Entering Khan’s little den

Pakistan's uranium enrichment capacity is generally believed to be centered at the A.Q. Khan Research Laboratory (KRL) located a bit outside the dusty city of Kahuta in north-eastern Pakistan. The centre was founded and directed by the nuclear black-marketeer Abdul Qadeer Khan in the 1970s. The industrial park was created in direct support of the Pakistani weapons program. And, according to A.Q. Khan himself, Pakistan got the capability to detonate a nuclear device (and thus had enriched enough uranium) by the end of 1984. It is widely assumed that Pakistan upheld a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes during the 1990s (although this was never verified). It is likewise assumed that production started again after India's second round of nuclear testing in 1998. It is not known if the plant escaped damage after the 8 October 2005 earthquake that shook the region. Pakistani officials claim that it escaped unharmed.

But what is the capability of this plant today? Well, figures are both unreliable and, in addition, some sixteen years out of date. It is sometimes assumed in the literature that the facility has some 3,000 centrifuges operating at any given moment, and that the capacity of the plant is somewhere between 9,000 and 15,000 separative work units. These figures rely on open source information compiled and assessed by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (Albright, et al., 1997). The authors of the study readily admit that "the number of operating machines at any one time is highly uncertain. Part of the confusion is that Pakistan has installed considerably more machines than it has successfully operated. In 1986, it was reported that Kahuta had 14,000 centrifuges." (See p. 275). Yet, the claim that the plant is capable of a meager 15,000 SWU's resurface time and time again. Over the last couple of weeks, I have been compiling a Google Earth placemark of the A.Q. Khan Research Laboratory, cross-checking with public imagery analysis to get a complete picture of the facility. Almost immediately, I suspected that the 15,000 SWU figure might be grossly misleading.

For instance, in 2005, the United States presented an image of the Kahuta Labs, and two structures were highlighted as centrifuge cascade halls. I am not sure why these two were selected by the United States' skilled analysts, and not other similarly sized buildings in the complex. Also, the US briefing (which in all fairness was about Iran, not Pakistan) did not touch upon the structures located in what's known as the "southern production area". This is a better image of what's known as the "northern production area", captured from Google Earth.

One useful tool in Google Earth is the measuring device, which allows the user to accurately measure distances on the ground. Using that tool, it is possible to ascertain the total floor space of the two buildings, which the U.S. has designated as cascade halls.

Building	Length	Width	Square meters
Western (lower) building	125	60	7,500
Eastern (upper) building	115	85	9,775
Total			17,275

Using a popular rule of thumb, that one centrifuge requires one square meter of floor space, the facility's dimensions easily swallows over 17,000 centrifuges. Indeed, these two buildings alone could house more capacity if centrifuges are stacked vertically. While it is highly unlikely that all floor space have been used up, the size of the buildings strongly suggests that more than 3,000 centrifuges are installed in this area. If one assumes that one third of each building is offices, staff facilities, control rooms, workshops, empty space etc, and, moreover, that only half the centrifuge hall is utilized, it seems more likely that 10,000 to 14,000 centrifuges are installed. This figure is mentioned in Albright et al, but does not seem to have gotten much traction in other literature.

So what is the capacity of the plant today? Well, it is assumed that the facility was renovated in the 1990s and that the P-2 centrifuges installed at that time has been replaced by more effective machinery.

Desig.	Derivation	Rotor	Velocity (m/s)	Length	SWU
P-1	SNOR/CNOR	Aluminum	350	1-2	1-3
P-2	G2	Maraging Steel	500	1	5
P-3	URENCO 4M	Maraging Steel	485	2	11.6
P-4	SLM/Unknown	Maraging Steel	508	3.2	21

Adapted from <http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1399/p3-and-p4-centrifuge-data>

Data on the capacity of Pakistan's centrifuges have been published by Nuclear Fuels (and has been reproduced by the Arms Control Wonk for the benefit of the poorer community). It is also assumed (at least here, here and here) that Pakistan's conversion facility at Dera Ghazi Khan is capable of producing 200 tons of uranium hexafluoride gas per year. If one assumes that Pakistan has installed 10,000 centrifuges and is enriching its product to the U.S. weapons grade level, and that they are setting their tails assay fairly high (to 0.4 per cent), the required feed perfectly matches (by a fraction) the annual production capacity of Dera Ghazi Khan. In other words, the rest of Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure fits around a centrifuge program centered on 10,000 centrifuges.

