New Agency report on Iran

As far as I can see, ISIS got first, and has released the Agency report to the wider community. Not surprisingly, Iran has not suspended uranium enrichment.

Iran moved one nine ton container of hexafluoride gas from its uranium conversion facility in Esfahan to its fuel enrichment plant in February 2007. A relatively small portion of this gas, 260 kilograms, has been fed into the cascades at the plant. On 13 May 2007, Iran had eight cascades running simultaneously while being fed with gas, two more cascades were running under vacuum, and three was under construction. My previous estimate that Iran can put in place approximately 11 centrifuges per day seems to be holding. However, it should be cautioned that the technicians at the AEOI will learn as they go along, and that therefore, the pace is likely to pick up over the coming months. There is no indication in the report that Iran is suffering from a lack of material, which has been suggested in some media. Although an Iranian sub-contractor did tell the Agency on 28 January 2004 that, "in his view Iran was not capable of manufacturing appropriate maraging steel cylinders with bellows". The contractor's comment, although primary source, does not tell us much about the domestic state of production. In March 2006, David Albright and Corey Hinderstein reported that Iran may have components for some 5,000 centrifuges but that "many components are not expected to pass quality control".

I am utterly confused as to which verification scheme the Agency is employing at the FEP. Earlier, Limited-frequency unannounced access (LFUA) have in earlier Agency reports been deemed "not feasible" at Natanz, probably since travel conditions to the site is not compatible with the requirements of unannounced access to the cascade hall, which is so critical in the inspection scheme. Earlier Agency reports talk about "frequent inspector access" (see GOV/2007/8). Since it takes several hours for an inspector to travel to Iran, and then from the Airport to the facility, one can hardly talk about unannounced inspections. Especially since modern air travel requires the airline to fax a copy of the passenger manifest to the destination. Indeed, once the inspector checks in at Vienna International, Iran knows he or she is coming.

Anyway, the first "unannounced" inspection at Natanz was apparently conducted on 13 May 2007, in other words after the disputed AFP story that Iran had blocked IAEA access to Natanz. Indeed, the usual list of dates when Inspectors visited is absent from the report. Now, however, there are reports about extremely frequent access by the Agency out there. Yesterday, an "informed Iranian source" said that the Agency had access almost every 10 days under the agreement with Iran. That's interesting, since if the first inspection was on 13 May, the second should be this week, and the next round sometime around 4-8 June. Last week, some informed souls I chatted with here in London thought that IAEA inspectors had been based in Natanz (in order to accommodate for the LFUA scheme). This does not seem to be the case. Instead, some poor inspectors have shuttle back and forth quite frequently, something that could be avoided, I suppose, if Iran finally agrees to remote monitoring. I seriously hope they're allowed to fly business class, the GAO's recommendations notwithstanding.

However, these inspections have to do with the detection of a diversion of nuclear material from the FEP. This is only part of the story. As pointed out by the Director-General, "assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material or activities" cannot be given unless Iran implements its Additional Protocol and, moreover, provides more cooperation to the Agency than ever before. As a consequence of the deterioration of relations, "the Agency's level of knowledge of certain aspects of Iran's nuclear related activities has deteriorated".

This partial blindness may be why Dr. ElBaradei now calls on the permanent members of the Security Council to redefine what they mean with suspension. As Jacques Baute said in 2004, "Absence of inspections … turns the whole community blind. Providing the IAEA inspectorate with the right level of authority … is a win-win situation".

It will be interesting to see what will come out of the Larijani–Solana meeting on 31 May, but we are clearly entering rough waters.

NB. I am off to Sweden for a short vacation, and then Norway for a meeting. I may not post very frequently over the next week.

VERTIC reports on Iran

VERTIC has finally released our two reports on Iran's nuclear program. Personally, I am quite glad that this is over, although the correspondence I'm getting seems to indicate that this issue is one that I can't escape that easily. I wish I was more like this guy in black, rude and dismissive.

