More on the IRT

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, imagery analysts in the United States started to pay close attention to grainy black and white, low resolution images of a tiny patch of North Korean property. Over the last years, they had been watching how the Soviet Union had supplied its fellow communists with a small IRT-2000 type reactor. This is a pool-type reactor using water as moderator, reflector, top shielding as well as coolant. The reactor model was originally designed and built at the Atomic Energy Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The first unit was built in Moscow and fired up on 23 November 1957. It is a very basic and simple reactor design, meant to operate at low power levels. And it requires very little maintenance.

Around the same time as the IRT-2000 type reactor was being developed in Moscow, North Korean scientists received training at various institutes around the Soviet Union. Reportedly, the cooperation culminated in a 1959 nuclear agreement on nuclear cooperation between the two countries. I could not find the text in the United Nations Treaty Series, which is odd. However, I did find something else. On 6 July 1961, the DPRK and the Soviet Union signed its treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance, which sets out the parameters of economic relations between the two states to some degree. Then again, it's perhaps not that important which legal instrument underpinned the transfer of technology.

According to the RRDB, construction of the IRT-2000 started on 1 March 1963 and the reactor went critical on 15 August 1965. It's been relatively lightly crewed. Back in 1996, the North Korean's held that it was staffed by 20 people, of which 16 were reactor operators. The facility was placed in the northernmost corner of what's now a sprawling nuclear complex, and originally comprised less than ten buildings (see image 1). Little is available in the open domain as to which building actually houses which activity, but ISIS have often maintained that they believe that the building due south of the reactor contained the Institute of Radiochemistry, where separation work first occurred. On Google Earth capture from 2005, this building looks in a terrible state of disrepair compared to other buildings within the walled IRT compound.

Image 1: IRT-2000 (Corona image, 1970):

According to the IISS, the Institute for Radiochemistry was originally fitted with 20 shielded hot cells and glove boxes. These were installed to produce isotopes for various purposes (for instance medical or industrial) from irradiated "targets. It is quite possible that some targets were uranium, and that the DPRK produced weapons grade plutonium that way. Worst case estimates talks about a couple of kilograms produced in this manner between the early 1970s and the late 1990s. There is speculation that the waste from such operations could have been hidden in tanks that are buried just north-east of the reprocessing plant, some 2.5 kilometers away.

Image 2: IRT-2000 (Google Earth, 2005):

Today, the IRT is hidden away, often overlooked, in the maze of buildings that make up the Yongbyon nuclear complex. Now, the IRT-2000 is not on the list of suspended facilities this time around, and neither was it, actually, during the good old days of the Agreed Framework. A safeguards agreement is in place (INFCIRC/252) for this facility. My understanding is that it was actually put in there to prevent the DPRK from irradiating uranium targets. Its legal status is uncertain. However, my guess would be - without doing a lot of research on this - that the agreement is still in force. I do not seem to recall any provisions that say that facility specific safeguards agreements are in force only as long as the state in question is a member of the IAEA. Then again, I may be mistaken.

So what will the future hold for the IRT? Well, it has been suggested that North Korea could start to implement safeguards there again, perhaps as a step towards mending its "broken relationship" with the IAEA. And that, of course, would be a most welcome development. More likely, however, the reactor will first run out of the highly enriched fuel it so desperately needs, and then be boarded up for good. After all, it has passed its prime.

Monitoring Yongbyon

Six-party talks on, amongst other things, the future of North Korea's nuclear programme concluded on 19 July 2007 without providing a disarmament timetable. This is not really that surprising, given that the first six months of disarmament action was a scabrous affair, where all sides decided to play a waiting game over some North Korean funds frozen in Macao. Eventually, the North Koreans got what they wanted: the funds were laundered through the international banking system, and diplomats merrily reconvened in China, armed with pens and papers, ready to get their teeth into the next steps towards complete North Korean disarmament.

On 14 July 2007, technicians working at the DPRK's ageing old natural uranium fuelled reactor entered its control room set to shut it down. A fair guess is that they felt saddened, perhaps disappointed, by the decision to button up operations, especially since some facilities recently have been refurbished. Most likely, this is not the first time these operators have gone through a power-down procedure. After all, the reactor has been intermittently used ever since North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003, and the subsequent collapse of the 1994 Agreed Framework (see this excellent ISIS analysis of recent reactor activities and this CRS write-up by Sharon Squassoni). However, this time around the control room staff should have been accompanied by the "shaggy dogs" of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

