New Look

Like the Chrysler at night, I got tired of the green feeling and decided to choose a new and blue template for the blog. I think that this template is easier to read and perhaps a bit less 'in your face'. Content's the same though. Please let me know if you think I choose unwisely.

(I suspect that all of my readers have been in New York, but for those who haven’t - the Chrysler Building (pictured) changes its lights every night. A long time ago, spending a couple of months at the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, I was fortunate enough to get an office facing the building. It was absolutely spectacular to see the building change its look every night. Spectacular building. Spectacular city).

Death of UNMOVIC

On 29 June 2007, the Security Council voted to disband UNMOVIC, thus dissolving the last of a long line of organizations involved in scrutinizing Iraq's non-existing weapons of mass destruction. Many in the arms control field has called for UNMOVIC to be preserved somehow in order to preserve its unique expertise and have a mechanism in place should the Security Council call for the establishment of a dedicated inspectorate again. Personally, I was never convinced by those arguments. To me, having a verification body without a mission sounded more like the way Austria maintained an admiralty after the first world war, even thought there was no ships to administer. Sure, you can never foresee the future. UNMOVIC could have gotten a new mission, just as Austria could have reclaimed the Croatian coastline and reconstituted its former naval might. And however forcefully people like my former director, Dr. Trevor Findlay, tried to argue that the expertise of UNMOVIC should be retained, it almost exclusively sounded like a retrospective golden dream. A bit like Austrian admirals dreaming of the fleet that once was.

Was it ever likely for UNMOVIC to go back to Iraq, to deliver a "definitive statement about the existence of weapons of mass destruction" in the country, as the Russian ambassador seems to have preferred? Even if the U.S. had allowed it, could the organization have dealt with the vicious and dangerous post-Saddam Hussein security environment? Could it have verified the findings of the Duelfer Report? This is all unclear.

The United Nations could not have been able to do its job without massive protection from Coalition forces (few UN watchers have forgotten the terrible fate of Sergio Vieira de Mello and dozens of his co-workers in 2003). And a veto by the coalition on where to go and what to see, even if it had been prompted by real security concerns, would have cast doubt on the reliability of UNMOVIC's findings. Perhaps a reconstituted, stable and peaceful Iraq would have invited inspectors back to finish the job and close the book, a bit like Romania invited the IAEA to perform a special inspection investigating some aspects of Nicolae Ceauşescu's suspected nuclear weapons program. But for now, the Iraqi government seems more interested in transferring the assets in UNMOVIC’s escrow account to the Development Fund for Iraq and of UNMOVIC property to the government itself.

It is undeniably in order to laud the now disbanded organization for its good work, to regret that it was not allowed to finish its job before the invasion, and to be rightfully upset about the way post-Iraq was handled. However, one should not hold on to an organization without a mandate for the sake of it. And it is not correct, I believe, to claim that "we get to reinvent the wheel with future ad hoc inspectorates, something we may regret in the event North Korea agrees to shutter its missile programs as the Clinton Administration had sought"

In my mind it is not that simple. As Trevor Findlay and Ben Mines argued in 2004:

The UNMOVIC case has demonstrated that an international inspection body can perform creditably. It was able to prepare itself well, deploy quickly, use technology skilfully, organise itself efficiently, maintain its impartiality and produce sober, balanced reports of a high technical standard. It was also able to successfully follow intelligence leads and reach quick and decisive
conclusions.

However, they also argued that:

Whether the idea of a permanent UNMOVIC as a standby mechanism for future Iraq-type cases is feasible remains to be seen. It may have a certain deterrent value and actual utility if urgent action is needed. However, its relationship to other verification and inspection organisations and arrangements would need to be carefully considered to avoid harming them.

I don't think we need to reinvent any wheels, should the United Nations be called upon to fill a certain arms control lacunae yet again. UNMOVIC drew lessons from UNSCOM. Any future regime is likely to draw lessons from UNMOVIC. But since it is likely to be deployed in another part of the world, where conditions may be very different, it is likely to have a very different staff composition and organizational structure. Imagine the future disappointment if it transpired that UNMOVIC was not up to the task in that very different environment.