Centrifuges	Type	SWU	UF6 Feed (tons)	Product (kg)
10,000	P-2	50,000	200	283
Product	93%
Tails	0.4%

However, if one assumes that Pakistan upgraded their facility in the mid 1990s, the picture is more worrying. Kahuta then has an enrichment capacity almost ten times higher than what is usually assumed. With so many centrifuges in operation, the Kahuta director will have to lower the tails assay to a more normal 0.3 per cent, or stretch the conversion facility beyond its capacity.

Centrifuges	Type	SWU	UF6 Feed (tons)	Product (kg)
10,000	P-3	116,000	194	580
Product	93%
Tails	0.3%

Finally, if one assumes that Pakistan has upgraded to their latest model (which David Albright may refer to in this article, where he talks of "10,000 uranium enrichment centrifuges, which rotate at supersonic speeds on high-tech magnetic bearings"), the production capacity of Kahuta becomes huge. It is not very likely that Pakistan has this much capacity installed at the facility. Rather, the management is likely to have a combination of centrifuges installed, from first to later generations, much like the setup at Urenco (Capenhurst) in the United Kingdom.

Centrifuges	Type	SWU	UF6 Feed (tons)	Product (kg)
10,000	P-4	210,000	196	799
Product	93%
Tails	0.15%

A very high SWU capacity does not fit the assumed production capability of the uranium conversion facility. The tails must be set ridiculously low, which does not make sense from a production standpoint. This could mean three things. Pakistan has more uranium conversion capability than is previously thought, the facility is not running all the time, or Pakistan has adjusted their SWU capacity to fit their conversion capabilities. To enrich the uranium contained in 200 tons of uranium hexafluoride gas (to 93 per cent uranium-235 with tails set to 0.3 per cent), Pakistan would need to invest something like 120 000 SWU. This figure fits neatly with the P-3 setup detailed above.

There is definitely electrical power available to run the plant. At least six high voltage transmission lines feed Kahuta Research Laboratories (this is assuming that a Pakistani pylon carries six lines). If one assumes that one Pakistani centrifuge requires 130 kWh per separative work unit, a 15,000 SWU plant would require some 1.95 GWhe per year. According to an electrical engineer I spoke to, there seem to be considerable overcapacity in power transmission, if the dedicated power line is supplying a 3,000 centrifuge cascade and associated buildings. However, a plant capable of 120k SWU will require something like 15,5 GWhe of electricity for the centrifuges to spin throughout the year. The electricity feed, and the size of the step-down transformer station, fits that kind of energy consumption level quite neatly.

These transmission lines will be highlighted in my forthcoming placemark. If you don't want to wait for my placemark, you can find the step-down transformer station and its auxiliary buildings at 33°37'4.54"N 73°22'52.40"E. Then trace the pylons (and sometimes the power lines) going southwest.

Works cited
Albright, David, Berkhout, Frans and Walker, William. 1997.
Plutonium and highly enriched uranium 1996: World inventories, capabilities and policies. s.l. : SIPRI/Oxford University Press, 1997.

Verification, what verification?

The relentless war on effective verification of international arms control agreements continues unabated. The battleground is now tranquil Geneva, Switzerland, where efforts are underway in the Conference on Disarmament to agree on the format for future discussions on the Fissile Material (Cut-Off) Treaty. A carefully worded draft work program suggests that the conference negotiate "without any preconditions" a "non-discriminatory and multilateral treaty" banning the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. So far, so good.

The program revives parts of the 12 year old Shannon mandate, which is good. However, there is one crucial difference. The phrase "…and internationally and effectively verifiable..." has magically vanished. This is likely the work of the United States. (For a refresher course on US opposition to FMCT verification, see Daryl Kimball's article in Trust & Verify No. 116 and this Economist leader (subscription required)).

Does it matter? The new proposal has support, despite its failure to mention verification. According to the 27 March 2007 edition of the CD report, the "vast majority" of states in the CD stand behind it. Only China has been actively resisting the proposal, whereas "none of the four states currently producing fissile materials for military purposes—India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan—have supported the proposal". Ironically, Iran seems to be the only one insisting that verification gets put back in the text.