They weren't however. A team of Agency inspectors left Vienna on 12 July 2007. And when they arrived at a pleasantly warm - albeit slightly rainy - Yongbyon (according to this weather site, temperatures on site have ranged between 20 and 30 degrees this month) they were greeted by their Korean interlocutors, and politely informed (probably with a smile) that the shut-down had happened earlier that day. The team is led by Mr. Adel Tolba. Little is known about the team-leader other than that he holds robust views, is a straight-shooter, and that he seems to be constantly well dressed (the keen observer will see him on pictures from the first trip to the DPRK wearing a great looking garb). It is a fair guess that he'd wanted to oversee the procedure himself. Snubbed, he probably frowned, lit up another of his cigarettes and instructed his team to start sealing up the place. "The place" being:

• Yongbyon Experimental NPP No. 1 (39°47'50.37"N 125°45'17.70"E)
• Yongbyon Experimental NPP No. 2 (39°47'20.09"N 125°45'41.94"E)
• The Radiochemical Laboratory (39°46'52.87"N 125°45'10.39"E)
• The Fuel Fabrication Plant (39°46'13.63"N 125°44'54.11"E)
• The Tacheon NPP (39°55'39.84"N 125°34'9.22"E)

The little guy ain't on the list

I may be mistaken, but I seem to recall that ENPP-2 refers to the unfinished hull just north-west of the plutonium reprocessing plant (the radiochemical laboratory as the North Koreans prefer to call it). If I am correct, one reactor in the Yongbyon complex seems to be missing from the list of shutdown facilities, namely the ancient, as well as tiny, IRT reactor (39°48'28.22"N 125°45'4.36"E). This reactor, imported from Russia, was one of the first buildings on the site. It was constructed in 1963 and went critical in 1965. Today, the reactor (which is fuelled by highly-enriched uranium) is plagued by fuel shortages, and therefore operates only occasionally for experiments and isotope production. Near this reactor is a small hot cell facility, capable of separating and processing a range of radioisotopes. It is sometimes suspected that it was in that building where North Korea separated its first miniscule quantities of plutonium (no reason to be overly upset: many years ago Jared Draeicer calculated how much plutonium this reactor can produce - it's a tiny amount).

Other then that: everything according to plan?

The IAEA brought with it one ton of equipment, packed in several crates and then hauled it on what looks like a commercial flight. In all fairness, it might have been chartered, but imagine if it was Air Koryo Korean Airways, and that they charged for overweight... hmmm... there is actually a 11:30 departure from Beijing every Tuesday and Saturday (and the inspectors did arrive on a Saturday). How much would the DPRK state carrier charge for a ton? Easy way to make a buck on verification, DPRK style.

Anyway, the equipment they brought with them indicates a fairly straight-forward procedure, which is probably along the lines I outlined in this previous post. When the seals are applied, and the cameras hooked up, tested, and operating, most of the team will return, leaving a few members behind. Jeffrey Lewis and friends have posted a rare picture of the guest house, which actually doesn't look that bad. I suspect, however, that it has a serious bug problem.

Update: Someone told me today that, yes, the inspectors had been on the 11:30 flight going out from Beijing but that it was presently unknown how much they charged for the overweight. My caller also informed that there is, nowadays, also a service on Thursday mornings (the official webpage has not been updated) and that one unusual item on the equipment list had been a fairly bulky power generator. A colleague at VERTIC suggested that the area might experience intermittent power delivery now when the reactor has been turned off. Sharp.

Securing minor concessions

On 11-12 July 2007, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) staff members visited Iran to discuss a work plan, aimed at resolving outstanding nuclear issues. The meeting also aimed to clarify some of the safeguards implementation issues that Iran and the Agency have been wrestling with lately. The mission seems to have been somewhat successful.

The moderate success is not due to an inexperienced Agency team. On the contrary, Jeffrey Lewis posted the Agency team composition some time ago: led by deputy-director general Olli Heinonen, it also included Herman Nackaerts (one of Heinonen's boys), Johan Rautenbach (he's not a simple legal advisor, he actually heads the entire Office of Legal Affairs) and Vilmos Cserveny, the director of EXPO (which is another crucially important office within the IAEA). Their Iranian counterparts seem to have been, amongst others, Javad Vaeedi, from the powerful Supreme National Security Council of Iran, and Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran's ambassador to the IAEA.

Rather, the conclusions of the meeting seems to be colored by Iran's enstrangement from the Agency. Now, Iran has said that they will allow the IAEA to visit their reactor construction in Arak, and that they will work towards finalizing the verification protocol at the uranium enrichment facility in Natanz. And the IAEA press release mentions that another meeting will be held in Vienna later this month, presumably to talk about the latter issue. But while the Natanz deal may actually lead somewhere, the Arak concession is so small its painful.

Why the fuzz over Arak?