Anyway, have a read of VM7 (law) and VM8 (tech). And please keep in mind that VM7 wasn't really meant to be published, but that's another story.

Larijani: “Listen, I really want to quit”

In case you haven't seen, this is extremely interesting stuff:

The London daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat has reported that Iranian Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani has asked, for the fifth time in recent months, to resign from his post, but that Iranian Supreme leader Ali Khameni has rejected his request.

The background to the Larijani's wish to resign is disputes with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and with Iranian Foreign Minister Menouchehr Mottaki, who, Larijani says, are thwarting the negotiations with Europe and the attempts to ward off the threats against Iran.

The next meeting between the EU and Mr. Larijani is scheduled for 31 May 2007.

New IAEA report on Iran due Wednesday?

We had a seminar on our forthcoming reports on Iran, which will appear on VERTIC's website tomorrow, here in London today. To make our networker happy, I'll cross post the reports here as soon as they are made available on VERTIC's site.

One participant asked me when the next IAEA report will come out. The answer to that is "it is will probably come out at the latest possible moment" --- that is on Wednesday (something also reported by PRESSTV).

That's fine. Why release something before the deadline? That makes no sense. In fact, I have only two questions: who will post it first, and how long will it take. Usually, ISIS is a good bet. However, I seem to recall that last time they were beaten to it by the New York Times. Last time, it took some 12 hours before the report was posted.

Eventually, however, the document will make its way to Gary Milhollin's Iranwatch. Sometimes I wonder why the Wisconsin Project bothers putting this collection online, since it doesn't really seem to believe in international inspections. On the other hand, why get excited about that, it's a great collection…

Myanmar has nothing… or?

It should have escaped no-one that tiny Myanmar has signed a contract with Russia on the purchase of a 10-megawatt research reactor (see this GSN story). Yesterday, State Department Spokesman Tom Casey said that Myanmar "has neither the regulatory nor the legal framework or safeguard provisions or other kinds of things that you would expect or want to see for a country to be able to handle successfully a nuclear program of this type".

Oh really? According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Myanmar's comprehensive safeguards agreement, reproduced in INFCIRC/477, entered into force on 20 April 1995. There are no safeguarded nuclear facilities in Myanmar, so it has a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) attached to this agreement. It still hasn't amended its SQP (see this article by Jan Lodding and Bernardo Ribeiro for more information on what that means). Okay, so Myanmar is already bound by international safeguards provisions. Obviously, if they'd want nuclear power on their territory, they would have to get rid of their SQP. It should also, quite naturally, set a good example and sign and ratify an additional protocol as well.

Casey continued to say that there "certainly would have to be a heck of a lot more work done by the Burmese before I think we would feel comfortable that they could safely deal with having a nuclear facility of this type on their soil". That's undeniably true. Neither VERTIC's VOD nor the Agency has any National Nuclear Authority listed for Myanmar. However, some further digging shows that the country does have a Department of Atomic Energy, under the Ministry of Science and Technology, which was established in 1996. It's located in Myanmar's capital, Yangon.

While running a nuclear reactor is a serious business, nothing stops the country from acquiring the necessary know-how. After all, why on earth would you invest time, effort and money into developing a full-blown regulatory framework, if you have nothing to regulate? Well, you only do this if you plan to introduce nuclear energy. So, has Myanmar done this?

Aha! Some work on establishing a regulatory infrastructure has occurred. See, Myanmar hasn't really mentioned this in its UNSCR 1540 report but it does have an Atomic Energy Law. This law has a framework character, and simply lies out the fundamentals. More work is probably underway on establishing the necessary infrastructure. For instance, work on strengthening the countries regulatory system is progressing under the IAEA's technical cooperation program. For instance, two years ago, the Agency started a project together with Myanmar to "strengthen the national capability for improvement of radiation protection infrastructure". At the end of the day, the Agency's lawyers are more than capable to provide whatever regulatory assistance Myanmar would require, to build its legal regime.