Maybe I am assaulting the holy grail of arms control, but all I am saying is that the disbandment of UNMOVIC need not necessarily be a bad thing.

UNMOVIC: Lessons learned

The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), released its so-called compendium the other day. It details the work of the Commission, as well as aspects of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. Especially interesting is the Commission's chapter on lessons learned. The scope of the report is modest, only some 1,100 pages. It will take months to digest it all, but it's probably a good idea to find some time to go through some of it.

So, happy reading boys and girls…

Off to Brussels

I am heading off to Brussels to participate in a meeting on UNSCR 1540, organized by, amongst others, my friend Matt Martin at the Stanley Foundation. Some of you may know that VERTIC is running a project on "National Implementation" of international norms (Matt didn't). This project has been running since 2005, and is funded by the Global Opportunities Fund. We are mostly active in the Middle East, having organized to workshops on international law, one together with the GRC in Dubai, and one together with CMC Amman. The first attracted participation from all Gulf States (including Iran) and the second one branched out to the west (we had Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco and Syria in attendance). Both workshops featured speakers from all relevant international organizations, including the 1540 committee. So it's unfair to say (which for instance Princeton University did) that no workshops have been conducted in the Middle East. Dear Princeton people, we've covered them all, and we did it more than a year ago. You guys are really hurting our feelings…

Due to sensitivities involved in the technical assistance business, I am not at liberty to tell you much more about the project, other than that it is really alive and well, especially with the addition of a third lawyer, Rocio Escauriaza, to our team.

Anyway, blogging will resume next week. In the meanwhile, I'd like to share two little pieces I wrote on UNSCR 1540 implementation back in November 2006. The first paper is really an analysis of the weaknesses of the resolution, and obstacles facing its proper implementation. I can't see that much have changed since I wrote it. The second thing is just a slide show (you may find some statistics interesting). If you have time, money, and inclination, find Daniel Joyner's article in the Leiden Law Review as well. Daniel, who is writing a book on non-proliferation law, is quite critical of the resolution. I remain a bit more traditional in my analysis, committed as I am to the legal positivism taught at Stockholm University.

Back to the DPRK

The return of the Agency
There has been movement on the stalled Denuclearization Action Plan (the DAP), which calls on the DPRK to "shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment" what's referred to as the Yongbyon Nuclear Facility (including its reprocessing facility). According to the plan, the various facilities at the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex (YNC) should have been shut down and sealed by 20 April 2007. However, the DAP ran into trouble over the transfer of money from a privately owned bank in Macao, the Banco Delta Asia, to any bank in any third state. The problem was essentially that North Korea, facing restrictions on the transfer of money, wanted some sort of guarantee that it could move around its off-shore holdings without other states intervening. However, those other states did not want to accept the cash, fearing US repercussions. Also, some may be reluctant to have North Korean money gushing around their financial systems, since that practice may potentially breach paragraph 8 (d) of UNSCR 1718 (2006). So far, however, it is fair game to trade with the DPRK since economic sanctions are targeted. Only Council-designated individuals or entities are subject to sanctions. And according to the latest report by the chair of the Sanctions Committee, no individuals or entities have been designated so far. But a risk averse banker may feel that this is something that may change at short notice. So, the entire process ran into a bit of trouble.

The North Koreans wanted to feel that they could trust the monetary system to accept their funds. At the end of the day, only the Russians seemed willing to play along, and the funds (US$25m) was transferred out of Macao. What surprised many was the length of the hold: some argued that it is going to be solved eventually, while others, myself included, expressed skepticism about the tenability of the plan. Then again, you're probably more likely to get a prediction on North Korea right if you base your prediction on the flip of a coin rather than rational arguments. Anyway, cooler heads prevailed, and pessimists like yours truly have been proven wrong (for now). And that's a good thing.

