David Albright and Paul Brannan have produced yet another excellent analysis of the likely Syrian nuclear site near Al-Kibar. I have written about it in previous posts here and here, and Jeffrey Lewis's outfit have produced an enormous amount of high quality analysis.
In their briefing, Albright and Brannan describe a clever Syrian deception strategy involving a very elaborate counter-IMINT tactics, also known as 'hiding in plain view'. In 2003, the Syrians, together with their North Korean contractors, ran the gauntlet by erecting a fake roof and walls on a large, partly buried, North Korean reactor. They did so in the hope that reconnaissance satellites passing above wouldn't cover their part of the world, or that the imagery analysts on the receiving end of the data wouldn't pick up on the unusual construction.
Moreover, the counter-IMINT tactic involved not constructing new roads, or putting up other significant tracks, airfields, rail tracks, air defences and site security. In other words, their main strategy would have been to minimize the visible signature of the facility. In the military, it's known as camouflaging your position. One Russian word for camouflage is "Maskirovka".
Soviet lessons...
Before 1991, Syria and the Soviet Union enjoyed the closest of relations. The Syrian military was equipped and trained by the Soviets, and Eastern European military advisors littered the hot Syrian Desert. After 1991, the Soviets seized to exist, but the classes they taught seem to be remembered by their Syrian clients. The premier doctrine of the Soviet Armed forces was to rely on subterfuge, speed, depth and decisiveness in their operational art. A critical part here was the doctrine of strategic deception.
The doctrine was developed during the Second World War (or the Great Patriotic War). In the view of the Soviets, successful strategic deception depends on the thoroughness of similar measures on lower levels. What use is the best cover, they argued, if it is blown by sloppy movement security or poor communications discipline? In my mind, the meticulous attention to the slightest detail was on proud display in the run-up to Operation Uranus, which in 1942 totally encircled the German Sixth Army. The Germans were totally overwhelmed by the sheer speed and force of the Russian advance – and seem to have been totally unaware that it was coming. In 1976, Lieutenant General M.M. Kiryan summarized the main lessons learned by the Soviets in this way.
- Mislead your enemy about your intentions;
- Maintain the secrecy of your plans;
- Hide your combat preparations;
- Use new weapons, techniques and forms of combat when possible;
- Direct your main strike correctly, and make sure to strike at the right time;
- Use your forces in a surprising manner;
- Manoeuvre rapidly and strike decisively;
- Conduct fraudulent actions and engage in deception; and
- Always use the terrain, weather, time of year and season to your advantage.
In my mind, another contributing factor to the success of Soviet deception in World War 2 was the poor quality of German intelligence. This led to the Germans constantly underestimating the strength of the Russian divisions and the vast size of the Russian reserve. The Germans also tended to underestimate the capabilities of the Soviets – both intellectually and technologically. Underestimating your foe often comes with a terrible price.
... applied by Syria
The Syrians made clever use of camouflage in more than one sense. The obvious use of cover was to hide the true shape of the structure by erecting a false roof and walls. Albright and Brannan also suggest a clever connection to the electrical grid through a water treatment plant located some five kilometres to the east of the site.
They argue that similar camouflage had been deployed by the Iraqis in the mid-1990s. Indeed, the power lines to the Tarmiya EMIS facility were buried so that they could not be picked up on the infrared. That way, the true nature and capacity of the site could be concealed. The Iraqis also minimized the use of security and fencing in order to minimize the visual signature of the site.
The Syrian strategy was as successful as the Iraqi. It worked for years. Albright and Brannan reveal that in 2005, US analysts found the building but could not figure out what it was for; it was "odd and in the middle of nowhere". It was only after the Israelis shared ground photos of the site that the US realized what the box on the Euphrates really was. At the end of the day, human intelligence proved to be the most reliable. For the proliferators, let this (again) be a lesson never to allow cameras onto sensitive sites. After all, another partially underground facility in a neighbouring country was exposed through extensive use of snappy snaps. There is a reason, I suppose, as to why cameras are often the first piece of inspector kit to be banned.
Remarkably, US or Israeli intelligence have not suggested that they have access to signals intelligence of any kind. The Syrians must have consistently used excellent transmissions discipline and security, with low power transmitters, direct landline, or simple communications silence. Moreover, sensitive documentation must have been couriered rather then sent over some sort of electronic medium. E-mails must have been a big no-no. The light and noise discipline has been truly impressive.
It remains to be seen if the IAEA will get any form of meaningful access to the Al-Kibar site. And I am deeply sceptical that Ephraim Asculai's suggestion that the IAEA should play hardball with the Syrians will lead anywhere but straight into a brick wall. The Syrian's do not want to admit to something that would reek of non-compliance with the NPT. Moreover, by denying that the site was nuclear, they've essentially painted themselves into a corner. They could have gotten away with a simple safeguards breach (by failing to declare the reactor at its design stage) by playing the "peaceful programme" card.
It's too late for that game now.
Lessons for the future
I do believe, however, that satellite imagery should play a greater role in multilateral verification. The lack of satellite imagery processing capacity is a major lacuna in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Regime. More important, however, is to shore up a solid inspection mandate for the IAEA. This cannot be done through willpower alone, but must include some diplomatic and political wrangling. States enter into agreements voluntarily, and safeguards agreements are not an exception. IAEA inspectors are not snake-eaters that can be parachuted into hostile territory (I've met a few, and they don't appear to be the combative type). All their inspection activities happen with some form of consent by the host State.
However, when they do get access to a states territory, they shouldn't get trapped by a narrow legal mandate. The Agency is authorized by its member States to 'establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose' (see art III (A) (5) of the Statute). The Statute also envision a broad legal mandate, where inspectors '...have access at all times to all places and data and to any person who by reason of his occupation deals with materials, equipment, or facilities which are required by this Statute to be safeguarded ...' (see art XII (C) (6)).
Safeguards in application today are a far cry away from being as comprehensive as they were envisioned in the 1950s. Indeed, when States start to think about improving the safeguards system, they should be thinking about getting back to basics.
Moreover, strong export control legislation coupled with an aware industry has proven to be an effective obstacle to proliferation. It will be interesting to see how the Yun story pans out. You kill one network, another pops up?
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