NB. The Agency has 18 active TC projects with Myanmar, including one on human resource development and nuclear technology support. Atoms for peace, dude.

Not very surprising …

No agreement on starting negotiations on a Fissban.

So, should the Conference on Disarmament negotiate a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty on a mandate which does not contain the words "effectively verifiable"? In March, I argued that it was going to be difficult to convince India and Pakistan to agree on "on a mandate which explicitly excludes verification. After all, while it is difficult to say how much weapons usable stuff has been produced on the subcontinent, fissile material imbalances between the two countries are likely". So, I've been talking a bit to members of the European diplomatic community, and some other people I know, about why they thought that the six president's proposal hasn't flown yet. Most are putting the blame squarely at China which, in their view, seems to magically control the motions of several other members of the Conference on Disarmament. Not a single person mentioned the role of India and Pakistan on this issue. It is somehow like their positions don't really matter. I think that's a peculiar train of thought, knowing that the CD operates on the principle that everyone should agree to everything, and that India nearly managed to block the adoption of the CTBT in the mid-1990s.

So, the six presidents wanted to delete the words effectively verifiable. India and Pakistan disagree. This is what they said yesterday. India held that "we are attached to the negotiation of a universal, nondiscriminatory, effectively and internationally verifiable treaty and it would be desirable for this to be clarified by the Presidency". Pakistan agreed, "we would like to recall that the majority of Conference members expressed their readiness to begin negotiations [on the basis of the Shannon mandate], which stated a call for an indiscriminately, multilaterally, international, and verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We believe that we should continue to adhere to these agreed parameters in order to launch sustained FMT negotiations".

The United States is opposed including the words "effectively verifiable" in the mandate. Some diplomats I've spoken to believe that the six president's proposal covers verification. One held, "it's like Iran at the NPT review conference. The entire conference knows that we're going to talk about it anyway." Okay, I agree with that. However, I do think that there is a genuine risk, if the current mandate gets accepted, that the verification aspect will be silently forgotten. True, verification is not an aim in itself, but it is hardly controversial (in fact, it's even a principle) to state that, "adequate and effective verification is an essential element of all arms limitation and disarmament agreements".

V-word. You're not forgotten. Hang in there.

Cryptokids

NSA sales pitch of the year: "cryptology is... so cool. We make codes so we can send secret messages to our friends. And we try to figure out what other people are writing about by breaking their codes. It's a lot of fun".

Hmmm.... okay..... Have these guys ever seen the inside of a secure room? Cool is not what springs into mind. These rooms look about the same as the one in the Falcon and the Snowman.

I am sure the people (person) at Kent's imperative will correct me if I'm wrong.

“…he was singularly objectionable.”

Today, I attended a lunch with the British servicemen who carried out the Grapple test series. This will be the last time this old cold warriors sit down and have a formal lunch together. Their numbers have been diminishing, and in the future, they're just going to meet up informally. Their respectable age did not stop them from downing several gin and tonics, or even a couple of pints of beer. Irrespective of how old they are, military men will always remain military men.

Anyway, this series of tests were designed to provide the United Kingdom with its first hydrogen bomb. More than a thousand British military men from all services had worked for a bit over a year to set up operations at Christmas Island, a flat tropical island some 2,000 kilometers south of Hawaii, hosting its very own blue lagoon. Royal Air Force personnel had prepared a landing site for heavy bombers scheduled to make the drops (in those days they dropped the suckers from planes). Moreover, scientists and technicians from the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE) had been busy setting up the necessary diagnostics gear. Off the island, the Royal Navy and the Royal Airforce patrolled an exclusion zone about the size of Western Europe into which, to quote one of the participants, "Soviet submarines weren't welcome". Over time, the site developed into a small city, with three mess halls (for officers, NCO's, and privates) and even a cinema. Alcohol was brought into the island, but the personnel had little time to enjoy rest and relaxation while on station. They were pulling 14 hour shifts, six days a week. They had Sunday off.