The International Atomic Energy Agency has finally been invited to talk business with the North Koreans. On Sunday, 24 June 2007, an august team of Agency veterans left Vienna for the DPRK. On the team's roster are, according to some reports, Olli Heinonen, the head of the department, and Kaluba Chitumbo, the head of Operations A (the division that deals with the Asia-Pacific region). Dr. Chitumbo is an Agency veteran who joined the Agency in 1984 after having served 14 years at the Zambian National Council for Scientific Research. Before that, he studied chemistry at the University of Uppsala, where he got his doctorate. Two team members are unnamed, but it's a fair bet that Olli and Kaluba brought with them additional technical and legal expertise – with the same amount of experience.

Facing familiar problems
Paradoxically, all that weight of knowledge and expertise is likely to be applied to a fairly straightforward task, namely to verify that a number of agreed processes at Yongbyon is verifiably shut down and sealed. The nuclear complex is a large facility, almost a small city unto itself, with a staff of about 1,000 scientists and research technicians, and several thousand general services and security personnel. The complex covers about seven and a half square kilometers.

Under the Agreed Framework, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) used a number of safeguards techniques to verify a "freeze on the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities" (some of them are outlined below). It is not clear what activities should be frozen this time around, but it is fairly reasonable to assume that a comprehensive suspension will be discussed. It is also quite obvious that the first item on the agenda is to see which technical elements could be salvaged from the Agreed Framework. In addition, the legal person on the team will have to fight hard to find a solution with reconciles the language of the Denuclearization Action Plan with operative paragraph 6 of UNSCR 1718. The crux is that the DAP emphasizes a cooperative, flexible, solution where the DPRK is allowed to negotiate the parameters of the task whereas UNSCR 1718 contains quite uncompromising language on monitoring and verification.

In any event, a number of important questions need to be answered at this particular juncture.

1. What facilities within the YNC should be shut down and sealed? A list of buildings is likely to be drawn up at this stage.

2. How should the shutdown be verified at each specified building? Here, the Agency is likely to draw on some of its experience in monitoring the freeze under the Agreed framework.

3. Should some form of activities be permitted at a shut-down facility? The North Koreans are likely to want to be allowed to conduct some form of routine maintenance, should this present round of discussions fail. The notion that each designated building should be sealed would indicate that North Korea is not allowed into already shut-down buildings. However, there are some plausible workarounds – or alternative definitions of what it means to seal something – foreseeable here that the Koreans may want to probe.

4. What timeframe should the Koreans be allowed to operate within when shutting down its facilities? Should there be room for some flexibility in that timeframe?

Can solutions be found in the past?
It is imperative that Messrs Heinonen and Chitumbo strive to avoid repeating some of the problems that plagued Agency monitoring during the Agreed Framework (the GAO wrote a report about some of these problems, the report is now some nine years old, but aptly illustrates some of the symptoms of a less than perfect working relationship).

For instance, one problem with the implementation of the agreed framework was that the Agency was denied access to certain auxiliary buildings, since the North Koreans did not allow visits to buildings only indirectly associated with the freeze. It remains to be seen if the North Koreans will consider that all buildings at the YNC should fall under the present agreement. If not, Agency inspectors may yet again get access to certain buildings at the site only at a case-by-case basis.

Once that has been decided, the Agency can employ quite familiar techniques to make sure that the facilities or the machinery isn't used. Last time, they put tamper-indicating seals on equipment and installations that were frozen. The applications run from low-tech cap seals, which are metallic, single-use, seals, to more sophisticated fiber-optic stuff. The Agency is not likely to naively believe that seals cannot be defeated, so a number of supporting safeguards measures are likely to be installed. For instance, video cameras will be installed at key points, to monitor movement of people and goods into and out of the area. These cameras are likely to be the DCM-14 workhorse. Finally, a short-notice inspection scheme is likely to be used to monitor certain equipment and areas in the shut down facilities that have not been allowed to be sealed. This scheme is likely to require the permanent placement of Operations A inspectors at the facility itself.

North Korea was planning to unload their 5MW(e) reactor in the latter part of 2007 or in early 2008. The 8,000 rods in the reactor is likely to contain a large amount of unseparated plutonium. If the past is indicative of the future, the reactor operator would require some three months unloading the fuel. It would thereafter need to be placed in the pool in the large spent fuel storage building adjacent to the reactor building. This unloading would need to occur if the reactor is to be decommissioned. However, in the short run, it is probably prudent to insist that the fuel rods remain in the shut down reactor for as long as they can. Thereafter, Agency inspectors would need regular access to the spent fuel storage to verify, amongst other things, that the rods are in fact irradiated fuel rods.

