The denuclearization process in North Korea has hit a much anticipated obstacle, namely how to deal with the correctness and completeness of North Korea's 'initial declaration'. The United States wants the DPRK to admit that it has an active uranium enrichment programme. Pyongyang does not want to play along with this game. It has repeatedly and publicly denied any enrichment programme, and will lose face if it suddenly admits to carrying a lie.Origins
On 11 March 1999, the Washington Post reported that the DPRK was looking to enrich its bomb-making capabilities, eagerly assisted by Pakistani scientists. The basis of the report was an US intelligence assessment claiming that 'North Korea's plan to set up a uranium enrichment capability for nuclear weapons is being helped by Pakistan, which has close ties to North Korea's missile program'. Over the summer, international media started to speculate about a 'missiles for centrifuges' arrangement between the two countries. Thereafter, the US intelligence community, in September 2002, 'learned that the North is constructing a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year when fully operational -- which could be as soon as mid-decade'. The facility would comprise about 3.500 to 5.000 P-1 centrifuges (making it relatively straightforward to hide).
While the US intelligence community seems uncertain about its 2002 assessment today, it is clear that North Korea got something in return for its missiles. This became painfully clear when A.Q. Khan came out of the nuclear closet in 2004. Details are still classified, but it's not likely that he offered the Koreans much more assistance than he offered Libya and Iran. The North is likely to have hit many technological obstacles trying to make sense of the inferior P-1 design.
Denuking the North
In 2005, North Korea agreed to implement a fairly ambitious denuclearization programme. According to the US-DPRK joint statement:
All elements of the DPRK's past and present nuclear programs – plutonium and uranium – and all nuclear weapons will be comprehensively declared and completely, verifiably and irreversibly eliminated, and will not be reconstituted in the future. According to these principles, the DPRK will return, at an early date, to the NPT and come into full compliance with IAEA safeguards, including by taking all steps that may be deemed necessary to verify the correctness and completeness of the DPRK's declarations of nuclear materials and activities.
In 2005, Jeffrey Lewis wrote, "The uncertainty surrounding North Korea's nuclear programs is a problem—North Korea will have to declare its nuclear facilities during Six Party Talks. What will happen when North Korea doesn't declare a gas centrifuge facility using all those components?"
It is not like this problem has not been foreseen by the nuclear negotiators. In 2007, the language on North Korea's declaration was much weakened. According to the denuclearization action plan, 'the DPRK will discuss with other parties a list of all its nuclear programs as described in the Joint Statement, including plutonium extracted from used fuel rods, that would be abandoned pursuant to the Joint Statement'. It is possible that Pyongyang interprets the agreement quite literally as simply delivering a list of its nuclear programs, and then having a discussion about it. Once it has allowed the other parties opportunity to talk about the list, it has fulfilled its end of the bargain. And undeniably, there is a marked difference between comprehensively declaring something and just discussing something.
Secret solution to a non-existing problem?
There is now some speculation that the uranium enrichment issue may be solved through a secret protocol. This would not help resolve outstanding issues from the point of view of multilateral verification. In order for the IAEA to resume meaningful work, they would need the implementation of all measures provided for in the DPRK's safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/403) and the Model Additional Protocol. If the DPRK agreed to it, and the Agency's Board of Governors approved it, all these measures could be initiated tomorrow.
The Agency would need a lot of information. It would require a full description of all peaceful and military nuclear activities, if any, and a chronology of their development. The Agency would also need information on research and development, uranium prospecting, source material production, imports and exports of items specified by the IAEA, all existing, dismantled and decommissioned facilities, and any future nuclear plans. Moreover detailed information would be required on any nuclear-weapon programme including technologies relevant to nuclear weapon development, as well as the organisation and administration, funding, key objectives and major milestones of such a programme.
The Agency is not likely to be able to assess this information on existing authority alone. It is likely that it needs supplemental authority going beyond the Additional Protocol. Such authority would give the Agency unrestricted access:
- to information - the right of access to whatever information or document the Agency deems relevant to its verification work, including that relating to the import and export of blueprints, sketches, materials, and equipment;
- to persons - the right to interview relevant personnel; and
- to locations - the right of access to any location in the DPRK including rights of access to all nuclear fuel cycle facilities, as well as any facilities and locations, including relevant military sites, or buildings deemed by the IAEA to be of relevance to its verification work; as well as to any equipment and technologies used for any civilian or military nuclear activities.
The authority has already been given through UNSCR 1718, but it would need to be implemented by North Korea.
It is unlikely, however, that North Korea will be willing to give the Agency this kind of mandate. And if a secret protocol may help resolve this issue once and for all, then secrecy it is.
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