The first device was dropped on 15 May 1957, precisely 50 years ago today. A Valiant B1 bomber flew 680 kilometers south, to Malden Island, and dropped the device, which fell for 52 seconds before detonating at an altitude of 2,400 meters. To the disappointment of the AWRE crowd watching, it resulted in a less than expected yield. This did not stop the UK to announce the test as an unparalleled success. After a short break in testing, the British resumed with Grapple 4. To save time, this test was conducted off Christmas Island itself. AWRE scientists had been working hard to figure out what went wrong in the first test. Indeed, they might have worked too hard. Grapple 4 (or more accurately Grapple X/Round C) was Britain's first thermonuclear device to achieve a yield of more than one megaton. This was reportedly more than expected, which resulted in some infrastructure damage on the island itself, which must have been quite embarrassing for the AWRE.

The stories I heard today were absolutely amazing. A person, who observed the explosion from the ground, said that even though they were facing away from the blast, wearing goggles, and shielding their face with their hands, the white light was intense. In fact, many described how they could, even though their eyes were closed, see a "perfect X-ray" of the bones in their hands when the bomb detonated. Then, as the terrifying fireball grew, another of the persons attending today's lunch, turned his aircraft around to head towards the mushroom cloud. In those high-tech days, pilots flew straight through the clouds to conduct airborne sampling. All pilots I talked to today described their flight through the mushroom cloud as surprisingly smooth, with "very little disturbed air". To me, that sounded like an aviator's typical low-key statement (and that's all Charles Elwood Yeager's fault).

These cold warriors enjoyed their lunch, listing to talks which reminded me of my childhood, that is the tale how NATO nuclear arms kept the peace in Europe by acting as a counterweight to the Warsaw Pact's massive numerical superiority. The days of the Cold War were grim indeed. Some said that they thought that today's politicians would change their mind about nuclear weapons if they ever had witnessed their awesome force in person. It must have been some sight. Anyway, after the dinner, my host (Lt. Col. B), gave me an unbelievable memento, namely one of his diaries from Christmas Island (no, nothing proliferative in it!). He details a few days when he's been tasked to take care of a number of VIPs, coming in from Britain to have a look at the site (The Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh). Thereafter, he's off to Tarawa. And, for some reason, I liked the following section, describing a 1959 party at Tarawa Island:

"There was a very beautiful French girl there called Manique, the wife of one of the Government officials. She had just returned from leave in France and told us that she was very unhappy with her husband. After meeting him this didn't seem a surprising fact as he was singularly objectionable. Somebody was talking to him at the party and mentioned that it was pleasant to meet people from another island, he countered that as far as he was concerned he'd have been more pleased if our plane had crashed! Charming fellow, he became known to us as Maresiur Manique!"

Perhaps what my friend encountered was one of the founders of Greenpeace.

Thanks for inviting me to today's lunch Lt. Colonel. I had a truly great time.

(Google earth placemark of the test site)

Test shot	Date and time	Type and yield
Grapple 1	15 May 1957, 19:37	Airdrop, 200-300Kt
Grapple 2	31 May 1957, 19:41	Airdrop, 720Kt
Grapple 3	19 June 1957, 19:40	Airdrop, 150Kt
Grapple 4	8 November 1957, 17:47	Airdrop, 1,8Mt
Grapple 5	28 April 1958, 19:05	Airdrop, 2,0Mt
Grapple 6	22 August 1958, 18:00	Balloon, 1,0Mt
Grapple 7	2 September 1958, 17:24	Airdrop, 2,5-3,0Mt
Grapple 8	11 September 1958, 17:48	Airdrop, 2,5-3,0Mt
Grapple 9	23 September 1958, 17:58	Balloon, 1,0Kt

A sad one month "anniversary"

We are now one month past the 14 April 2007 deadline to shutdown and seal the YNC.