This saga has yet to end. Expect more, but not necessarily the worst.

Iranian centrifuge construction

I'm taking a break from thinking about managed inspections. Believe me, it's more fun than one would think to look at means to protect classified information from leaking to inspectors. But I've been doing it for the most part of the day, and I am getting a bit saturated. Therefore, I decided to do some Natanz calculations, taking into account ElBaradei's comments, which were flagged by Jeffrey Lewis here. Iran could have 8,000 centrifuges by Christmas, but that would require them to accelerate construction well beyond what they've managed so far. It would also require them to push beyond the magical "lack of components ceiling". I put everything into Excel, and allowed Microsoft to do the calculations for me. This is what I got. The left column is a simple projection based on historical construction, the middle assumes that the Iranians can put together one cascade per week, and the right hand that they can put together two cascades per week. You pick what you believe. Although ElBaradei is a very capable guy, I personally remain sceptical to any claim that the Iranians suddenly constructs at a pace much higher than historically proven.

And really, the amount of centrifuges in there isn't that important. The international community knows that construction is ongoing, and that the size of the facility already exceeds what Pakistan had at the beginning of their nuclear weapons programme. As I said before, we're definitely heading into very rough waters.

If the figures look, well, a bit ugly, blame blogger. Although I am not completely behind on HTML, I cannot figure out how to put nice tables in without messing up all formatting. It's a user friendly service, whenever it feels like being user friendly...

India to expand reprocessing

From Platts: "India is constructing two more reprocessing plants in addition to the three already operating at Tarapur, Kalpakkam and Trombay, S. K. Munshi, chief superintendent of reprocessing facilities at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center at Trombay, said June 12. In an interview following a talk given at the IBC Global Conferences' radioactive waste management conference in London, he said two new plants were being built at Tarapur and Kalpakkam which should start operating within the next few years. "Reprocessing is a must to meet our closed nuclear fuel cycle program," Munshi said."

Exploring some legalities

This is interesting. Ambassador Soltaniyeh has said that Iran is not prepared to accept any additional monitoring or verification schemes until Israel joins the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and submits its facilities to Agency safeguards. But that is not all. He also thinks that the nuclear weapon states should "act to article VI" of the treaty before Iran is obliged to do something about the confidence deficit that currently plagues its nuclear program.

This technique, of attempting to make the proper implementation of ones own obligations conditional on something else, is unfortunately not very new. In 1995, Sir Nicholas Lyell, the British Attorney-General, argued that article VI "suggests strongly the conviction that it might not be possible to achieve nuclear disarmament without general and complete disarmament, and then only if it was bolstered by strict and effective international control". What Sir Lyell said, of course, was that every single gun on the planet needs to be removed (and put under effective international control) before the nuclear weapons states are required to get rid of their nuclear weapons. This is no longer the position of Her Majesty's Government, possibly due to its realization that the argument is… well… silly.

Now, this is not deterring Ambassador Soltaniyeh, whose comments have a menacing Chinese undertone. Let me explain. The Kuomintang (the Chinese National Party) has argued for over 70 years that treaties are only valid for as long as they are implemented fairly. In theory, treaties are "based on mutual benefit and equality of states", which means that a treaty under which one party incurs all the obligations, and the other party all the rights would be unequal. According to the Kuomintang, this meant that the treaty is void and can be renounced at will. The Chinese communists have a similar view. According to the 1991 edition of the Concise Law Science Dictionary unequal treaties are those "concluded by the coercion of one party through unjust methods with the aim of imposing unequal obligations on the other party". The ChiCom definition won't help Soltaniyeh much since the NPT was drafted and negotiated in an open process, hardly "unjust methods". That's not the point, however. The point is that Soltaniyeh's comments feel like a set-up for the suspension of Iran's adherence to some articles under the NPT itself (something allowed under article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).