It is going to be difficult to convince, say, India and Pakistan to agree on a mandate which explicitly excludes verification. After all, while it is difficult to say how much weapons usable stuff has been produced on the subcontinent, fissile material imbalances between the two countries are likely. On the other hand, note that the new work program includes the phrase "without any preconditions". The optimist would probably see these three words as a potential back door, through which one could sneak verification back on the agenda. The pessimist would say that verification is a lost cause.

According to the CD Report, the 2007 Six Presidents (the grouping of states which put forward the proposal) wants a decision on Thursday. I would be surprised if it the mandate gets approved. However, I'm not a betting man, and the three magic words may perhaps change some minds, so I would not wager on it getting filed under "u as in useless".

Trust and verify

Within a couple of days, VERTIC will print and distribute the next edition of Trust & Verify. It's going to be an interesting issue, with a lead article on how to strengthen safeguards in states with limited nuclear activities written by the good people of the International Atomic Energy Agency. For those not familiar with Trust & Verify, it's the centre's newsletter. The first issue came out in June 1989. Back then, the centre was headed by Dr. Patricia Lewis, now director of UNIDIR. Back then, Dr. Jeremy Leggett, who founded the centre to promote the idea of using seismology to verify the test ban treaty, had left for Imperial College. After having promoted the test ban treaty, Dr. Leggett became an environmental champion. According to Time Magazine, he became "one of the key players in putting the climate issue on the world agenda". Not bad... not bad at all... So, anyway, if you aren't subscribing to Trust & Verify, subscribe today. Doesn't cost a dime…

Assuring nuclear supplies?

Surely, creating an international enrichment centre, open for all states that wish to invest money into a reliable supply of nuclear fuel, is a good thing? So, at least, Russian President Vladimir Putin seems to think. Therefore, over the last year the Russian Federation has been constantly moving towards the establishment of an international uranium enrichment centre. In July 2006, Sergey Kirienko, the newly appointed head of the Russian Federal Agency for Atomic Energy announced that the Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Complex would become the first international uranium enrichment center in the world. Does this sound splendid? Well, there are still wrinkles in the proposal that need to be ironed out. First, how will Russia convince other states (for instance Iran) that their investment will result in an assured supply of fuel? Second, how does Russia intend to safeguard this huge enrichment plant? Today, both questions remain largely unanswered.

As Charles McCombie and Niel Chapman have pointed out, the idea that the nuclear fuel cycle should, somehow, be brought under multilateral control is as old as nuclear technology itself. However, the Russian proposal must be seen against a backdrop of renewed interest in the concept. In 2003, the IAEA Director-General proposed that enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear fuel should be brought under international control. Several other states, including the United Kingdom and the United States have proposed their own solutions on how the fuel cycle can be multilateralized. This is probably due to a combination of two factors, Iran's controversial nuclear program, and a perceived resurgence of nuclear power as a clean, safe and reliable source of energy. Determined to table a credible proposal, Sergey Kirienko continued to work on the Russian plan throughout 2006. In September 2006, he flew to London and detailed the Russian initiative at the World Nuclear Association's annual meeting.

In a nutshell, the proposal is to accept foreign investment into Angarsk, to involve the IAEA in some of the management of the centre, and to put it under Agency safeguards. And, of course, at no time will foreign investor get access to Russian uranium enrichment technology. The Agency and Russia have started work. Recently, they set up a working group which will develop the proposal and agree on acceptable safeguards procedures at the complex. The IAEA's greatest concern "was provision of a mechanism that would ensure that States cut off for political reasons continue to receive nuclear fuel". In many ways, the Agency's concerns seem to mirror the disquiet of Iran, who has repeatedly complained over Russia's handling of the loading of the Busher reactor (the Iranians often moan that the Russians refuse to guarantee fuel deliveries throughout the lifespan of the reactor. Instead, the Russians insist that fuel contracts should run for one year at a time). Perhaps therefore, Dr. ElBaradei will present a paper on assurances of supply of nuclear fuel by June 2007.

Russia's plan is ambitious. In the near future, part of the existing capacity will be geared towards civilian production (in cooperation with Kazakhstan's atomic power company, Kazatomprom). Thereafter, the capacity will be expanded. Finally, the center will be fully internationalized. Perhaps to facilitate this process, Russia plans to create a privately owned cooperation, Atomenergoprom, which may play an important role in the operationalization of the center, which, we hear will happen by the end of 2007.