Is North Korea prepared to conduct a second nuclear test? The answer is probably yes. How long would they need to get ready for a shot? The answer is, probably only a few days. How will the world know about the upcoming shot? Well, rather than finding out through image analysis, it is likely to be through another statement that the DPRK will "in the future conduct a nuclear test under the condition where safety is firmly guaranteed" (one hundred per cent). What we're talking about is, to paraphrase a colleague in Vienna, "verification through CNN". It is no coincidence that the CTBTO's shiny new Operations Centre has nice looking flat screen TVs on its walls.

Preparing for a test of a nuclear explosive device is a time consuming enterprise. Many stages require careful consideration, the foremost, perhaps, being the selection of the grounds themselves. It has to be a relatively secluded location with favorable geological conditions. For instance, the proliferator would want to select an area with relatively low water content, since fractured and water-saturated rock may amplify the seismic signal produced by the test, it may also allow transuranics to migrate from the site itself (see for instance this report and this article). Perhaps therefore, the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission (or PAEC) put up a requirement that its site should be "bone dry".

The most time consuming task will be to locate, survey and prepare a piece of geologically suitable real-estate. However, the diligent proliferator will have planned for and executed this task several years, perhaps even decades, in advance. For instance, it is believed that operational reconnaissance aimed at locating a suitable Pakistani test site began in 1976. The sites identified was then prepared for 2-3 years, before being sealed up in 1980, several years before Pakistan had enough nuclear material for one weapon and 18 years before the actual test (this article in Defence Journal describes the entire process in greater detail). Similarly, the Indian Shakti site was drilled in the early 1980s, and then mothballed for almost two decades before being brought back into service.

The advantage of doing this is apparent. The preparation of the site and the test itself becomes separated in time, which makes it difficult to figure out what the purpose of the construction is. Perhaps the drilling is associated with some form of prospecting? Perhaps the tunneling has some unknown military or civilian purpose?

Detecting more imminent test site preparations is notoriously difficult as well. If serious, the determined proliferator has learned the art of successful counter-intelligence operations. For instance, India's final preparations were done at hours when there was no satellite reconnaissance coverage of the site. They made sure that heavy equipment was returned to the exact same parking spot at the time of the next overpass, making scene change recognition difficult. When they rolled out their diagnostic cables, they made sure that they were covered by sand. They even replaced removed vegetation in order to conceal the dig. The Pakistanis did no worse, according to Dave Albright, Corey Hinderstein and Frank Pabian, "adobe structures were scattered throughout the site successfully giving it the general appearance of a simple hamlet. The Pakistanis also used camouflage netting, matting, and canvas to conceal the instrumentation bunker, cabling, a few other structures, along with various pieces of equipment around the site."

In January 2007, CNS released a paper arguing that a second DPRK test is "likely" due to a set of political and technical variables. I would add another variable to that, namely Chaemyun, i.e. the concept of maintaining face and protecting the honor and dignity of the individual itself. If the test was a technical fiasco, and much of the technical data points in that director, everyone from the director of the YNC, the test director, to the relatively junior technician turning the firing key, would want the opportunity to prove themselves capable in the face of their superiors. Moreover, as Daniel A. Pinkston and Shin Sungtack argues, the North Korean's have a military technical need to validate its warhead design, especially if they were aiming to test a compact unit which is deliverable by missile.

At the end however, the decision to conduct a second test will be taken at the highest level, by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, Chairman Kim himself. Most likely, he isn't likely to approve a second test before it seems perfectly clear that the DPRK cannot get renewed access to the international monetary system (see this post over at DPRK studies), and that he cannot get anything out of the current round of six party talks. What's holding him back from authorizing a second test if negotiations fail? Well, when I was in Vienna, some held that the country was close to bankrupt, and a new round of sanctions would most definitely topple the regime. Well, as this excellent National Security Archive collection puts it, "North Korea's Collapse? The End Is Near – Maybe". There is a constant tendency to underestimate North Korea's ability to survive. Typical "Team B" thinking if you ask me.

NB. I know that an "anniversary" is reserved for annual events. So what's a monthly reoccurance?

