Safeguarding Sukhumi

Russia’s armed action in Georgia has few nuclear dimensions, but has nevertheless made me think about the long row of nuclear smuggling incidents in the region. One of the first nuclear institutes established by the Soviet Union was that in Sukhumi, Abkhazia. The institute was initially set up in an old sanatorium (all pictures in this post are taken at the site itself)

Lavrentiy Beria was born near Sukhumi and clearly wanted to bring one of the most prestigious and important projects in Soviet history back to where he grew up. He also went to technical school in the city.

Several German scientists were relocated there, and many seemed to have liked it. The contrast between post-war Germany and the lush and beautiful landscape of Abkhazia must have been hard to fathom. No expense was spared. Many Germans stayed for decades, and brought up their families around the facility. Many are buried in the now overgrown cemetery nearby.

The institute has now largely fallen into disrepair (many buildings in Abkhazia are still pockmarked by small arms fire), but concerns over the nuclear material balance at the facility have proven hard to dispel. 

GE view of the facility (42°58'59.93"N 41° 3'41.84"E)

From 8 to 10 September 2005, the IAEA conducted a safeguards mission to Abkhazia, reportedly to follow up on long-running concerns that at least two kilograms of weapons-usable uranium is missing from the facility. In the past, GSN have also reported on missing plutonium from the site.

Such concerns over the security and reporting of this institute are not new. Indeed there has been much uncertainty if or indeed whether plutonium had ever been stored in the facility. When Russian inspectors gained access to the institute in 1997, four years after Abkhazia proclaimed independence from Georgia, they found no indication of missing nuclear materials. They also determined that the facility had been deserted. A subsequent IAEA visit in 2001 (at the invitation of the Abkhaz government) confirmed these findings.

The Georgian authorities and Abkhazian officials cooperated fully with the inspectors when the IAEA visited in September 2005. The results were evaluated and were thereafter reported to the Georgian government in line with the provisions of Georgia’s safeguards agreement. As a break-away region of Georgia, Abkhazia is outside the Georgian government’s jurisdiction and control.

Under the existing safeguards agreement with Georgia, the agency is not required to inform the Abkhaz authorities of the result of the inspections (although it is something they are most likely to do anyway).

Since Abkhazia is not recognized by the international community, it cannot join the NPT nor bring into effect bilateral verification arrangements with the IAEA. Its facilities remain subject to the Agency’s safeguards agreement with Georgia. The IAEA has still to conclude subsidiary arrangements, detailing the rights and obligations for the IAEA and the facility operator for the Sukhumi Institute in Abkhazia.

The Abkhaz case highlights the problem in verifying failed or unrecognized states and points up the need to develop acceptable guidelines to deal with these (admittedly few) cases.