ACA analysis of India-specific safeguards

Today, the Arms Control Association released a 'critical analysis' of the India-specific safeguards agreement (here). The piece is written by Daryl Kimball, Fred McGoldrick and Lawrence Scheinman.

I was pleased to see that they noticed the ominous looking paragraph 4, which reads 'the application of safeguards under this Agreement is intended to facilitate implementation of relevant bilateral or multilateral arrangements to which India is a party, which are essential to the accomplishment of this Agreement'. I understand that there has been considerable debate in Vienna about the precise meaning of this clause - the debate has been spearheaded by several delegations: the Austrian, the Swiss and the Pakistani.

They also highlight paragraph 13 - which also has been under considerable debate. The IAEA's Ollie Heinonen had reportedly been discussing this with India's Anil Kakodkar at length back in February/March this year.  The IAEA had been pushing for the rapid inclusion of Indian reprocessing facilities, but the Indians had refused.

To some degree, the paper simply reflects what's already been said in Vienna. And at the moment, it seems like the resistance of skeptical states is very fragile. The speculation from the capital of the nuclear world yesterday was that no-one seemed willing to call a vote they were sure to publicly lose, instead preferring to fight on inside the comfortable opacity of the NSG.

Still, it's useful to have the discussion black on white.

An India-specific AP

Last week's IISS meeting with Greg Schulte was really convened to discuss the US-India deal and not so much North Korea. During questions and answers I asked how much this deal is going to cost the IAEA membership (in terms of safeguards expenditure) and what the status was in respect to negotiations on the India-specific Additional Protocol. He basically said that everything is cool.

So, is it?

For the India deal to go ahead, the Hyde Act requires the US President to make a number of determinations.

In respect to the Additional Protocol (AP), the President must determine that 'India and the IAEA are making substantial progress toward concluding an Additional Protocol consistent with IAEA principles, practices, and policies that would apply to India's civil nuclear program'.

So, with the India-specific safeguards agreement drafted and submitted the IAEA Board for approval, what's the status of the AP?

Starting Negotiations

It is not clear what 'substantial progress' means. But at the very minimum, discussions with the Agency should have started and should show promise. These negotiations were scheduled to begin on yesterday. The Hindu carries the story.

The de-jure nuclear weapon states have Voluntary Offer Agreements (VOA) with the Agency. Their Additional Protocols essentially allows the state to exclude any verification activity directly accessing activities significant for that states national security (i.e. all locations and activities related to the military fuel cycle). 

For these states, the Agency are usually concluding that, 'nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied in selected facilities remained in peaceful activities or was withdrawn as provided for in the agreements'.

But could a India-specific AP be different? Some seems to fear that it just might be.

Ten days ago, PR-inside published a letter from a number of Indian nuclear heavyweights expressing concern over the application of the protocol. They write (with my emphasis):

While the actual draft of the Additional Protocol (AP) applicable to India may have to be negotiated and agreed to at a later date, it is absolutely necessary that a prior agreement between the IAEA and India on the essential features of such an Additional Protocol must be reached simultaneous with the finalisation of the safeguards agreement and before signing it. The most intrusive actions under safeguards are always taken on the basis of this protocol, including the 'pursuit clause' which permits interference with our non-civilian programmes on the basis of unsubstantiated suspicion.

They continue:

India needs to make it clear what the limits are beyond which we will not entertain any IAEA action or intrusion, and it should be clear that a standard Model Protocol applicable to non-nuclear weapon States will not be acceptable to India. The leverage to debate and get the kind of restricted Additional Protocol we want will be entirely lost once a safeguards agreement alone is first put in place and the installations put under safeguards. As we understand, the limitations within which India is willing to enter into the Additional Protocol regime was neither discussed by Indian negotiators at the IAEA nor do they appear in the safeguards draft or its attachments. The Government needs to clarify their thinking on the Additional Protocol before proceeding to the IAEA Board.

They can rest easy. My guess would be that India's Additional Protocol will be modelled on a Nuclear-Weapon State 'Voluntary Offer Agreement' (VOA).

It is theoretically difficult to envision a non-nuclear weapon state type Additional Protocol applied on India, especially since the separation plan isn't exactly putting up watertight barriers between the military and civilian fuel cycle. GOV/2008/30 even contains procedures for the case when one facility is handling safeguarded as well as unsafeguarded materials, see for instance paragraphs 94-96.

I am sure that potential suppliers of uranium or other nuclear services would rest easier if the Agency had access to the same kind of information flow that is envisioned in INFCIRC/540. But it would seem highly unlikely that that happens.

Paying the bill

Now, how much is this going to cost and whose going to pay for it?