“Don’t come in here” (maybe)

Today, the AFP ran a story claiming that Iran "has blocked UN atomic experts on a first unannounced test inspection of an underground nuclear site where it enriches uranium, despite a pledge to allow such visits". I can only assume that the news agency is referring to the interim verification arrangements agreed by the Agency and Iran in February 2007 (see the famous paragraph 8 of GOV/2007/8).

This is not the first time the Iranians have decided not to give the Agency access to the underground enrichment halls at Natanz. Inspectors were turned around at the door in March 2007 as well. Later, the government said that it had concerns letting inspectors in, since there have been frequent leaks of information from the Agency to foreign diplomats and, of course, the press. The Iranians reportedly have security concerns about this, fearing outside intervention should too much information become available. It should remain unsaid whether the leaks originate from operations or from the Agency's political echelons. It really doesn't matter. What does matter, however, is that the Agency has a responsibility under article 5 of Iran's safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/214) to safeguard the information flow between the IAEA secretariat and others. Indeed, information can be given to the Board of Governors (as a collective) "only to the extent necessary for the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities in implementing [the safeguards agreement]".

The failure by the Agency to prevent information from leaking, does not justify Iran's neglect or failure to allow the agency "frequent inspector access" to the site after more than 500 centrifuges has been installed (which apparently was agreed earlier this year). According to an unnamed diplomat, "the Iranians said they wanted to talk again about the terms of the visits".

In clear text, the Iranians are saying "no remote monitoring – and no frequent access", which is to completely disregard the Agency's view. This is hardly the best way to build confidence in its nuclear program, and will just serve to further alienate the few friends Iran has left.

NB. The AFP also refers to an anonymous diplomat saying that Iran now had some 1,600 centrifuges installed in the underground facility, which fits fine with my previous estimate that Iran can mount approximately 11 machines per day.

Update: The Iranian ambassador to the Agency has "rejected" the AFP report, saying that it only aims to "weaken Iran's placement in the final days of the Non-Proliferation Treaty revision [sic!] conference". Moreover, IAEA spokesperson Marc Vidricaire has called the allegations "baseless".

Table: Projected pace of construction at the FEP

Date	Centrifuges	Source
17 February 2007	656	GOV/2007/8
17 March 2007		Reported inspection attempt
16 April 2007	1,312	GOV/INF/2007/10
21 April 2007		Reported inspection attempt
11 May 2007	1,587	Estimate (11 machines/day)
11 May 2007	1,612	Estimate (12 machines/day)
1 September 2007	2,912	First module completed (estimated 11,5 machines/day)

Admirals don’t like open source IMINT

For some time, easy access to satellite imagery, through applications such as Google Earth, has stirred discomfort with some intelligence professionals. The application has made countries such as China and India quite uneasy. Now, the U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency has weighed in. The Agency's director, Vice Admiral Robert B. Murrett has discussed whether curbs on the availability or use of satellite imagery are needed. See the full article here.

He's an impressive man, the admiral, but he, and others who think like him, might find it tricky to put the genie back in bottle. Mr. Satellite, also known as John Pike, put it this way, "if the area they are trying to protect is too broad, then surely there would be some news organization that will take them to court on prior restraint or some other freedom-of-the-press infringement … If the area that is being protected is too narrowly defined, you are giving away the secret location" (reminds me of the story of Eli Cohen and the trees on the Golan).

Seems to me like the good admiral is simply saying, "trust me, you don't need to know"…

A visit to BARC

Homi Jehangir Bhabha is by many considered to be the father of India's nuclear weapons program. He was born in Bombay in 1909, and received his doctorate in physics from the University of Cambridge in 1934, only some five years after Yuli Khariton, one of the men behind the Soviet Union's bomb program had left the very same university. In 1954, he acquired the land where the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre is sited. Bhaba died in 1966, only 57 years old, on his way to an IAEA meeting in Vienna. The research center was subsequently named in his honor.

