You stuck in the great wall of China?

This site claims it will check whether your site is censored in China. I don't know how accurate it is, but it looks great. So I ran a few tests this morning and got these results. It looks like the great firewall has a problem with our friend the Wonk, and the US State Department...

Allowed:
BASIC, CTBTO, IAEA, SIPRI, UK Foreign Office, VERTIC

Blocked:
Arms Control Wonk & US State Department.

Verifying a ban on ASAT testing?

The 11 January 2007 Chinese anti-satellite weapon test is producing ripple effects in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Switzerland. Why shouldn’t it? Lyndon Johnson once said that “control of space means control of the world”. Today, space assets are critically important, not only for modern warfare, but also for civilian communications.

Has an increased reliance on space led to the development of sturdy regulation of its uses? Not really. At the moment, international law prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons (or any other kind of WMD) in orbit. Everything else is fair game: especially reconnaissance, early warning or communications satellites. More states are either placing or planning to place such “passive military” satellites in orbit. For instance, the Japanese recently launched two spy satellites from its launch site on Tanegashima Island. More states are probably looking into the option.

Two weeks ago, US Ambassador Christina Rocca remarked that it is lawful to attack assets in space from the ground. It is easy to agree with her that it is regrettable that China calls for a treaty preventing an arms race in outer space, while at the same time leaving the door open for the deployment of ground based interceptors. However, why should future consideration of the issue be ruled out only because “years of discussions in this area have failed”?

The US and the Soviet Union held talks in 1978-79 on how to solve the problem with ground based ASATs. As Rocca points out “they failed for a number of reasons, including the determination that effectively verifying compliance was unattainable due to definitional problems and the difficulty of determining what constitutes an ASAT”. These problems have also been highlighted by others, such as Regina Hagen and Jurgen Scheffran.

Okay. It is easy to buy that argument when it comes to a ban on the deployment of ground-based ASATs. But why should that automatically disqualify a ban on the testing of this type of weaponry? As Goldblat has pointed out, a ban on the testing of these weapons could cause some uncertainty “as to whether and how they would perform”. It would be easy to verify whether a state has tested a kinetic kill vehicle in the physical world (it would be near impossible, of course, to verify a ban on computer simulations and the like).

NB: The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs have produced a compilation of relevant documents for those interested in the legal fine print relating to the use of outer space.

Iran and remote monitoring

In June 2006, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported, “the enrichment process and product at PFEP, including the feed and withdrawal stations, are covered by Agency containment and surveillance measures”. No details were given, but it is likely that the Agency referred to the installation of cameras, set up to monitor movements of materials or handling of equipment.

The cameras used by the Agency are not your typical Kodak. They are bulkier and uglier, but they are also robust, tamper proof, able to authenticate that its pictures are genuine, and able to withstand hostile environments. They are able to take pictures at fixed intervals, randomly or if something unusual happen before its lens. However, the camera needs to be hooked up to an encrypted communications line if the images are to be transferred off-site. Otherwise, an inspector has to connect to the camera and download the pictures when he visits the site (all of this is described in more detail in the Agency’s safeguards glossary and the Agency’s book on safeguards techniques and equipment).

Iran and the Agency have agreed that cameras should be installed at the enrichment plants. However, Iran is not willing to allow data to be transmitted off these sites. Since 2006, the Agency has insisted that Iran agrees to remote monitoring, since “measures normally used for verification at operational enrichment facilities (e.g. limited frequency unannounced access) are not feasible at the PFEP”. This inspection type gives the inspector access to the cascade hall to conduct visual observation and to take samples. The Agency reports don’t elaborate on why LUFA's are unfeasible. Nuclear operators sometimes don’t want inspectors to snoop around in the cascade hall. They may, for example, want to safeguard their technology against industrial espionage. For example, do you remember Resende? However, that is related to the desirability of LUFA’s … not their feasibility.

Recently, Iran has sulkily asked the Agency to provide them with some examples of where other states have been asked to do the same. The IAEA only needed a week or so to formulate its response. The details of the reply are confidential but one can guess the letter’s contents. Remote monitoring is becoming standard safeguards practice. One will find this simply by flipping thorough the latest Safeguards Implementation Report. By the end of 2005, almost one third of the Agency’s 962 surveillance cameras were capable of transmitting its images off-site. Indeed, the Agency had installed 84 remote surveillance systems (302 cameras) in 15 states (and in Taiwan).

