuel cycle facilities of importance in Saudi Arabia, and a study by SIPRI claims that the Kingdom doesn't have any sizable deposits of uranium.

This might change, however. The United States and Saudi Arabia signed an MOU on civilian nuclear cooperation on 16 May 2008. While details are scarce, future nuclear trade is most definitely envisioned.

DG intervention at BoG

The IAEA has published the Director-General's intervention to the BoG meeting on 1 August 2008. It is an interesting read, and I've made it available here.

At present, comments are off. I've had in my mind to publish a policy on this after a number of off-topic posts appeared. So far, I haven't really had time to do this, and I don't intend to turn comments on without a policy.

If you'd like to let us know what you think about ElBaradei's statement, use the e-mail for now.

Heinonen's trips

It should have escaped few that the IAEA DDG-S, Olli Heinonen, visited Iran 7-9 August 2008. However, very little information has escaped about what the purpose of his trip was.  According to the Iranians, the talks were held with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and they were 'exclusively technical' as well as 'constructive'. That doesn't say much.

A guess would be that the AEOI and Heinonen discussed the data on the 'mock laptop' delivered to the Iranians for their review. This laptop contains some information copied from the infamous 'laptop of death'. I've heard that the computer files that were given to the Iranians have been carefully wiped clean from all metadata that could indicate when the file was created and how it was used. This makes it awfully difficult to assess the validity of the original file.

Another guess would be that they discussed a new facility attachment for the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz. If Iran has moved beyond 3.000 centrifuges, a new attachment seems prudent. Of course, the IAEA is likely to continue to push for remote monitoring capabilities.

They could also have discussed opening an IAEA safeguards office in Tehran, which would be a very welcome development.

At least Heinonen is welcome in Tehran. He's not welcome in Damascus.

Syrian 'nuclear mastermind' killed?

In blogging, one is supposed to keep to the topic (in my case verification, compliance or implementation) and not deviate too much.

However, this story is way too intriguing to let go. Apparently, General Mohammed Suleiman, a senior Syrian official, was shot dead while watching the Mediterranean Sea from his oceanfront villa in Tartus (34°52'46.98"N 35°53'42.61"E). He was shot by a sniper, reportedly firing from a boat off the coastline.

It is interesting since General Suleiman was allegedly involved in setting up and coordinating Syria's nuclear cooperation with North Korea.

Israel denies involvement in the murder.

New VERTIC Brief

Some light reading for the weekend. VERTIC's new brief is written by Malcolm Coxhead, an influential guy in CTBT circles (he heads up current efforts to build a strong on-site inspection regime). It's a good paper, straight from the horse's mouth:

I hear that Angela Woodward, my boss, has big plans for our brief series. So, if you're a practitioner or theorist interested in contributing to the development of effective verification measures, you know where to find her. Of course, if anyone has a problem with Malcolm's paper, or just want to shower it with praise, let us know.

Board of Governors meeting on India

The IAEA has just published the Director-General's statement to the Board of Governors on the US-India deal:

Draft Safeguards Agreement with India
I am pleased to put before you the draft Agreement with the Government of India for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities. As the Secretariat has already provided an extensive briefing on this, I will emphasize just a few points.

The text before you is an INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreement based on the Agency´s standard safeguards practices and procedures. These 66-type agreements are not comprehensive or full-scope safeguards agreements. They are concluded in accordance with Article III.A.5 of the Agency’s Statute and provide for the application of safeguards to specific facilities or other relevant items. In the case of the draft before you, it is an "umbrella agreement", which provides for any facility notified by India to the Agency in the future to become subject to safeguards. The draft also envisages the possibility of applying current Agency safeguards in India under this new agreement by suspending, subject to agreement by the relevant parties, the application of safeguards under existing agreements. The "umbrella" nature of this agreement provides a more efficient mechanism for ensuring that safeguards requirements can be met. It satisfies India´s needs while maintaining all the Agency´s legal requirements. Such an "umbrella" approach could also be used for the conclusion of other 66-type safeguards agreements. As you can see from India´s Plan, which has been circulated for the information of all IAEA Member States, a total of 14 reactors are envisaged to come under Agency safeguards by 2014. I should note that the Agency already applies safeguards to six of these 14 reactors under existing 66 type agreements with India. We expect to start implementing the agreement at new facilities in 2009. Facilities will be notified by India to the Agency in stages and the Secretariat will keep you informed when facilities are submitted for safeguards.