While an international fuel centre is a positive development, the issue of assurances of supply needs to be resolved before the center can earn third-party trust. Also, naturally, investors will want to have assurances that their investment cannot be used to enhance a Russian nuclear weapons program. Reportedly, Angarsk has never produced highly enriched uranium. And this will help in the establishment of credible safeguards (there should be little HEU contamination at the site). Safeguards in Angarsk would probably need to be administered under a separate safeguards agreement. And precisely how safeguards should be applied is something that still is open for negotiation.

Come back tomorrow, Mr. Inspector

The reporting that Iran has refused Agency inspectors entry to the cascade hall at the Fuel Enrichment Plant in Natanz, Iran, feels a bit like a storm in a tea-cup. Sifting through the reports, mostly written by disapora Iranians, became quite painful after a while. Indeed, the most matter-of-factly piece I could find on the issue was the Kommersant article I just linked to. The article also has a charming Russian feel to it.

Negotiating access to cascade halls can be a tricky. To illustrate, I dug up this piece in Trust and Verify No. 117 about the grueling road towards safeguarding Resende, Brazil. The article, which is written by Erik Asplund, starts on page 4.

Of course, the Brazilians claim that they have secrets to protect (a revolutionary new centrifuge design). One wonders why the Iranians, using antiquated European technology, are so jumpy about letting the Agency see their pipe work. Oh well… I'll try to find out more.

Busy week ahead, too busy perhaps

Ambassador Hill looks surprisingly content having his his Chinese-American cup of coffee while assuming a battered rockstar-esque pose on the eve of what might be a very busy week for arms control pundits. Today, China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea and the United States starts the next session of the six-party talks in Beijing, China. Later this week, the UN Security Council will discuss the adoption of yet another resolution on Iran's nuclear program. Reportedly, Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad wants to get on an airplane and fly over to New York so that he can address the council in person. The idea of holding a high level, high publicity, debate, feels unnervingly familiar.

While Iran continues to be unwilling to take concrete steps towards enhancing the transparency of its nuclear fuel cycle, progress may still materialize in the Far East. From a verification point of view, Dr. ElBaradei's visit to North Korea seems to have been moderately successful. According to its chief, the International Atomic Energy Agency "expect the DPRK to invite [them back] to work out the modalities" of how to verify the shut down and sealing of the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex. Clearly, the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the implementation of this agreement still needs to be clarified. However, as the Director General alluded to in the CNN interview posted below, it may simply be a case of blowing some life into the verification arrangements under the agreed framework. If so, the following five areas would be monitored.

• The Yongbyon 5 MWe Nuclear Power Plant;
  
• The Yongbyon Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant (located at the south end of the complex);
  
• The Radiochemical Laboratory (i.e. the plutonium reprocessing plant);
  
• The Yongbyon 50 MWe reactor (which is located next to the reprocessing plant); and
  
• The Taechon 200 MWe reactor (which is located outside the YNC).
  

This article will give you an impression of how those areas were monitored.

Now, a keen observer will remark that the site of the Taechon reactor is separate from the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex, and therefore falls outside the 13 February 2007 agreement (which just talks about the Yongbyon Nuclear "Facility"). While technically falling outside the agreement, North Korea could, as a gesture of good will, let the Agency visit Taechon as well (the unfinished reactor lies circa 20 kilometers northwest of the YNC. Those interested can find the skeleton at 39°55'39.84"N 125°34'9.22"E). In 2003, David Albright wrote that the reactor was more than two years away from completion in 1993, and that "North Korea is unlikely to finish this reactor for several years". Given that a lot of structure has been exposed to the harsh North Korean climate for more than a decade, the question is rather how much of the old site is salvageable. Nevertheless, construction could theoretically resume, and an Agency presence in the country could ensure that this does not happen. A new photographic baseline of the facility, and any other facility to be frozen, would need to be taken. In addition, the Agency and the DPRK need to agree on a specific inspection protocol (the "modalities" if you will).

The invitation that Dr. ElBaradei expects may come soon. North Korea may well be happy with the US Treasury's recent decision to release over US$25m currently frozen at the Banco Delta Asia in the casino-infested city of Macau, China. If so, one may expect to see the Agency visit the country again. That time, perhaps, under more tranquil circumstances.

DG in another type of tank

Do not miss the ElBaradei exclusive on CNN. It's posted on the Agency's website. I almost felt hit by the last sentence. A got a mail from a friend, saying that I am a "very very bad man" for being so cynical about his trip to the DPRK. So I felt like I had to put this clip up... just to make up for past sins.