The center has a host of different facilities and reactors, detailed, for instance in Andrew Koch, Christopher Derrick, and Shelby McNichols's 1999 CNS report on "Selected Indian Nuclear Facilities". Amongst those facilities are the CIRUS reactor, heavy water moderated reactor supplied by Canada in 1954. This reactor may be shut down in 2010. Another famous reactor is 100 MWth Dhruva reactor, which went critical in August 1985. In 2004, ISIS estimated that these reactors had produced up to 530 kilograms of plutonium over the year.

This placemark identifies three main areas of BARC, namely CIRUS and Dhruva, the fuel reprocessing plant, where plutonium is extracted, and the fuel manufacturing plant, which reportedly has the capability to produce hexafluoride gas.

As of 31 December 2005, no facilities in Trombay were safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Picking cherries, Mr. Ambassador?

Well, it shouldn't really come as a surprise to anyone that the multilateral process here in Vienna isn't working flawlessly. In fact, the first meeting of the current NPT review cycle feels like a tired rerun of the 2005 debacle, except that 2005's bad boy, Egypt, has been substituted by 2007's bad boy, the Islamic Republic of Iran. An American colleague and I jokingly remarked that we should stop meeting each other, since we always end up lounging at the back of the plenary, exchanging sarcastic comments about the aptitude of the chair and the attitude of some of the participants, while the conference collapses in painful slow motion. James and I tried to present our two papers today, but the news that Hossein Mousavian had been arrested, presumably for talking to people like us, didn't quite inspire me to give the presentation of a lifetime. In fact, I just wanted to get out of the room as quickly as possible. We did much better in an informal presentation the day before.

Now, what's the problem with the review conference? Well, Iran doesn't want to have language in the agenda stating that the conference will consider "… approaches and measures to realize [the treaty's] purpose, reaffirming the need for full compliance with the Treaty". The buzz on the floor has been that Iran fears being singled out in the upcoming review cycle. Now, Iran, having balls the size of Mount Everest, has decided to play hardball and block the entire conference from proceeding. Initially, the floor teemed with rumors that "Iran really doesn't want to be isolated", and that "it's seeking a way to gracefully surrender, since it thought that they would have the support of at least some". Well, then again, diplomats from nations on friendlier terms with Iran said that the country won't back down, that they're prepared to wait, to quote Adlai Stevenson, "until hell freezes over". Iranian balls are not only huge; they're also made of cast iron. A couple of possible ways to break the deadlock has been discussed, but none has been really convincing, prompting a colleague to groan, "I really hate multilateralism".

I don't get the Iranian's position. Iran's ambassador, Soltanieh, referred to compliance several times in his talk to the plenary; "Nuclear weapon States have not fulfilled their obligations under Article VI of the NPT", "the recent decision by the United Kingdom [on Trident related projects] is in full contravention of article VI of the treaty and in defiance with the unanimous decision of the 2000 NPT review conference". Nuclear weapons sharing arrangements are "in contravention" of article I of the treaty, et cetera et cetera. So why not discuss this under the agenda item which reaffirms "the need for full compliance with the treaty"?

Well, Iran's suggestion may work well for the nuclear weapon states. If the reference to compliance is deleted, Iran should avoid commenting on nuclear weapon state compliance with article VI or, for that matter, Nuclear Suppliers Group member compliance with Article IV.

Talking about compliance, I like that Iran seem to believe that the 2000 NPT review conference decision is somewhat binding. One should recall that that document also stipulates that article IV rights must be exercised in conformity with articles "I, II and III" of the treaty (see page 8). This would mean that Iran, which has been found in breach of its safeguards agreement (and by extension article III), should refrain from developing its fuel cycle until all ambiguities are resolved. This reference was also in the Ambassadors speech … not.

Okay… they'll probably agree on an agenda eventually. Ambassador Duarte, the previous chair, managed to do so in 2005. But the conference clock is ticking, and there will be precious little time left to "move into clusters" (i.e. talk shop) once the agenda is agreed. Oh well, maybe things will go better next year.