Upcoming meetings ‘to die for’

I apologize for the light posting lately, but it is not without cause. In addition to having been promoted to senior researcher at VERTIC, with all that it means, I've been busy reviewing a long and interesting paper on nuclear disarmament. I've also started to prepare for two important meetings in Geneva next week. If you're around, come and participate. The details are as follows:

5 May 2008, 13.15-14.15, conference room 9
Joint presentation by the AWE, VERTIC and NRPA on the UK-Norway disarmament work.

Participants:

• Attila Burjan, AWE
• Marius Bjorningstad, NRPA
• Me, VERTIC

8 May 2008, 13.00-14.30, NGO room.
BASIC/VERTIC seminar on 'building on the momentum for disarmament, what can NPT states do?'

Participants:

• Fiona Paterson, UK FCO, chair
• Paul Ingram, BASIC
• Me, VERTIC

Also, the UK national presentation of their disarmament work is scheduled for 6 May 2008 at 13.15 in Conference Room 9. Don't miss that.

The DCM-14 camera

Recently, the Arms Control Wonk published a number of photographs from the centrifuge plant at Natanz. We will never know why the president's office has decided to publish these potentially important images. It is not the first time I heard of Iranian recklessness with sensitive nuclear data, however.

In February, I wrote that "several centrifuge parts are laid out on display inside their Natanz facility, for all visitors to see". Back then, my contact commented that Iran's centrifuge technicians are almost naively proud of their progress. In any case, these images will enable the community to analyse Iran's capabilities in more detail.

Can something also be learned about the state of IAEA monitoring at the facility?

An observant reader on the ACW commented that all activities 'takes place under the watchful lenses of the IAEA wall-mounted cameras'. The camera in question is nothing less than an ISO-9001 registered DCM-14, supplied by Canberra (which in turn is part of French nuclear giant Areva). On the picture, the camera is wall mounted and seem to be directed in an about 30-degree angle down towards the centrifuge cascades. Also visible is an Iranian installed security camera, which looks like it's 'faster' (capable of a larger aperture).

DCM stands for Digital Camera Module. It's been the workhorse of the IAEA since 1996. It was developed under the German member state support programme, and is essentially what enabled the Agency to start remote monitoring. In 2000, they would cost you US$ 15,000. I haven't checked current prices.

The camera itself is a standard digital camera, with a CCD/CMOS sensor. Images, which presently aren't in the highest of megapixel ranges (images are about 20Kb when compressed), are collected by the sensor, authenticated by the DCM-14 and then stored on an ordinary PCMCIA card. For a plant like Natanz, images from the camera (and several others) are then transferred to a server where it is stored on a hard-drive.

It is what happens next that is interesting. If Iran has allowed for remote monitoring, the image is likely to be encrypted and then sent via ISDN to some central point in Iran. From there, the image is transmitted to Vienna. The integrity of the image is authenticated by the DCM-14, which in turn is protected by a seal. If there is a power-failure, the camera unit's PCMCIA card will hold the images.

It is presently unknown if Iran has allowed the IAEA to transmit digital images off-site. Cameras were installed by the Agency before Iran started to expand operations at the Fuel Enrichment Plant. Iran refused to allow the Agency to transmit images off-site, however, arguing that no other fuel producing nation had been required to do so (see my previous post here). The IAEA conceded, but asked Iran to turn on the information tap once the number of installed centrifuges exceeded 500.

Iran continued to claim, however, that the VPN transmission is not secure. And they seem do have done so even after the 500-limit was exceeded. According to a memo by the UK Foreign Policy Centre:

I was told that Iran would be very reluctant to agree with the installation of any remote monitoring cameras due to the security defects of such remote technologies, which are based on the use of the internet. Iran believes that such remote transmissions could provide unauthorised third parties with confidential information about Iran's nuclear programme.

It would be interesting to learn if Iran has changed its mind on this issue.

The DCM-14 is nearing the end of its life-cycle, and the IAEA is looking at replacing it with a next generation system.

Iran’s national day of nuclear energy

Today, Iran's president announced his country's decision to commence a new phase of construction at the uranium enrichment facility in Natanz. This move is likely to undermine the small increase in goodwill gained by the conclusion of the so-called work plan, and put the prospects of a negotiated settlement with Iran further beyond reach.

The media is being fed conflicting information about what, precisely, is going to be installed. The president referred to the installation of 'advanced centrifuges' (Reuters), but Global Security Newswire quotes an unnamed diplomat claiming that the centrifuges aren't the 'proprietary IR-2'. I would guess, however, that Iran has decided to start installation of the IR-2 (see my previous posts here and here).

In the last IAEA report there was mention of development work going on at Kalaye Electric, a 9,600 square-metre compound in east Tehran. This site was the centre of Iran's centrifuge effort between 1995 and 2002, when main operations was moved over to Natanz. Kalaye Electric was in torpor during Iran's application of the Additional Protocol, but must have restarted soon after it ceased to provisionally apply the agreement.


My suspicion is that Kalaye Electric has spearheaded the R&D drive on the IR-2, before the design was handed over to Natanz for testing.

Iran's capacity to produce carbon fibre rotors remains unknown. For its part, Iraq never acquired the necessary capacity, but instead bought 20 rotors from a European dealer. URENCO buys its carbon fibres from a Japanese company, Toray Industries Inc. Spinning high-quality carbon fibre is a complex, expensive and difficult process. It is done is specially designed winding machines.

More is undeniably to come.

Absent due to Call of Duty

Not the game.

I apologize for the light posting. I've spent the last two weeks travelling the Nordic countries (first my native Sweden and then neighbouring Norway) before heading home to find London covered by a fine layer of white snow. The Norway trip was on nuclear disarmament verification.

There is a lot of work to be done on how to verify the dismantlement of nuclear weapons. While it is relatively clear that some form of access to the weapon can be given to non-security cleared personnel, major uncertainties still remain as to what questions can be asked and what documentation can be requested. Uncertainties also remain in respect to measurements, records and chain of custody.

That said, we've had a lot of progress in understanding the dismantlement chain, and is therefore closer to defining the nuclear weapons complex. On balance, the Norway workshop was a positive experience. A less positive experience was our airport hotel, and the extortionate rate they charge us for the five minute ride to and from the train station. Larry MacFaul and I managed to get a couple of beers on the house though.

Anyway, the Atomic Weapons Establishment is likely to present some findings of their verification work at the NPT PrepCom in Geneva. If you plan to be there, drop by the presentation, since I am likely to hide in some dark corner. If you're not there, I'll summarize the discussions on this blog for you.