Also, check out my specialized arms control search engine in the bottom right corner (or go here). It may look terrible, but may prove quite useful, once I've decided which sites to search and which not to search...

”We’ll always have Pyongyang”

If they expected a triumphant return to North Korea, thinking that their leader's Nobel Peace Prize would build bridges into the secretive Stalinist regime, they were sadly mistaken. A month ago, it was reported that an Agency team headed by the Deputy-Director in charge of safeguards would head a team of technical experts to North Korea, to discuss the details of how the freeze of activities at the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex should be verified. That sounded just about right, a meeting on the right level, comprising professionals talking shop over a cup of tea (or maybe a Lapin Kulta).

A month later, the Director-General (DG) of the Agency, accompanied by his press secretary and other Agency dignitaries, departed Vienna in a hailstorm of photographic flashes. The delegation was not exactly low key, which seems odd for an organization that prides itself in its unassuming professionalism. On the other hand, Dr. ElBaradei was personally invited by the DPRK, in his own words to "develop the relations between the DPRK and the Agency, as well as to discuss problems of mutual concerns". Oh my, how intriguing…

Before the meeting, Dr. ElBaradei said that he "would like to focus on how to bring the DPRK closer to the Agency [and to] to discuss the broad framework for how to implement the Beijing Agreement among the Six-Party talks which foresees that the Agency will monitor and verify the freeze of the Yongbyon nuclear facility including the reprocessing facility". This sounded good, although one hoped that there would be more detail in the discussion than just a chat about the "broad framework". True, the DG wants to "gradually move forward" on developing relations with the North, but the deadline for suspension draws nearer and there is quite a lot of procedures that need to be put in place if a cease is to be verified.

Nevertheless, spirits must have been high on that Agency flight from Beijing to North Korea, but once the plane had taxied to the terminal building, the wheels had stopped, and the engines had been shut down, the mood must have soured. Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan, North Korea's chief nuclear negotiator did not want to meet up to talk shop. According to the Agency's spokeswoman, Ms. Melissa Fleming, Mr. Kim was "too busy" preparing for the six-party talks. Reportedly, Dr. ElBaradei himself has said that the minister was "sick". In the end, the Agency chief had to settle with a more junior minister and a member of the DPRK's rubber stamp parliament. It's an imaginative choice of reception and one can almost imagine the protocol division of North Korea's foreign ministry strained by the effort to find a suitable level person to meet up with Dr. ElBaradei. Especially since the guest is the head of an organization once labeled "a cat's paw" and "a shaggy dog" of the US.

During the day, the "shaggy dog" talked to the North Koreans about something. Talks were cut short; "Air Force IAEA" reportedly went wheels up over Pyongyang Airport an hour earlier than expected. First, Melissa Fleming refused to comment on the progress of talks, later she said that "It was very much about the relationship between the IAEA and the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), as well as general discussions about the IAEA's monitoring and verification". All that the Agency chief managed to say was that North Korea remains "fully committed" to the Disarmament Action Plan agreed last month. To have general discussions on monitoring and verification may be pleasant, but one was hoping for something more concrete to have come out of the meeting, like a plan for on-site verification of the shut-down, and subsequent monitoring. Perhaps a plan was decided on. If so, there is nothing about it in the news. If not, Dr. ElBaradei hopefully managed to agree a follow-up meeting where such matters can be decided on.

In my humble opinion, the story of ElBaradei and the North Koreans smells a bit like the story of Albright, Annan and Arafat. In the meanwhile, the South Korean Foreign Minister says that the North shows no sign of changing the operational status of Yongbyon. The deadline to verifiably shut it down is now only some four weeks away.

Expect more about this in the following week.

Filez on Iran

I have created a portable document file containing all IAEA reports on Iran. The advantage of using one consolidated document is, of course, that it is searchable. I have put this document on my Google pages until I can find a larger home for my collection of files. Enjoy.

Update: for an extensive collection of documents on Iran, visit www.iranwatch.org.

Catching particles in East Africa

On 10 September 1996, a vote was called in the UN General Assembly. The issue at hand was whether the assembly should adopt the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. On that day, a representative of the United Republic of Tanzania reached for the abstain button. When the lights on the voting board stopped flickering, 158 states had voted in favor of adoption. Tanzania's delegate must have found him or herself in relative isolation. Only Cuba, Syria, Lebanon and Mauritius had abstained, probably not to offend the opponents, India, Bhutan and Libya.