The IAEA's initial budget estimate is an additional €1.2m for one new facility in 2008 (see GOV/2008/30). I can only assume that that would be unit 6 of the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS-6). This unit is scheduled to be connected to the grid on 1 December 2008, and to be put in commercial operation by 28 February 2009.

It is not known how much the rest of the deal will cost. I assume that an economic forecast has been made by the Agency, but it is yet to be published. It will depend on the type of facility being put under safeguards.

Reactors consume a lot of Person-Day Inspection (PDI) effort (this is the old 'man-day inspection' concept in INFCIRC/153, defined as '… a day during which a single inspector has access to a facility at any time for a total of not more than eight hours'.

Presently, only 316 PDI's are spent in INFCIRC/66 states (i.e. India, Israel and Pakistan). 385 PDI's are spent in the de-jure nuclear weapon states, whereas the main effort, 8271 PDI's, are been spent in non-nuclear weapon states around the globe. A staggering fifteen per cent of all inspection effort is being spent at the three reprocessing plants operating under safeguards. This is bound to rise when the Rokkasho reprocessing plant comes on-stream for real.

As India puts more facilities under safeguards, the associated safeguards costs are expected to rise quite a bit. Especially so if and when India puts the Tarapur reprocessing facility fully under safeguards. 

Still, compared with other things, the budget increase is modest. I've seen estimates that the nuclear renaissance in the rest of the world might add another US$20m to the safeguards budget (in today's money) by 2019. India is likely to add another US$10m to that. But it is difficult to say, and all members are likely to pressure the Agency to deliver a quality product for essentially nothing. They are still likely to argue over payment, though.

So who will pay? Well, it will be appropriated through the regular budget. In other words, the IAEA membership as a whole will be expected to chip in.

This means that the main financial burden of safeguarding India will not be carried by India herself (which in 2008 was assessed to pay € 822.511 and US$ 194.730) but rather by wealthier states. Granted, of those the United States pays a huge portion of the Agency budget, and a large amount in extra-budgetary contributions.

However, the EU share is not insignificant, which has been concerning some Europeans over the past years. The feeling has been that the US and India deals, with all its implications on the bigger non-proliferation regime, while Europe picks up quite a lot of the bill.

Kind of like paying for a lunch you've not been invited to.

But on balance, perhaps everything is pretty cool. At least if you're American or Indian.

The Indian separation plan

On Friday, India circulated its separation plan to the IAEA membership, see INFCIRC/731.

Read it together with Pakistan's letter to the Board of Governors (first published by Siddharth Varadarajan) and the still restricted GOV/1621.

I've heard rumors about the possibility of going to a vote on the India-specific safeguards agreement. I wouldn't count on it, though. It would run against long-established Vienna traditions. My bet would be that it's adopted by consensus.

Then again, the Board's votes on Iran (GOV/2005/77 and GOV/2006/14) was also pretty unusual, so traditions are perhaps there to be broken.

So, an interesting week for verification, with the Indian safeguards agreement up for decision on Friday, and the P-5+1 deadline expiring on Saturday.

DPRK verification saga continues

Both James and I have written quite a bit about the Agency’s role in investigating the extent of the DPRK’s nuclear programme. And last Friday, the US met with the IAEA Director-General to discuss the future. As expected, the meeting was largely inconclusive.

To some extent, I agree with Washington’s assessment that it’s not that important who participates in the verification effort as long as the job is done correctly, and that the end result is the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The first, short term, goal is obviously to stop the North Korean arsenal from expanding further. This can verified through a combination of efforts at Yongbyon and through the implementation of a confidential verification protocol in respect to uranium enrichment and nuclear exports and imports.

If the DPRK is to rejoin the IAEA, the organization would probably need to be let into the loop as early as possible. This point is even more pressing if the North would consider rejoining the NPT.

Strong IAEA involvement would also help assuage some of the concerns of Japan, which is an important stakeholder in the six party process.

Anyway, this is from PR-inside:

A lot of work must still be done to verify North Korea's nuclear disarmament and the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog will be significantly involved in the process, a senior U.S. diplomat said Friday.

But U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill added the International Atomic Energy Agency's exact role still had to be determined. He suggested Washington was less interested in who participates and more in how well the job of overseeing complete disarmament and a return to purely peaceful nuclear activities gets done.

«We need real verification,» Hill told reporters after meeting with IAEA Chief Mohamed ElBaradei.

«We need a protocol that will really do the job of making sure that what is said in their declaration is correct, so the IAEA has a lot of experience in this regard and I think we would all look forward to drawing on that experience,» he said.

Agency officials reportedly feared that the IAEA could be marginalized in verifying North Korea's pledge to give up its nuclear arms program.