Why is the Islamic Republic so hesitant to allow images to be sent to Vienna? Beats me. However, at the moment, Iran and the Agency have applied a ‘quick fix’. Agency inspectors will be allowed frequent access to the cascade hall until Iran has assembled 500 centrifuges at the FEP. Once it’s done so, the IAEA expects Iran to turn on the feed.

IAEA report on Iran

The latest report is available here and is given to us by the good people at the New York Times. I was wondering how many hours it would take before someone leaked the report, given that the Agency, this time around, even released a statement saying that they could not release the report to the public. The floodgates held longer than I thought.

North Korea's Esfahan

On 20 February 2007, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) published a paper on the North Korean plutonium stock. According to this paper, North Korea has separated between 46 and 64 kilograms of weapons-usable plutonium, which is enough for six to 13 nuclear weapons. While the focus of the paper is on the plutonium stock, there is also a short but intriguing reference to North Korea’s fuel manufacturing plant (FMP).

Apparently, the country has no natural uranium fuel left. Therefore, North Korea would need to refurbish and restart the FMP if it intends to reload and power up its five-megawatt-electric reactor.

The facility is located within the Yongbyon Nuclear Centre and covers an area approximately 350 by 600 meters. The plant comprises more than a dozen buildings of various sizes and configurations. It has been shut down since 1994, but appears to have undergone significant renovation. Mr. Ri Hong Sop, the director of the Yongbyon Nuclear Centre, told ISIS staff that fresh fuel production would start soon if there were ‘no additional hindrance’. The director must have felt quite excited (if North Korean’s get excited) when Marshal Kim ordered the plant renovation. The poor man will probably be dismayed, but it’s a fair bet that Olli Heinonen and his IAEA team, in addition to the other facilities in the area, have set their sights on the fuel manufacturing plant. For Mr. Ri, the recent six-party-agreement must seem like a major hindrance as well as a significant nuisance.

The Agency is supposed to conduct all necessary monitoring and verification as agreed between the DPRK and the Agency. Three major questions are likely to be up for discussion. First, what is meant with the term ‘Yongbyon nuclear facility’ (as opposed to the ‘Yongbyon nuclear centre’)? Second, what monitoring and verification is necessary in order to confirm that the area has been shut down and sealed? Third, what monitoring and verification is necessary to confirm that the area thereafter continues to be shut down and sealed?

The FMP is a critically important facility to shut down and seal. No more fuel, no more use of the reactor. Moreover, this facility seems to house all production lines necessary to produce uranium hexafluoride gas. Who knows, if the North Korean's have managed to set up a uranium enrichment plant somewhere, maybe they intended Yongbyon to supply it with the UF6?

One can assume that the Agency will insist on an on-site presence during the sealing up of the area. But what about thereafter? Will some poor Agency inspector be permanently based on the North Korean countryside (as they used to be), or will another verification solution be deployed? This paper, by Mr. Duk-Ho Moon, suggests the use of remote monitoring amongst other things. Since it is unlikely (but not impossible) that the Agency will resume full-scale investigations within the next couple of months, why not? The list on page 34 is interesting, and it would be great to see the deployment of technologies such as unattended ground sensors around the perimeter fence.

By the way, this story, by Siegfried Hecker, makes for delightful reading.

Iran continues to prep Natanz

Last week, Iran moved one container of uranium hexafluoride gas from its uranium conversion facility located in Esfahan to its uranium enrichment facility located in Natanz. The container is holding approximately 9,000 kilogram gas.

In theory, nine tonnes of hexafluoride gas could produce up to 45 kilogram of 94 per cent enriched uranium metal. However, this would require that an infinite amount of separative work is invested into the product. In order to produce approximately one significant quantity of the metal, the amount of uranium-235 in the waste stream cannot exceed 0.35 per cent. However, at such a configuration, the Iranians would need to invest approximately 4,438 separative work units into the product and, at current enrichment capacity, it would take them at least 6 years and 9 months to process the nine tonnes and get enough enriched product for one weapon (and that’s assuming that the plant is working at optimum effectiveness). It is more likely that it would take twice as long.