The Arak complex (34°22'7.67"N 49°14'29.25"E) houses not only a reactor construction but also a heavy water production plant. This highly secured industrial compound was scheduled to be visited by the IAEA Director General on 21-22 February 2003, but that visit fell through. On 5 May 2003, Iran wrote to the Agency and informed it, for the first time, about its intention to construct a heavy water research reactor at the site. The heavy water reactor programme is quite old. Iran took the decision to start research & development in the early 1980s. The decision to build the reactor itself had been taken in the mid-1990s (see GOV/2003/63:46). The purpose of the reactor, according to Iran, is to conduct research and development and to produces radioisotopes for industrial and medical use. Again, according to the Iranians, a relatively large reactor, in the order of 30-40 megawatts-thermal was necessary in order to "have a sufficient neutron flux" (GOV/2003/75: 42).

It is not clear exactly when construction on the reactor started. Agency inspectors first reported construction in March 2005 (GOV/2005/67:33). It has then carried out design information verification at a regular basis. One was, for instance, carried out on 29 January 2007 (GOV/2007/8:13). During 2007, however, Iran's cooperation with the Agency has eroded, and it suddenly refused the IAEA's request to visit Arak again.

As has been pointed out by Daryl Kimball, Robert Einhorn and others, Arak could be used as a bomb factory. The reactor size is suitable for plutonium production. How much? Well, a lot of your results will depend on factors such as thermal efficiency and load factor (how long the reactor can operate), but the the most significant variable is the burnup. With a burn-up of some 200 MWD/t, and a flow of some 50 tons of natural uranium fuel going through the reactor, the yearly plutonium production would be some 9,4 kilograms of plutonium, and the mixture would be very fine indeed for a weaponeer, it would look something like this:

Pu238: -
Pu239: 9,3 kilograms
Pu240: 10 grams
Pu241: 1 gram
Pu242: -

These 9,4 kilograms could be used for one or perhaps two plutonium based weapons per year - and the low plutonium-240 content makes it very useful for nuclear weaponeers.

What is design information?
Simply put, the state under safeguards hand over blueprints of their nuclear facilities to the Agency, so that they can check that they contain no hidden areas, trapdoors, concealed elevators, hidden basements, etc. This information is crucial so that the inspector knows where he is and what's supposed to be behind a certain door. If the inspector does not know this, he may be mislead (the Israelis used some pretty effective deception techniques at Dimona). So design information contains:

• a facility description;
• the form, quantity, location and flow of nuclear material being used; and
• procedures for nuclear material accountancy and control.

This information is then being used by the IAEA to, amongst other things, design a safeguards approach for the entire facility. The design information verification inspection aims to check that the state's blueprints and plans are complete and accurate. Quite obviously, the IAEA then has the right to periodically revisit the design. If not, a state could embark on a ambitious reconstruction scheme once the first (and only) inspection has been done.

So, did the meeting produce any breakthroughs?
Well, no. While Iran's statement that they will allow for an inspection in Arak may sound grand and like they are making some great concession, they are really only doing what's required of them. The Agency has been keeping an eye on Arak since the first Persian shovel hit the dirt. Since then, the inspectors have simply tried to do their job. The Iranians refused to let them continue to do verify the reactor design and then changed their mind. As pointed out by Albright, Shire and Brannan, "Iran has already turned over design information and has no legal basis for refusing the IAEA’s requests to verify design information at the facility". So, sure, it's fine that they are now letting the Agency go back at doing what they're supposed to do. But being grateful or thankful for that is a bit like thanking someone who just broke into your house, but then decided to change his mind.

Hopefully, continued discussions in Vienna will result in Iran finally allowing remote monitoring at the uranium enrichment facility. The Iranians feel singled out, and have asked the Agency to provide examples of remote monitoring in other enrichment sites. The reaction is a bit childish. Clearly, the IAEA has decided that cameras capable of transmitting images off site are necessary components in the safeguards approach for the site. Iran has very little to lose by letting these cameras stream images to Vienna, and their argument that such an arrangement would somehow jeopardize the physical security of the site just doesn't hold water.

Those who wish to take out Natanz already has good plans for how to do that - and I am for one pretty sure that those plans doesn't involve tapping in to the Agency's video-feed.

Olli Heineken

I was just, as so many of us, trying to catch up with the news coming out from North Korea and Iran when I came across this formulation in World Nuclear News:

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said it had reached a deal with Iran to allow an inspection of the Arak heavy water reactor. A delegation from the IAEA headed by Olli Heineken, deputy director general for safeguards, visited Iran on 11-12 July.

Whoa, back up. Olli... Heineken? I wish, really wish, that someone with photo editing skills could redo this old beer commercial into a roadmap capable of solving the Iranian nuclear issue/crisis/file (pick your word):

DG statements

A couple of days ago, the IAEA DG briefed the press on Iran, the DPRK and the Agency's budget situation. His briefing followed an extraordinary meeting with the Board of Governors. The entire press background is available on the Agency's website, but I'll cross post the audio files here for the sake of simplicity.