But Hill, Washington's point man on the North Korean nuclear process, said IAEA monitors were already at North Korea's main nuclear facility at Yongbyon.

Earlier this month, North Korea was given a blueprint detailing how the international community would verify a long-delayed list of its nuclear programs _ a step toward eventual dismantlement. That proposal called for intrusive inspections, interviews with scientists and a role for the IAEA.

North Korea raised some preliminary objections but made no formal response to the proposal.

On Thursday, Asia-Pacific nations called for an «effective» plan to verify North Korea's declaration of its nuclear programs but backed away from an earlier recommendation of active involvement by the Vienna-based IAEA.

And this is from M&C:

UN nuclear watchdog chief Mohammed ElBaradei wants the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to play more than an advisory role in verifying North Korea's nuclear programme, diplomats close to the agency said Friday.

In late June, Pyonyang handed over a declaration of its nuclear programme and materials to be verified by the six parties involved in the denuclearization of North Korea.

On July 12, the United States, Russia, China, South Korea and Japan agreed with North Korea to verification measures such as visits to facilities and interviews with North Korean specialists, with details still needing to be worked out.

'When necessary, the verification mechanism can welcome the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to provide consultancy and assistance for relevant verification,' the communique after the July 12 meeting said.

US negotiator Christopher Hill was in Vienna on Friday to brief IAEA Director General ElBaradei about the latest developments regarding North Korea, including the IAEA's possible mandate.

'We have to figure out what that role is,' Hill told reporters after his meeting.

ElBaradei considers the IAEA to be the competent authority for verification and wants either a full participation by agency inspectors or no involvement at all, one diplomat said.

'ElBaradei is unhappy about the advisory role,' he said.

Another diplomat said ElBaradei was seeking a more clearly defined role in checking that North Korea's statements about its nuclear programme are correct.

'The IAEA has a lot of experience in this regard and we would all look forward to draw on this experience,' Hill said. The agency should be 'involved in a significant way,' he said.

In the past months, specialists from North Korea and the United States have disabled the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. IAEA inspectors are continuously present in North Korea's nuclear centre, performing only an monitoring role.

Diplomats and experts say Pyonyang is not keen on working directly with the IAEA, as it is an impartial agency standing outside the political six-party deal under which North Korea agreed to dismantle its nuclear programme in return for energy and economic aid.

In the final phase of the agreement, North Korea would get rid of its nuclear weapons.

'We have a long way to go,' Hill said. 'We don't have an agreement on how to turn over weapons, so obviously the weapons stage is one that we want to get to very soon,' he added.

US change of tack on the DPRK?

At a discussion meeting at the IISS today, Ralph Cossa, the President of the Pacific Forum CSIS, spoke on "Denuclearising North Korea – prospects and problems". His presentation was on-the record, but most of the subsequent remarks were off it. So I'm a bit constrained about what I can write.

Anyway, he argued that most participants in the six-party talks - at least the ones he is in contact with - do not want to see the IAEA involved in the denuclearization process. And this square with previously gathered information (see my previous posts here and here).

On the other hand, I also attended a meeting with Greg Schulte yesterday and was mystified by the Ambassadors response to James question (see ACW). Schulte's reply was also on the record.

Clearly, there are many twists and turns down this particular road. And the end of the day, however, I think that the DPRK will get its way. Since they aren't members of the IAEA, and clearly despises the organization, they're likely to hold the line.

Ralph Cossa suggested that UNSCR 1718 may soon die silently. The value of this resolution was doubtful. It raised uncomfortable questions relating to state sovereignty (in particular see Andreas L. Paulus and Jörn Müller's analysis for ASIL's Insight series). But it also seemed to undermine the argument made by some that nuclear testing is illegal under customary international law (see my analysis here and here). Personally, I don't subscribe to that theory, and would instead argue that UNSCR 1718 was a major step back from UNSCR 1172.

Moreover, it can be argued that the resolution did little more than prevent Chairman Kim from drinking his favorite brandy.

UNSCR 1718 is still locking in several six party participants. Unlocking the requirements of the resolution could give the parties more flexibility. And if moves are made to lift the requirements of 1718 in the name of political expediency, one cannot help thinking that the same can be done for UNSCRs 1696, 1737, 1747 and 1803.

Iran to stop investigations into weaponization?

George Jahn reports that Iran might stop cooperating with the Agency in respect to its investigations into alleged weaponization work. This is very unfortunate, since non-cooperation might alter the calculus in many capitals, above all Jerusalem.

If true, safeguards operations in Iran will now revert back to a strict application of Iran's comprehensive safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/214). This means that the IAEA's ability to do a state-level evaluation will be severely constrained. It will be very difficult to detect undeclared activities or materials - most of Iran's centrifuge R&D will be out of reach.