Anyway, even though I recently published a paper on an "extra reinforced inspection committee", this is the first time I've heard of any moves to actually establish one, and that it has been proposed for over two years! It's a good idea (I would say that wouldn't I), and it should be explored. Especially since the "extra reinforced inspection committee" actually will help safeguards some of Iran's rights under the treaty. Let's hope that the Ambassador's comments are his own, and not representative of the Iranian policy establishment as a whole.

Inside the Agency, part 2

The second part of Rob Broomby's report on the International Atomic Energy Agency is available here.

The usual turmoil in Vienna

This week, the IAEA Board of Governors is due to meet in Vienna, Austria. Before the Board lies the draft annual report for 2006, which describes all Agency activities throughout the year. Another item is the safeguards implementation report for 2006, which provides a description and analysis of the operation of the treaty, and which summarizes some of the problems encountered. I intend to write more about that a little bit later.

Over the last three years, it has become customary to discuss Iran at each Board meeting. This meeting is not expected to be different. On 11 June, the Director-General delivered his statement to the Board. This statement reflects on the "brewing confrontation" between Iran and the West. While emphasizing the need for a negotiated statement, he doesn't really go all the way and call on the Security Council to lift their three resolutions on Iran. Instead, he emphasizes that "transparency and cooperation by Iran would … be in the interest of … Iran", especially since "the lack of progress on our verification mission, coupled with the additional limitations on our verification authority, has resulted in a deterioration of the Agency's level of knowledge regarding certain aspects of Iran´s nuclear programme".

The U.S. Ambassador to the Agency immediately called a press conference, telling the assembled reporters that the IAEA reports show "a trend of Iran increasingly withholding cooperation with the IAEA", a statement which undeniably carries some validity.

In the meanwhile, Mr. Javad Vaeedi, the deputy secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, the body which is supposed to be formulating Iran's nuclear policies, has met with a representative of the European Union in an attempt to build on the 30 May meeting between Javier Solana and Mr. Vaeedi's boss, Ali Larijani. The deputy secretary commented that one "should not expect [the meeting] to make a miracle". This corresponds to the same comments Mr. Vaeedi made in Iran on 24 May, when he said that a "dialogue of resistance" is necessary to safeguard Iran's nuclear energy which is necessary for Iran "attaining a geostrategic position"… hmmm… How did he manage to avoid getting fired after that statement?

Then, of course, someone exercised a little bit of information warfare by leaking a story to the AP that Vaeedi was also going to meet with Mr. Olli Heinonen, our stern DDG Safeguards, to explain a few discrepancies. For the second time in a short while, the Iranians claim that the AP was misinformed. This time around, however, the Agency kept quiet, and did not publish a rebuttal. If I were that AP journo, I would be completely paranoid by now…

Absent friends

Today, on Sweden's national day, I'd like to remember Tobias Boström Renström. He was a childhood friend of mine who gave his life to the service of peace in Yugoslavia in 1993. Strange thing was, I was at serving in the same mission but didn't even know he was in the same AO until he was dead. In fact, last time I saw him was on a C-130 on his final journey home. I still remember standing at attention, saluting as the gray bird took off, being the representative of my family, as well as a member of my armed forces. It wasn't really the best time of my life.

A week ago, my parents gave me a video shot in the 70s. Tobias was in the video and he was, well, a kid. We were on vacation in Norway. Who would have thought that he gave his life 20 years later, some 10 kilometers from one of his childhood friends without even knowing that he was in the same country? Life is fragile, my friends. Treasure it. Don't be fucking careless…

But do know that Tobias died doing what he loved to do: soldiering.

Shopping for bombs

A couple of weeks ago, I finished reading Gordon Coreras excellent book 'shopping for bombs', which details the rise and fall of Abdul Qadeer Khan's black market empire. My career in the UK actually started with me looking at the newly instituted Proliferation Security Initiative. I was working with BASIC then, so some of my time was actually spent convincing various FCO officials that I did think that the PSI was a good idea (somehow, they seemed to think that I was into entrapment). Nowadays, the PSI is a more or less a household name, and many of the recommendations that we at BASIC brought forward back then has been implemented. (No, I don't think that they were listening to us --- it's purely coincidental).