The years passed, and most of the states who abstained or voted against haven't changed their minds. Libya has been a full member since 6 January 2005. Lebanon signed the treaty on 16 September 2005, but has yet to ratify.

The first state to convert, however, was Tanzania. In a blitz move, it signed and ratified the treaty on 30 September 2004. Then things moved quickly. Within a couple of months, a site survey was conducted in order to prepare the ground for the deployment of radionuclide station RN64, which is the only IMS facility on Tanzania's territory. The CTBTO also arranged for the training of two technical staff members of the Tanzania Atomic Energy Commission (TAEC), so that they can operate the station.

Finally, the Provisional Technical Secretariat arranged so that the station itself could be installed at the University of Dar es Salaam. Today, the good people of Tanzania seem pretty enthusiastic about the entire affair, the 1996 vote is long forgotten. And that is a good thing. One of the lessons learned by the first System-Wide Performance Test (the "SPT-1") was that it is essential to get more national data centres up and running. And once they are up, someone needs to ensure that they are properly funded and staffed.

At the moment, that someone is not the United States. According to Arms Control Today, the States' contributions continue to lag. This may have an impact on the establishment of new stations, but are more likely to affect the recapitalization (CTBTO jargon for maintenance) of old stations, some of which were established in the early 1960s. However, if Tanzania could change its mind, then, perhaps, so could the States.

New placemarks

I have uploaded two new Google Earth placemarks on the homepage. The first gives you all the stations of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty's International Monitoring System (save the radionuclide laboratories). The location of each station is derived from the treaty, so don't expect to see a station under the placemark. In fact, the imprecision of the treaty gave rise to some problems when the CTBTO was young. For instance, they found that they were supposed to place radionuclide stations on the open sea, which isn't optimal. They also found that they had to negotiate every move of the stations themselves.

Anyway, the second file is not made by me, it is made by the USGS and will give you a real time view of at least some earthquakes shaking the planet. Together with the previously posted file on historical nuclear explosions, I think the files give a pretty stunning visualization of the challenges facing CTBT verification. I hope you'll like them.

Is UNMOVIC's destiny sealed?

On 7 March 2007, Reuters reported that the UN Security Council is going to disband the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), and that Iraq, the U.K. and the U.S. is putting together a draft resolution to that effect. Rumors about the dismantlement of UNMOVIC have circulated around UN Headquarters in the past. For instance, last year, the Iraqi ambassador to the United Nations called for the disbandment of the unit. The council seemed sympathetic to Iraq's request. Indeed, the Russian ambassador remarked, "I can agree that there is a general perception by the council members that the time to wrap up the body has come. The problem is how to do it".

It remains to be seen if council members have ironed out their differences in respect to procedure. In the meanwhile, have a look at Trevor Findlay's paper on a standing UN WMD verification body.

The power of Google

This blog now has a home. Enjoy.

"Routine" safeguards in Russia?

Japan currently owns some 6,400 tons of reprocessed uranium. This material is currently stored in France and the United Kingdom. There have been recent reports claiming that Russia may get the lucrative deal of enriching this uranium. The potential for profit is great. In addition to the unprocessed material, the East Asian economic powerhouse creates a constant stream of spent fuel. A staggering 55 power reactors provide some 30 per cent of Japan’s electricity and the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant, which may reprocess up to 800 tons of uranium per year, is very close to being commissioned.

While it is a lot of reprocessed fuel to handle, it is perfectly safe to say that Russia's uranium enrichment plants are more than capable of handling anything that Japan would throw at them. Pictured is a section of the centrifuge cascade at the Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Complex. This large factory maintains eight percent of Russia's enrichment capacity, or 1.6 million kilogram separative work units per year. The complex was built to produce low enriched uranium, which was then transported to other centrifuge plants in the Soviet Union. There, the material was further enriched into weapons grade. The amount of material involved is mind-blowing. By itself, the factory is able to churn out 8-9 tons of weapons grade uranium per year. To achieve optimum efficiency, the complex also operates a uranium conversion facility.

Throughout the Cold War, it was generally assumed that Russia relied on diffusion technology to enrich its uranium. It wasn't revealed that the Soviets had built a considerable uranium enrichment capability until after the collapse of the Union. Russia's massive 20 million kilogram SWU per year capacity had been built up during the 1960s and 1970s. Diffusion was phased out during the 1990s and today, Russia is in the process of deploying its ninth generation supercritical centrifuge. Traditionally, however, the Russians have relied on a short subcritical centrifuge design with a thin needle bottom bearing and magnetic top bearing.