As with other safeguards agreements between the Agency and Member States, the agreement is of indefinite duration. There are no conditions for the discontinuation of safeguards other than those provided by the safeguards agreement itself. The termination provisions contained in the agreement are the same as for other 66-type agreements. Naturally - as with all safeguards agreements - this agreement is subject to the general rules of international law. Therefore, the agreement should be read as an integral whole. The preamble provides for contextual background and safeguards are implemented in accordance with the terms of the agreement.

Finally, I should note that India and the IAEA have already begun discussions on an additional protocol to the draft safeguards agreement.

The Union came out more or less endorsing the deal (which wasn't that surprising given that all Union heavyweights supports it), but wishing for a speedy conclusion of the additional protocol.

Rumor has it that the NSG will meet in Vienna on 21 August 2008.

Update: the safeguards agreement has been approved.

Discussions at INMM

The annual INMM meeting concluded a couple of weeks ago. On the agenda was safeguards in uranium gas centrifuge enrichment plants (GCEPs). A number of papers were presented and discussed. However, nothing was submitted that discussed improving the IAEA's capability to detect undeclared uranium enrichment facilities.

The safeguards community seems keen to tackle the problem of 'overproduction' at GCEPs. Overproduction occurs when the operator fails to declare everything that is going into (fed into) the cascade and everything that comes out of it (is withdrawn). This is very difficult to detect as long as the operator doesn't change the enrichment level. The overproduction of low-enriched uranium can then be shipped off to a clandestine GCEP for processing to weapons grade.

As the vast majority of separative work goes into the process of enriching to reactor grade, the benefit for the proliferator is that a very large civilian GCEP can be used to feed a quite small military GCEP with very little risk of detection. The larger the GCEP, the easier it is to hide overproduction.

The INMM papers discussed further development of approaches involving electronic mailboxes combined with short-notice inspections. The electronic mailbox sends off real-time process inventory listings to the IAEA. A mailbox system is shorthand for a computer network or other arrangement in which operators provide operational information in a form that cannot be changed. This information would include the cylinder inventory as well as information on facility status. It is not impossible to beat such a system, but it makes it more difficult, and the operator would need to plan a diversion more diligently (see more here).

The INMM also discussed further strengthening measures. This included methods for uniquely identifying and tracking UF6 cylinders. And methods for maintaining a material balance through the enrichment plant: this could be done through continuous monitoring of the load cells.

Considerable attention was given to 3D laser imaging for design information verification (DIV). This technique has been discussed in ESARDA circles, and elsewhere, for some time (see an article here). What it essentially does is to create a three-dimensional image of the cascade hall at regular intervals. A computer system then compares the images with each other. If re-piping occurs, it will not only flag this fact, but also point out where the new pipes are located.

Since a large GCEP may contain many kilometers of pipes, it is beyond a human inspector to walk about and checking everything.

In respect to HEU production, the discussion is now largely focussed on continuous enrichment monitors (which are presently deployed in URENCO plants) and a portable cascade header enrichment monitoring system. Such systems are not precisely new, but are still very useful: see for instance this operational manual for a system deployed at a Gaseous Diffusion Plant.

One way of controlling over production in GCEPs would be to get a clearer understanding of the volume moving into and out of the plant (by monitoring the physical entry and exit of UF6 cylinders). This was also discussed at the INMM.

So it seems like it had been a fairly productive meeting in Nashville. I'm very much looking forward to the publication of the CD with all presentations and poster sessions.