One way to reduce the amount of time necessary to get to that weapon is, naturally, to install more capacity at the enrichment plant. This is something Iran has announced that they will do. Mr. Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, has reportedly said that his organization is capable of installing one cascade (or 164 centrifuges) per week. Given the AEOI’s past achievements, this figure seems quite inflated, but if the organization manages to keep it, Iran could have some 3,000 centrifuges installed by June 2007.

In the meanwhile, Mr. Ali Larijani, the secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council seem to believe that the European Union is willing to negotiate on the basis that Iran is allowed to enrich uranium up to civilian grade. Mr. Larijani is meeting with Mohamed ElBaradei, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, today.

Mr. ElBaradei recently argued that Iran now have learned so much from its pilot programme that it would be impossible to turn the clock back. In his view, ‘there's a big difference between acquiring the knowledge for enrichment and developing a bomb’. While this is true, most experts would probably say that once a state has aquired that knowledge, making the bomb is easy. Agency safeguards, while perfectly capable of detecting a diversion of materials from a plant, cannot stop a state from proliferating. Safeguards are a burglar alarm, not a lock. As long as Iran’s intention with its nuclear programme remains murky, it would seem unwise to allow the country to produce the stuff that makes nukes.

Agency return to the DPRK?

On 13 February 2007, North Korea agreed to 'shut down and seal' the Yongbyon nuclear facility, and to invite the Agency to verify the shutdown. For verification, the relevant paragraph reads as follows.

"The DPRK will shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment the Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the reprocessing facility and invite back IAEA personnel to conduct all necessary monitoring and verifications as agreed between IAEA and the DPRK."

This statement is interesting. First, it does not seem to give the Agency automatic right to resume its investigations into the extent of North Korea's nuclear programme. North Korea is simply required to "shut down" and "seal" the facility. Presumably, the Agency is to verify that North Korea has performed these two steps. This would require some sort of permanent Agency presence at the facility. North Korea is not required to decommission the facility, and the words "for the purpose of eventual abandonment" clearly leaves room for the DPRK to argue, at a later stage, that a decommissioning of the area was not part of the original deal.

The words "all necessary" monitoring and verification also indicates that we are probably talking about some sort of minimum agency verification at this stage. Admittedly, it could also mean all-inclusive verification, but given the fragile relationship between the Agency and the DPRK, this is not very likely.

IAEA Deputy Director General Olli Heinonen is reportedly due to travel to North Korea within the next two weeks. It will be very interesting to hear what was discussed and agreed during that trip.

Chris Charlier moves on

It should come as no surprise that Iran has asked the Agency to remove Chris Charlier from the roster of inspectors authorized to visit Iran. The outspoken Belgian, who in 2005 featured in an excellent PBS/Frontline documentary on Iran's nuclear programme, has been transferred to another section within the IAEA. While the United States have called Iran's action 'outrageous' and have accused Iran of 'inspector shopping' (whatever that is), Iran has responded by accusing Mr. Charlier of leaking inspection sensitive information to states hostile to Iran. Iran's suspicions are probably pretty well founded, since Charlier did not hold back an inch in the documentary. If his that outspoken on the record, imagine what he'll be off the record...

IAEA C&S in Iran

The International Atomic Energy Agency continues to install containment and surveillance at Iran's nuclear facilities. On 2 February 2007, there was a report about the installation of two cameras at the Uranium Conversion Facility in Esfahan. Then, on 10 February 2007, reports surfaced that all cameras had been installed at the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz.

Agency cameras are installed to monitor the movement of nuclear material and to detect any interference with containment or tampering with IAEA safeguards devices, samples and data. Consequently, the camera is installed so that its field of view covers the entire area of safeguards interest, so that the movement of safeguarded items is captured.

Iran reduces the Wests lead-time

David Sanger and William Broad reports that Iran already have set up 328 centrifuges at its underground facility in Natanz. The country is trying to execute plans to install 3,000 centrifuges at the facility as early as possible. In the article, Mark Fitzpatrick from the International Institute for Strategic Studies argues that the Iranians would need this year to install and test the machines, and another year to let them run, if they want to produce enough material for one weapon. His assessment seems to be seconded by the good people over at Arms Control Wonk.