Without a good safeguards approach at the FEP, overproduction of LEU might go undiscovered (since there is no real way to measure how much material is flowing through the cascade - the Agency largely relies on bookkeeping). Without an additional protocol in place, there is no chance really to detect a secondary enrichment plant, which can receive and refine the overproduction to weapons grade.

Hardly something that inspires confidence.

Supercomputing at Oak Ridge

This article is awesome if you're into computers, which I must admit I am in a big way. The processing power at Oak Ridge is any computer-literate person's wet dream.

Daniel Terdiman could not help himself. He just had to take pictures of the Oak Ridge Graphite Reactor. This is what the Atomic Tourist has to say about that facility:

Here's where it all began. The Oak Ridge National Laboratory's expansive research into fission, fusion, fossil, and other sources of energy grew from the frenzied wartime effort to produce plutonium from uranium. In early 1944, this small pilot plant -- and an accompanying processing facility -- achieved that objective, producing the world's first gram quantities of plutonium. In the process, the Graphite Reactor paved the way for a full-scale plant in Hanford, Washington, to produce the larger quantities of plutonium needed to create the bomb dropped on the Japanese city of Nagasaki, ending World War II.

You don't really need to go high-tech to build the bomb. You just need imagination, and lots of robust dials and controls.

Main building

Control Room

Loading Face

Credit: Daniel Terdiman/CNET News

EU Joint Action on the CTBT

According to Euroalert, the European Commission has just approved a joint action on the CTBT, to be implemented by the Provisional Technical Secretariat in Vienna. I remember talk about this JA some time ago, so it feels good to see that it's become reality.

The text in full:

The Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) is engaged in identifying how its verification system could best be strengthened, including through the development of noble gas monitoring capacity and efforts aimed at fully involving States Signatories in the implementation of the verification regime. The Preparatory Commissio should therefore be entrusted with the technical implementation of this Joint Action.

On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Chapter III of which contains a list of measures that need to be taken both within the European Union and in third countries to combat such proliferation. And, in the same year, the Council adopted a Common Position on the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery. That Common Position calls, inter alia, for the promotion of the signature and ratificatio of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

The States Signatories to the CTBT have decided to establish a Preparatory Commission, endowed with legal capacity, for the purpose of carrying out the effective implementation of the CTBT, pending the establishment of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO).

For the purposes of ensuring the continuous and practical implementation of certain elements of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the EU will support the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBTO) in order to further the following objectives:

• Strengthening the capabilities of the CTBTO monitoring and verification system, including in the field of radio-nuclide detection.
  
• Strengthening the capacity of the States Signatories of the CTBT to fulfil their verification responsibilities under the CTBT and to enable them to benefit fully from participation in the CTBT regime.
  

In this scope, the projects to be supported by the EU will have the following specific objectives:

• Continuing support for the development by the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO of capacity in the area of noble gas monitoring and verification for the detection and identification of possible nuclear explosions.
  
• Providing technical assistance to African countries aimed at fully integrating States Signatories into the CTBTO monitoring and verification system.
  

This Joint Action entered into force July 15th , and it will expire 18 months after the date of the conclusion of the financing agreement between the Commission and the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO or after six months if no financing agreement has been concluded before that date.

In the scope of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Commission provided early this year 475,000 euros for workshops in order to enhance the capacity and skills of officials in targeted States, and help them to identify gaps and needs.

State Level Approaches

The 49th Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) is currently underway in Nashville, Tennessee. Personally, I have always wanted to go there, but I've never managed to slot the expenditure under an appropriate budget line. It's a shame, since the meeting reviews safeguards developments, and discusses the way forward.

One paper presented this year, written by Mark Goodman and Dunbar Lockwood, discusses the State Level Approach (SLA). This concept is not entirely straightforward to understand, since it doesn't appear in any legal document. Rather, it has been developed over time as the Agency tries to equip itself for a increasingly complex verification mission.

Essentially, SLA thinking can be traced to the evolution of the safeguards system. Goodman and Lockwood succinctly describe the safeguards history:

The IAEA has moved from INFCIRC/66 safeguards agreements, which apply safeguards to specific listed items; to CSA, which apply safeguards to all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities; to CSA plus an AP, which together cover the full peaceful nuclear fuel cycle and include complementary access rights whose purpose includes detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities

Without doubt, the system has evolved dialectically. From the earliest, severely constrained, accounting regimes contained in bilateral agreements to the present information-driven regime embodied in the INFCIRC/153-540 system.

