North Korea's Esfahan

On 20 February 2007, the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) published a paper on the North Korean plutonium stock. According to this paper, North Korea has separated between 46 and 64 kilograms of weapons-usable plutonium, which is enough for six to 13 nuclear weapons. While the focus of the paper is on the plutonium stock, there is also a short but intriguing reference to North Korea’s fuel manufacturing plant (FMP).

Apparently, the country has no natural uranium fuel left. Therefore, North Korea would need to refurbish and restart the FMP if it intends to reload and power up its five-megawatt-electric reactor.

The facility is located within the Yongbyon Nuclear Centre and covers an area approximately 350 by 600 meters. The plant comprises more than a dozen buildings of various sizes and configurations. It has been shut down since 1994, but appears to have undergone significant renovation. Mr. Ri Hong Sop, the director of the Yongbyon Nuclear Centre, told ISIS staff that fresh fuel production would start soon if there were ‘no additional hindrance’. The director must have felt quite excited (if North Korean’s get excited) when Marshal Kim ordered the plant renovation. The poor man will probably be dismayed, but it’s a fair bet that Olli Heinonen and his IAEA team, in addition to the other facilities in the area, have set their sights on the fuel manufacturing plant. For Mr. Ri, the recent six-party-agreement must seem like a major hindrance as well as a significant nuisance.

The Agency is supposed to conduct all necessary monitoring and verification as agreed between the DPRK and the Agency. Three major questions are likely to be up for discussion. First, what is meant with the term ‘Yongbyon nuclear facility’ (as opposed to the ‘Yongbyon nuclear centre’)? Second, what monitoring and verification is necessary in order to confirm that the area has been shut down and sealed? Third, what monitoring and verification is necessary to confirm that the area thereafter continues to be shut down and sealed?

The FMP is a critically important facility to shut down and seal. No more fuel, no more use of the reactor. Moreover, this facility seems to house all production lines necessary to produce uranium hexafluoride gas. Who knows, if the North Korean's have managed to set up a uranium enrichment plant somewhere, maybe they intended Yongbyon to supply it with the UF6?

One can assume that the Agency will insist on an on-site presence during the sealing up of the area. But what about thereafter? Will some poor Agency inspector be permanently based on the North Korean countryside (as they used to be), or will another verification solution be deployed? This paper, by Mr. Duk-Ho Moon, suggests the use of remote monitoring amongst other things. Since it is unlikely (but not impossible) that the Agency will resume full-scale investigations within the next couple of months, why not? The list on page 34 is interesting, and it would be great to see the deployment of technologies such as unattended ground sensors around the perimeter fence.

By the way, this story, by Siegfried Hecker, makes for delightful reading.