Anyway, Gordon's book is really interesting, even for us who work in the field. He actually manages to make nuclear non-proliferation exciting. He is taking us into a murky world of flash weddings, suave salesmen, fast cars, treachery, money and high politics. Reading his book is almost like watching an episode of the Sopranos, except that Tony Soprano is Pakistani, has a degree in metallurgy, and is generally considered to be the "father of the Islamic bomb".

It's a great book. Not surprising, really, since Gordon is a great guy, and great guys tend to write great books. The only thing I could not figure out was what he's thoughts really are on the involvement of the Pakistani government. I did try to talk to Gordon about it, but he just avoided the question. That said, avoiding the question while remaining friends with everybody is an admirable trait.

Look at Mikoyan, the only Soviet communist that has participated in Stalin's government, and attended John F. Kennedys as well as Lenin's funeral. He was Armenian, and known for his ability to remain in the centre of power while, at the same time, keeping out of trouble. The story goes that one day during a rainstorm, a colleague asked him, "Comrade Mikoyan, would you like an umbrella?" Mikoyan answers, "No, I'll just dance between the raindrops".

So there you go, Gordon, you're in good company. However, I will eventually find out what you really think. In the meanwhile, I'll keep your book close at heart.

(Yes, Mikoyan's brother was the founder of the famous aircraft design shop which brought us classics such as the MiG-15, 19, 21, 25, 29 and 31. The guy's grandson is a Russian rock star, which still remain close with Nadezhda Sergeyevna Alliluyeva's grandchildren. I'm not making this up.)

(Yes, read Simon Sebag Montifiores book "Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar". Anyone knowing the Armenians will smile at Simon's description of the Armenian extended family, visiting from Yerevan).

BBC interview with IAEA DG

In case you've missed it, the BBC's 35 minute interview with IAEA DG Mohamed ElBaradei is available here. This interview is part of journalist Rob Broomby's year-long project covering the Agency, where he was given unique access to the holiest of holy: the operations of the organization. This first part of his two radio programs is available here.

Throughout the interview, Mr. ElBaradei is attempting to hold the middle ground. He criticizes the Iranians and the west in equal measure. Naturally, he is refusing to comment on whether Iran is acquiring nuclear weapons, arguing that wanting an enrichment capability is not the same thing as wanting a weapon. He observes that it won't be possible for Iran to move towards the production of weapons grade material without the Agency knowing it, and that Iran is "very far" from achieving industrial scale production. He found it problematic that Iran challenges the authority of the UN Security Council, but asks rhetorically, without providing answers, how the Council should handle non-proliferation issues. In his mind, the problem is that the present path is a path towards confrontation. Suspension has, in his mind, been transformed into a question of saving face.

There is also a bit in the interview about his views on the U.K.'s Trident replacement, the state of the non-proliferation regime, the need for multilateral control of the nuclear fuel cycle, and North Korea.

I'm not going to comment too much on the Director-General's views on his own functions and powers. Naturally, his mandate does not include the prevention of war, as he implies. Neither is the Director-General of the Agency the guardian of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Statute of the organization envisions a DG with administrative powers, which often is the case in international organizations. The constituting document reads that, "the Director General shall be responsible for the appointment, organization, and functioning of the staff and shall be under the authority of and subject to the control of the Board of Governors" (article VII.B). Moreover, the DG "shall perform his duties in accordance with regulations adopted by the Board". Of course, there is nothing in the Statute that prohibits a DG to assume a broader role, if the member states permit him to do so. While IAEA DG's have had a quite role in international politics over the years, the Secretary General of the UN is often in the hot seat. Sometimes, a forceful SG comes along and assumes broader powers than envisioned. Dag Hammarskjold is a good example. When he was appointed, the P-5 thought he was going to be manageable. In the end, he gave us peace keeping operations (and the Soviets tried to unseat him). And Hammarskjold once said, "Never for the sake of peace and quiet deny your convictions". That sense of integrity is definitely one thing that ElBaradei and Hammarskjold have in common.

Anyway, towards the end of the interview, Mr. ElBaradei admits that he reads blogs, and that he doesn't agree with bloggers that claim that he's soft. I suppose this blog is one of them.