The main advantage with the Additional Protocol is that it allows the Agency to receive much more information on the nuclear fuel cycle in the State than is the case under a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. This has allowed the IAEA to develop the so-called "physical model". The paper I've linked to deserve to be read in whole, but one paragraph in particular sticks out:

The narratives and indicators at the [top-level structure of the Physical Model] will help to assess the general consistency of a State's nuclear programme as a whole, including internal consistency of the declared present and planned nuclear program; consistency of overall production and imports as well as flows and inventories of nuclear material with the utilisation inferred from the declared nuclear program; consistency of nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities with the declared present and planned nuclear program; and consistency of uses, manufacture or imports of specified equipment and non-nuclear material with the needs inferred from the declared nuclear program.

In respect to the SLA Goodman and Lockwood writes:

In contrast to the traditional check-list approach, the SLA builds on a careful and structured analysis of all aspects of an individual state's nuclear activities and the nuclear weapon materials and technologies acquisition paths available to it that is embodied in the State Evaluation Report (SER). The SLA envisions safeguards implementation via an Annual Implementation Plan (AIP) based on an SLA customized for each member state.

In other words, the increased information flow is fed into the physical model. Indicators of undeclared nuclear activities is red flagged by this process and are followed up. This new approach has been remarkably effective in detecting relatively small anomalies (in Egypt, South Korea and Taiwan to mention a few), which can then be investigated and written off.

Goodman and Lockwood points out that:

"States should have in place effective legal and regulatory frameworks that require correct and complete reporting of their relevant activities"

This is because the Agency is dependent on a free and unhampered flow of information from the investigated state. The need to develop independent State Systems for Accountancy and Control (SSAC) is highlighted in just about every Safeguards Implementation Report published by the Agency. This ongoing work should involve just about every Agency department - from Legal to Safeguards to Technical Cooperation.

The real problem now is that there is no real way to assess SSAC effectiveness in, for example, properly collecting and transmitting import and export data (there are other areas as well). Goodman and Lockwood make a big point out of this.

"For nuclear material reporting, the IAEA conducts independent measurements through which it can assess the quality of the SSAC for nuclear material. How the IAEA should address the quality of the State's reporting in other areas in not as straightforward"

While the information-driven approach carries with it many benefits, there are also dangers. As Goodman and Lockwood writes:

"If there is a continued squeezing of resources, the IAEA will need to be particularly careful to avoid a number of risks, for example: reducing inspection effort at declared facilities in such a fashion that a clear link between inspection measures and conclusions is lost; incomplete coverage of credible diversion paths; or turning to dubious mechanisms (highly infrequent random inspections) to address declared facilities. This is the downside of the flexibility allowed by the SLA"

It is also not known how an information driven approach can be implemented in a nuclear weapon state, as James points out over at the Arms Control Wonk. This has never been a problem before, as safeguards in the de-jure five have been facility-specific as best. Obviously, safeguards in the de-facto four have also been based on INFCIRC/66. North Korea being the exception (but the DPRK pulled out of the IAEA in 1994, before the development of information driven safeguards).

India may perhaps be the real playground for those wishing to develop an information driven approach in a nuclear weapon states.

North Korean Verification: Problems Ahead?

Yesterday, I wrote that I heard that the Japanese are unhappy with the present verification proposal. And indeed, they sure are angry cats. The problem, as I understand it, is that the United States and the DPRK is in rare agreement that the Agency should be shut out from the verification process. The Republic of Korea has had no problem with this. Neither have the Chinese and the Russians.

The original proposal was for the United States to more-or-less replicate what they did in Libya. The States would do the forensic work in its own laboratories, while the Agency would be relegated to the sidelines - not being allowed to do their own inspections or their own forensics. Now, I've heard that the Japanese have one primary objection to this solution: it doesn't want the Bush Administration to "cut any corners" on the DPRK. Therefore, they would want the IAEA Department of Safeguards involved at an early stage.

The US, on the other hand, does not wish the Department to work on the issue. Their fear is, as I understood it, that this could lead to a lengthy and drawn-out process. The US would want the enrichment file to close before the end of this year. And the fear is that it could draw out into 2009.

The Japanese are motivated by a different set of threat perceptions than the other six parties, and clearly see the DPRK as a significant military threat. The South Koreans seem to find it unlikely that the North Korean arsenal would ever be used against them. For them, obviously, Korean reunification is the ultimate goal. Militarily, China and Russia is not likely to see tiny North Korea as anything but a nuisance.

This would explain why the Japanese would want to have an international organization involved. And, while it would be preferable to get lots of traction in the process, its end goal is likely to be less than optimal unless the Japanese are perfectly happy people. It's not known how far the Japanese wants to go with this, though. It is unlikely that they would harpoon the process over it. At least not at this stage.