The country will not be able to produce weapons grade material at the site without it being picked up by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The problem here is not detectability. The problem is lead-time. With its current configuration of 328 machines, it would take them approximately 6.82 years to produce enough material for one weapon. The Agency would detect the reconfiguration from civilian to military production within a month or so, giving the international community ample of time to react. However, if the Iranians were to install another 984 centrifuges, the production time would decrease to 1.71 years. With 2,952 centrifuges installed, Iran would need 0.76 years (or 9 months) to produce enough material for one uranium bomb.

There is still ample of time to come to an agreement with Iran, and too seek an arrangement that alleviates the concerns of the international community, while at the same time guarantees Iran's right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, this time gets shorter and shorter for every centrifuge that Iran hooks up to its cascades.

NB: I assumed a feed assay of 0.71 per cent uranium-235, a tails assay of 0.4 per cent, and 94 per cent enriched product. Moreover, I assumed that the Iranian centrifuges are capable of 2 SWU/year.

To see or not to see

There are conflicting reports coming out from Iran regarding whether they plan to install the 3,000 centrifuges at its uranium enrichment facility at Natanz. My bet is that they eventually will press ahead with construction, which would be very unwise.

Despite the belligerent attitude, it is a good development that Iran finally decided to allow the Agency to install containment and surveillance at the site. I seem to remember that this is something the Agency has wanted Iran to do for quite some time. Of course, according to Ali Larijani the installation is to be governed by the 'rules and regulations of the NPT and safeguards regime'. In other words, do not expect to get icing on the cake.

Containment and surveillance equipment is installed by the Agency to supplement its material accountancy work. To put it the cameras are installed there to make sure that no material enters or exits the facility without being accounted for. The devices are not placed wherever the Agency feels like placing them, but rather at certain 'strategic points' throughout the facility. By installing cameras, the agency hopes to achieve better utilization of equipment, better planning of inspections and a reduction in the inspection effort needed to meet verification requirements.

In any case, to have cameras installed at the site is better than not having them at all.

Nuclear celebrations soon underway?

According to the Agence-France Press, Iran has started work to assemble centrifuges at its underground uranium enrichment facility at Natanz. Progress seems to be quite modest, shipments of centrifuge parts started to arrive last week. It is not clear how many centrifuges the Islamic Republic intends to build at its underground site. However, rumour has it that the country will assemble 3,000 centrifuges at the site, and this figure is repeated in the AFP article.

Likewise, there is no reliable information on how many centrifuge rotors Iran has assembled. According to unnamed IAEA sources, the country has parts for about 5,000 centrifuges. It is not known how many centrifuges have been assembled from these parts. According to a report by the International Atomic Energy Agency, it had assembled 1,274 rotors by 10 October 2004. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein reports that a large number of these centrifuges, perhaps half of them, are not expected to pass quality control. The total amount of workable centrifuges may therefore be significantly lower. The same report stipulates that Iran's assembly rate is somewhere between 70 and 100 centrifuges per month. If one assumes that they've continued to assemble centrifuges at that rate, Iran would be in possession of between 3,234 and 4,074 centrifuges by 10 February 2007.

Centrifuging uranium is a complicated industrial process, and Iran would need to install control and emergency equipment, feed and withdrawal systems, and other systems and controls at the site. The production line would then need to be tested by introducing vacuum in the centrifuges. It is not very likely that this process is finished by the end of 2007.

The international community's reaction time for an eventual Iranian withdrawal from the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and Agency safeguards, will be significantly shorter if Iran manages to bring 3,000 centrifuges on stream. From the day it successfully reconfigures its facility from peaceful to military production, it would just take the country six months to produce enough enriched uranium for one weapon. IAEA safeguards will, however, be capable of detecting the reconfiguration. Given the relatively small size of the facility, it would not be difficult to detect a diversion of low-enriched uranium from the facility.

Expect to hear more about this soon, since Iran has announced that they will hold a 'nuclear success celebration' in the coming weeks.