• DG speaks on Iran;
• DG speaks on the DPRK; and
• DG speaks on the budget situation.

IAEA – Iran Action Plan

Jeffrey Lewis has an excellent post up on the new action plan the IAEA intends to draw up with Iran. His report includes a reference to Sweden and the Swedish nuclear program. He is pointing us towards a report by the Stimson Centre, but those who know some Swedish may want to have a look at the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate's series on Sweden and the bomb. (some reports are in English).

• Försvarets forskningsanstalt och planerna på svenska kärnvapen (pfd)
• Sweden and the Bomb. The Swedish Plans to Acquire Nuclear Weapons, 1945–1972 (pdf)
• Nuclear Weapons Research in Sweden. The Co-operation between Civilian and Military Research, 1947 - 1972 (pdf)
• Kärnvapenforskning i Sverige. Samarbetet mellan civil och militär forskning (pdf)
• Making a Historical Survey of a State's Nuclear Ambitions (pdf)
  

The Stimson report is alright as well, I guess.

Anyway, just to add to Jeffrey's post. I've had precious little time to follow up properly on Iran lately, but I did had a quick chat with a few friends in Vienna, and the mood there could be described as "cautious optimism". That is, some of the people I talked to actually believed that something could happen. Whatever that is, however, it would be incremental, such as releasing the documentation concerning uranium metal and its casting into hemispheres. Others were more pessimistic about the prospects for progress. The impression I got was that most felt that "something" would come out of the trip.

At a meeting here in London last week or so, I argued that too much optimism was uncalled for. A small step will create immediate goodwill in the world's media, I said, but the outstanding issues are so fundamental that it will take years and years to resolve them. Even if Iran were to reapply the additional protocol, the Agency investigation is likely to take many years, in light of the clandestine nature of Iran's nuclear program.

But, by all means, let's hope for the best. It's good that Heinonen's busy.

h/t armscontrolwonk

Happy reading (for some)

On 3 July 2007, the IAEA Director-General circulated a report on monitoring and verification in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the Board of Governors. I obtained a copy of this report from a diplomat and friend close to the Agency, and it makes for highly interesting reading. It appears that Olli Heinonen's team of seasoned Agency inspectors was indeed given the complete tour of the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex. But most interesting is, of course, the inspection protocol agreed with the DPRK.

The Agency's Office of Legal Affairs employed a very elegant - yet so obvious - solution to the problem that North Korea isn't a member of the Agency anymore. The office invoked article III.A.5 of the Statute which gives the Agency authorization to:

establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy.

It is the Agency's view that this 'authorization does not require the State to be a member of the Agency and does not prescribe a particular form or substance for safeguards arrangements. The monitoring and verification in the DPRK will therefore be consistent with the Statute'. This is a beautiful solution, which fits perfectly with the role and mandate of the organization.

So what is the content of the deal? Well, the solution here is also quite elegant, and in line with the mandate contained in the Agency Statute. The IAEA will receive a list of facilities which has been shut down and/or sealed by North Korea. The Agency will thereafter be given access to all facilities on that list. As I suspected, the Agency will then apply their own seals and install whatever video surveillance they deem necessary to fulfill the verification task. If surveillance cannot be installed for practical reasons (political reasons are not valid excuses), the IAEA and the DPRK will agree on the implementation of other appropriate measures. These measures aren't defined in the agreement, but are likely to include inspections, which is probably why there is a clause in there about the DPRK having to furnish the necessary visas to the IAEA.

The Agency's activities in the DPRK will be quite cheap, approximately US$5.3m over two years. But the Agency being cost effective is not a substitute for a fresh influx of money into the organization. It is in need of cash, and states better take the DG's comments about the severity of the situation seriously, or ultimately risk having an organization without capability to fulfill its mandate.

This is obviously just a first step on a very long journey. A full disclosure of all North Korean nuclear activities is expected, and the Agency will be involved in the verification of that disclosure. Beyond doubt, this will require a thorough verification process. For now, however, the IAEA has secured a good arrangement and a sound base for its future efforts. And you know what? This is probably the first good news in respect to arms control I've looked at this year.

T&V and CSNT

Apologies for not posting in a while. I've been quite busy preparing a new funding proposal and getting our national implementation measures website ready for launch. Also, some of my analysis of developments in the DPRK and Iran has been snatched by the editor of Trust & Verify (a new issue is due later this month).

However, don't forget that the International Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism enters into force tomorrow. And also don't forget to have a great weekend.