It is not known whether the six-parties have discussed the problem of verifying DPRK warhead assembly operations yet. It is unlikely that they have. When they do, that's obviously going to bring out its own sets of problems.

Some of these will be technically challenging to overcome.

DPRK verification ventures

It's been clear for some time that the IAEA's role in verifying the denuclearization of North Korea is uncertain (see my post from March 2007). This may be for several reasons.

First and foremost, the DPRK doesn't like the Vienna outfit.

The KCNA has labelled the agency 'hell-bent on the anti-DPRK hostile policy' and 'so reckless as to be unable to distinguish truth from lies and preserve neutrality and impartiality'. And the Director-General himself has been slapped around on occasion. KCNA wrote, after a mention of the DPRK in one of the DG's talks:

The DPRK is not a member nation of the NPT and had already withdrawn from the IAEA. It has nothing to do with the IAEA. Yet, he is still pulling up the DPRK over this or that. This is an undisguised provocation and an imprudent act exceeding his authority.

The second reason might be that the US is reluctant to involve the IAEA in the process. The US and the UK were hesitant letting the IAEA into Libya too early, preferring to go through the initial steps of information collection and authentication without the Vienna crowd participating. ElBaradei learned of Libya by watching CNN, something that some Agency members still remembers with dislike.

Over the year, it's become increasingly clear that the main objector to Agency involvement is the DPRK. It prefers to solve this issue bilaterally, with the United States, and have at times attempted to shut out even close partners, such as China.

Now, it would seem that the door is half open for the Agency. According to the 12 July 2008 statement jointly issued by the participants of the so-called six party talks:

In accordance with the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks adopted on 19 September 2005, the six parties agreed to establish a verification mechanism within the Six-Party Talks framework to verify the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 

The verification mechanism consists of experts of the six parties and is responsible to the Working Group on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 

The verification measures of the verification mechanism include visits to facilities, review of documents, interviews with technical personnel and other measures unanimously agreed upon among the six parties. 

When necessary, the verification mechanism can welcome the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to provide consultancy and assistance for relevant verification. 

The specific plans and implementation of the verification will be decided by the Working Group on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in line with the principle of consensus. 

The skeleton has been agreed upon, at least. The basic components of the investigative process will be declarations and inspections, but the details are still to be decided.

The Agency will not play an active role in the process. It can be invited - presumably if all six parties agree - to give advice or assistance in discreet areas.

This process doesn't fall far from VERTIC's thinking in respect to Iran. In the heavily edited VM7, we argued that, in respect to a similar mechanism:

While Iran is likely to view such a confidence-building mechanism as in its own interests, it is also likely to reject any proposal that does not acknowledge its active involvement and allow it some measure of control over the process. On the other hand, if the other parties to the agreement believe that Iran is in effective control of the confidence-building venture, their confidence in the outcome of the process will decrease or, in the worst case, completely disappear. A delicate balance must therefore be struck. The process should involve Iran to the greatest extent possible, but contain checks that ensure that the international community is convinced that its product accurately reflects conditions in Iran.

I remember wanting "conditions on the ground" in the original draft, which was edited out. The main conclusion comes through, however. The DPRK cannot be in total control over which sites to declare, discuss, and visit. But it also cannot be expected to fall over on its back. Finding the right balance, the right buy-in, in the verification process will be very difficult.

I've heard that the Japanese are unhappy with the outcome of the text. Presumably, they would have wanted more Agency involvement. We shall see.

European Space and the IAEA

Some weeks ago, I participated in a meeting on Iran where I again raised the idea of Iran becoming the safeguards laboratory of the East. The senior Iranian at the conference asked me what specific projects I had in mind. I raised the area of information transmission. Iran has been concerned that the transmission of safeguards information over the internet is not secure, which is why the would allow VPN transmissions off Natanz.

Now, the IAEA and the European Space Agency have completed the planning phase for their six-month pilot test for a secure satellite communications network. The IAEA secretariat believes that this project is "critically important" for their safeguards work.

The satellite network will be operated from a dedicated data centre in Vienna, which has already been set up. This center is designed to "ensure reliable and secure transfer of safeguards data from the field to Agency headquarters and to enable monitoring of the systems on a near real time basis" (GOV/2008/14, par. 94).

Now, this centre already downloads data from over 140 systems worldwide. This includes 50 radiation detection systems and 90 surveillance systems (with about 340 cameras attached). These cameras produce about 150,000 images per day. The total load on the system is about two GB of data per day, which isn't really that much.

The network will use the two-way Digital Video Broadcasting - Return Channel via Satellite (DVB-RCS) standard, which has a maximum transmission speed of 38MB/second, more than enough for the current two GB load. This standard could also, in theory, transform Agency inspectors to virtual Jack Bauers ('download it to my PDA!'). In practice, however, that aren't likely to happen.