Japan now insists that the nuclear material that it sends to Russia is properly safeguarded. That's a catch, since, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, none of the enrichment plants in Russia are safeguarded by the organization. Indeed, according to the latest safeguards statement, Agency activities in Russia are "limited to the evaluation of accounting reports on the export and import of nuclear material". Therefore, while stating that Russia "can be an important option for Japan for spent fuel enrichment, given that there's a limited number of providers", Japan's trade minister Akira Amari is convinced that the IAEA must participate in any talks between Russia and Japan.

The absence of safeguards in Russia is quite natural, given that Russia is a declared nuclear weapon state. Safeguards have very little non-proliferation value. According to its safeguards agreement, Russia may simply inform the Agency that material, or indeed entire facilities, are withdrawn from safeguards. That does not mean that a safeguards approach has not been worked out by the Agency. There is a neat little arrangement worked out under the "Tripartite Enrichment Project" and personnel at Minatom, the Agency and the China Atomic Energy Authority have written a paper that explains how it works.

Australia arranged for bilateral safeguards when it decided to supply China with uranium. It is likely that a similar arrangement will be negotiated between Russia and Japan. Therefore, it is quite likely that we'll see more Agency inspectors in Russia, and that Japan will press for the establishment of a bilateral accountancy system. That is a good development, given that Russia authorities still have no solid international experience in accountancy and control of nuclear materials.

US-Agency turf-war ahead?

I wanted to share this excerpt from the 28 February Special Report with Brit Hume. Two things strike me. First, Christopher Hill does not seem to hold David Albright's report that the intelligence on North Korea’s uranium enrichment programme is questionable in very high regard. Second, the idea that the International Atomic Energy Agency may not verify the “disablement” (whatever that is) of North Korea’s arsenal smells like a repeat of the P-5 Agency turf-war over who was going to verify Libya's disarmament. I don't know, but have a feeling that it might be a tad bit too early to mark your territory. The Dear Leader might still change his mind.

Rep. David Scott: “The North Korean government’s a very secretive government. What guarantees do we have that we can really trust them?”

Rosen: “The deal North Korea struck with the U.S., Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea on February 13th requires the North, within 60 days, to halt operations at and readmit UN inspectors to its massive nuclear reactor complex at Yongbyon, the North’s only known production site for the plutonium used in its arsenal of nuclear weapons. In one positive sign, the North has already invited the top UN inspector to return to Yongbyon after a four-year ban. But the North refuses to admit that it is also, as the U.S. charges, operating a highly enriched uranium, or HEU, program. Ambassador Hill said that in the next round of implementation steps, which requires a full listing of all its nuclear activities, the North will have to account for the HEU program.”

Amb. Christopher Hill: “We know from Pakistanis that they bought these centrifuges. There’s no other purpose to a centrifuge of that kind than to produce highly enriched uranium.” (my emphasis)

Rosen: “Hill said the parties will also need to account for the estimated 50 kilos of plutonium the North has already produced, and that they still need to decide whether it will be the International Atomic Energy Agency or the permanent five member states of the UN Security Council that will perform future inspections, as well as what will happen if any of the parties disagree over the results of those inspections.”

Amb. Christopher Hill: “We have not yet worked out the rules on how challenge inspections, for example, might be accomplished in the future. The United States, as some of the other countries have, we have our own national means of verification --- national technical means that I’m not in a position today to tell you the role of the IAEA versus the role of some of the perm five members.” (my emphasis)

Swedes collect Xenon in the ROK

On 12 December 2006, the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) released a very interesting statement. The document reads that the Swedish Government flew down a mobile radionuclide collection system to South Korea within three days after North Korea's nuclear test. It immediately captured some quantities of Xenon. The FOI claims that the samples, in combination with meteorological data, points towards a high level of probability that the Xenon originated from the area of the North Korean test. Someone I trust has seen the data. He says that it is a good capture. The DPRK test vented quite a bit in other words, which fits perfectly with what I heard a couple of months ago, that the seismic signature "looked odd" and that it looked like the cavity created by the test had collapsed. The person I talked to also said that the Swedes were so confident that the DPRK would test that they wanted to fly out the gear several days in advance of the actual test.