A dedicated satellite network will generally be more secure than using the terrestrial networks. It also makes the IAEA less vulnerable to local communications disruptions. The CTBTO has been operating a similar system for years, and I suspect that a lot of experience can be transferred from one VIC building to another. But a dedicated network is not foolproof.

It is, for instance, possible to do a downlink intercept by tapping into the weaker sidelobe signal (also called the overspill signal). You can also hack the satellite itself, of course, by logging on to its systems.

Therefore, all uplink commands must be encrypted and authenticated, so that the Agency and the ESA knows that no foreign government is on the line with them. Obviously, all information transmitted over the network must be encrypted to the highest possible standards.

At the moment, Brazil, Hungary, Ukraine (Chernobyl) and Armenia participates in the trials. Maybe Armenia's good friend and southern neighbour would like to participate as well?

CTBT verification works

I cannot help posting this CTBT film featuring no other than the unknown Austrian voiceover guy (who appears on all their films), the proud North Korean broadcaster-woman (who mostly appears on DPRK state TV), Lassina Zerbo and Tibor Toth. It is quite cool.

The three other Syrian sites

Syria’s destroyed nuclear reactor at Al-Kibar has been the focus of considerable attention throughout July. Few would have missed the International Atomic Energy Agency’s visit to Syria in late June. James blogged about it at the wonk. He expressed skepticism over the alleged link with Iran, which I think is a healthy reaction.

Having observed the interaction between Syrian and Iranian diplomats at the Agency GC for some years new, I would personally be surprised if they're not talking. Close personal interactions in Vienna does not mean, however, close cooperation on undeclared nuclear facilities.

Anyway. A three man team, headed in person by the DDG-S Olli Heinonen, arrived at Damascus International Airport on Sunday, 22 June. No details of the trip has been released by anyone, and officials on both sides of the Atlantic are very tight-lipped about what, if anything, might have been uncovered.

Most press reports claim that Heinonen and his crew met Syrian officials on Sunday evening, and then headed out on a 400 kilometer trek to Al-Kibar first thing Monday morning. According to Mark Heinrich, the Syrians had restricted inspections to that site, at which Heinonen and his entourage were allowed to take “extensive environmental samples”.

It is not clear where samples were taken. Understandably, Heinonen himself did not give much detail. In his quite Finnish way he simply said that samples had been taken of “quite a lot of things”. Obviously, that can mean anything.

It can also yield surprising results. Consider that the Iranians thought that they were home-free at Kalaye Electric before Chris Charlier's team swiped at a place where the Iranians forgot to sanitize.

Ephraim Asculai, a senior research fellow at the Institute for Science and International Security, have argued that, "Inspectors will [...] attempt to sample for particles of uranium, particles of the cladding, and particles of graphite", but does not seem very optimistic that tell-tale signs will be picked up. Moreover, he argues that it "is highly unlikely that inspectors will find any above-ground major components of the reactor and affiliated equipment" but that remnants of the reactor foundation might still be present at the site.

So, we'll see what the sampling will reveal. I am pessimistic, but you never know.

The three other sites

The Syrians did not allow Heinonen and his limited team to get access to three other sites fingered by US intelligence as being associated with the country's nuclear programme. Reportedly, one of the sites may have some reprocessing capability. Two sites are operational and one is under construction.

I have tried to find out what these sites are and where they might be located, but no-one honestly have a clue. Even people that usually are in the know. I've noticed, though, that someone has been buying coverage of two areas in Syria. First in January then again in May. The dates indicate that it is the same client - although that might also be a coincidence.

One location is the chemical weapons facility near Al Safir and the adjacent SCUD site (36° 3'31.23"N  37°20'9.57"E). The other location might be a triple fenced compound in the Syrian desert (34°37'35.72"N  37°14'2.10"E). Of course, this is not evidence of anything. It is simply an observation. But there is SAM coverage of both areas.

The Agency team flew back on Tuesday, 24 June. If I have to guess, they probably took Austrian Airline’s daily 3.55 pm shuttle to Vienna.

A North Korean Plane

Apologies for the long silence. I am still on vacation in Sweden, tending some personal business. Still, I have been receiving e-mails about the Ritter - Albright story, which I think is a sad but typical story in our business. The Africans have as saying, 'when the elephants dance, the grass is weeping'. So, I'm going to stay out of it.

This AP story caught my dull eye:

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan (AP) — Pakistan gave centrifuges to North Korea in a 2000 shipment supervised by the army during the rule of President Pervez Musharraf, nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan said Friday.

Khan told The Associated Press in a telephone interview that the uranium enrichment equipment was sent from Pakistan in a North Korean plane that was loaded under the supervision of Pakistani security officials.

His claims contradict his 2004 confession that he was solely responsible for spreading nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya — and Pakistan's repeated denials its army or government knew about Khan's nuclear proliferation activities.

Khan said the army had "complete knowledge" of the shipment of used P-1 centrifuges to North Korea and that it must have been sent with the consent of Musharraf, the then-army chief who took power in a 1999 coup.

"It was a North Korean plane, and the army had complete knowledge about it and the equipment," Khan said. "It must have gone with his (Musharraf's) consent."

Khan's allegations, reported earlier Friday by the Japanese news agency, Kyodo, are his most controversial yet and could prove deeply embarrassing for both the army and Musharraf, a key ally in the U.S.-led war on terror.

Musharraf's spokesman, Rashid Qureshi, rejected Khan's claims.

"I can say with full confidence that it is all lies and false statements," he said. Army and Foreign Ministry spokesmen declined immediate comment.

Khan is regarded as a hero by many in Pakistan for his key role in the program that gave it the Islamic world's first nuclear bomb in 1998, seen as a deterrent against historic archrival India. After his 2004 confession and televised statement of contrition, Khan was pardoned by Musharraf but has been kept under virtual house arrest at his spacious villa in Islamabad. Since a new civilian government took power after February elections, eclipsing Musharraf, the retired scientist has increasingly spoken out in the media.

Asked why he had taken sole responsibility for the nuclear proliferation, Khan said he had been persuaded that it was in the national interest by friends including Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, a key figure in the-then ruling party.

Khan said that in return he had been promised complete freedom, but "those promises were not honored."

Hussain could not immediately be reached for comment.

Khan also said that he had traveled to North Korea in 1999 with a Pakistan army general to buy shoulder-launched missiles from Pyongyang.

Khan's wife this week said she was challenging her husband's detention in court. The Khans have appointed an attorney to petition the Islamabad High Court for an end to the restrictions on his movements and for his freedom to speak to the media.

On Friday, a lawyer for Khan alleged that listening devices had been planted in the scientist's tightly guarded home.

Pakistan says it has taken extra steps to tighten its control of its nuclear assets since Khan's network was uncovered in late 2003. It says a foolproof command and control system is in place so its nuclear assets cannot get into the wrong hands.

But Khan's bald accusation that the military establishment was in the know adds to widespread skepticism that he could have exported nuclear technology under the radar of Pakistan's pervasive security apparatus.

"No flight, no equipment could go outside without the clearance from the ISI and SPD and they used to be at the airport, not me," Khan said, referring to the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency and the Strategic Planning Division that manages Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

Political and military analyst Talat Masood said it made sense that the effort was coordinated by more than one person.

"If the requirement of an aircraft was there, the requirement of dealing with another country was there, it's not just one man who could have done it," Masood said. "Whether they were doing it individually or collectively or as a state policy or informally — that needs to be determined."

Pakistan has refused to allow outsiders to question Khan, including from the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency, but says it has shared the findings of its own questioning of Khan.

Khan said he had visited North Korea twice, in 1994, and then in 1999, when he was sent to procure missiles during the so-called Kargil conflict when Pakistan clashed with India in disputed Kashmir.

Khan told Kyodo that the missiles were shoulder-fired SA 15 missiles.

Khan told AP that Musharraf had requested him to make the second trip and he did so accompanied on a special plane by an army general, Iftikhar Hussain Shah.

"Since I had good relations with them (North Korea) and they respected me, they gave us 200 missiles after getting them from their army and those missiles were loaded in the same plane," Khan said.

He said after the Kargil conflict ended, Pakistan's government tried to return the missiles to North Korea to avoid paying for them but following his intervention, paid for and kept the weapons.

Khan was bitter in his criticism of Musharraf and confident in his own high standing among Pakistanis despite his 2004 confession.

"People still respect me, and if any one has any doubts and thinks himself more popular, he should go with me to Aabpara or Raja Bazar (two markets in Islamabad and nearby Rawalpindi)," he said.

Comparing the reception he would get to that which would be accorded Musharraf, Khan said: "You can cut my nose if his (Musharraf's) clothes remained untorn."

The Khan saga continues. It is, of course, very unlikely that Khan managed to run his proliferation circus without heavy political cover. So why should Khan, who admittedly has a flexible relationship with the truth, be lying about this? No wonder the Pakistani government has sworn never to give the IAEA access to the isolated metallurgist.

Khan, by the way, does not reside in one house. He owns most of a city block. No less than 12 different villas connected by their gardens. I wonder if Gordon knew that.